


The Stuarts and Corsica

- International edition -



D. Ramelet Stuart

2024

The Stuarts and Corsica
International Edition
(*Ebook version*)

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Tribute to :

My Grandfather Dumenicu Stuart (1914-2005)

My Mother Louise Stuart (1948-2007)

My Cousin Jacques Stuart (1946-2013)

My Cousin Jacques Stuart (1929-2018)

My Cousin Henri Stuart (1930-2019)

Special Thanks to Miss Abigail Yardley

Preface

It is a pleasure to write a preface for M. Ramelet Stuart's book. The link between the Stuarts and Corsica has long been evident to me. In *Poetry and Jacobite Politics in Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland*, first published in 1994, I noted that the association between Jacobitism and Corsican nationalism dated back to the 1730s, while in James Boswell (2007), I noted the alignment of the Corsican and Catholic causes in Lady Traquair's correspondence with Boswell, the Corsican material in Jacobite Secretary Andrew Lumisden's library and the likelihood of Boswell's mission to Corsica being a little more than simply Romantic adventure. In 2012, looking at the career of Theodore von Neuhoff, Gaspar came to a similar conclusion as to the relationship between Corsica and Jacobitism: not only was the plan to make Charles Edward king of the island something not born from Boswell's boasting, but the very suggestion had been made to Boswell's Grant Tour guide and cicerone, the Earl Marischal, thirty years earlier. Moreover, von Neuhoff himself, 'King of Corsica' in the later 1730s, was intimately bound up with the Jacobite cause, being the husband of Catalina Sarsfield, a friend of John Law, and an associate of Cardinal Alberoni-as well as-as Thierry Giappiconi has claimed- an officer attached to King James during the 'Fifteen.

Didier Ramelet Stuart has extended this increasingly intriguing use of Corsica as a political contestation point in Mediterranean affairs considerably further in this intriguing book. He notes the longstanding presence of the Earl Marischal in Corsica from at least 1729 and Rousseau's interest in the island as linked to his acquaintance with the exiled Jacobite commander, who corresponded with the Swiss philosophe on the island's constitution as late as 1766. M. Ramelet Stuart also explores the role of Freemasonry with commendable seriousness, for example in examining the role of Irish Jacobite lodges in Neapolitan regiments, and points out the link between the Jacobite admiral George Cammock's squadron and the island, as well as the extensive use of Irish and Scottish regiments in the Spanish service as well as imperial Austrian/Holy Roman Empire Jacobite commanders such as Francis Patrick O'Neill. He notes the prevalence of Jacobite officers in attempts to secure Corsica: John MacDonald who trained Theodore's troops; Ulysses Browne, Henry Lloyd (later an officer in the 'Forty-five and a pioneer of light infantry doctrine), a slew of junior officers from the Limerick Regiment in the Spanish service and the intriguingly named Captain John Dick. John Dick, cousin to Lumisden and the Jacobite sleeper Alexander Dick of Prestonfield, was the British Consul at Livorno who secured Boswell's passage to Corsica, while the Jacobite Earl of Dunbar, who met Boswell several times, had been involved in the 1734 plan to free the island.

These links continued. In March 1739, the French staff officer John Sullivan, Adjutant-General in the Rising of 1745, landed on Corsica. Cardinal Tencin suggested afresh that Prince Charles should have the island as a potential wedding settlement, and Charles was reported on Corsica as late as November 1753, and rumoured of in connexion with the island into the 1770s. In 1755, Pasquale Paoli-the son of Theodore's regent, and a former officer in a Neapolitan regiment whose commander's wife was an Irish Jacobite exile- became General in Chief of the Corsican nation. As early as the 1760s, it was suggested to Paoli that Ossianic material from James Macpherson's epic should be integrated into Corsican national songs and there were calls for Scots volunteers to fight for Corsican independence. These did not arrive, but 30 guns, 2917 roundshot, 5020 grapeshot and 38 casks of powder from the Carron ironworks and elsewhere apparently did, thanks to James Boswell's subscription for Corsican arms, transferred-as M. Ramelet Stuart argues-by Perth Freemasons of St Michael's Lodge, principally ex-Jacobite officers, who arranged the money transfer through Drummond's Bank, Andrew Drummond being the nephew of Major-General William Drummond, 4th Viscount Strathallan, who died leading the Perthshire Horse in a heroic attempt to slow the British advance at Culloden. By 1769, Boswell had raised £20 000 (€3.5M in 2024 money), and some of his guns may have been used at Ponte Novu in May that year, when the Comte de Vaux finally defeated the army of the Corsican Republic. The previous year, Henry Lloyd (commissioned in the French army at Fontenoy, captain in the 'Forty-five and a French major before entering the Prussian service and serving as an Austrian colonel and major-general under the Jacobite exile Field Marshal Franz von Lacy, supreme commander of the Imperial forces) organized supplies for the defence of Paoli's fledgling republic. The connexions run deep and M. Ramelet Stuart has brought so many of them to light.

Professor Murray Pittock MAE FRSE,
Bradley Professor at the University of Glasgow.

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Introduction

The writings of the history of Corsica mention nothing of the life of the last Stuart pretenders. Aside from a few rare exceptions, no association is made between James Stuart III and his two sons, Princes Charles Edward and Henry Benedict and the island's history in any of the many disciplinary fields. The same applies to the tens of thousands of Irish, Scottish and English exiles who supported the Stuart royal family in their exile following 1688, all practically absent from Corsican history books.

However the work of historian Michel Vergé Franceschi, published in the 2000s, sheds light on the Jacobite networks and their extensive links with Corsica. This connection has never been tackled exhaustively, nor from an international point of view, although literary and historical works about the last Stuart pretenders and their numerous supporters provide elements that deserve to be rigorously examined.

The simple presence of a Stuart family in Corsica from the end of the 18th century (1766-1774) isn't enough to prove the family's ties with the Royal Family. To understand how and why Corsicans came to know the supporters of the Stuarts, the Jacobites, we need to go back to the genesis of the Jacobite movement and explore their diplomatic actions in detail. From there on, the connection with Corsica and the Corsicans may become more evident.

Often, physical proximity on the ground, directed by historical circumstances, is the starting point for the building of a lasting relationship. Indeed, this was the case for Corsican and Jacobite soldiers in the service of Spain. This particular history will be revisited with reports of several feats of arms little known to the public, discovered only recently thanks to first-rate archives in Italy, Spain, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom.

This will give us a much better understanding of how central Jacobite figures could suddenly develop an interest in Corsica. In this context, we will analyse the crucial role of George Keith, 8th Earl Marischal, in developing links between the royal House of Stuart and Corsica.

We will also be able to see to what extent the Stuart pretenders may themselves have been in direct contact with the Corsicans and adhered at times to the idea of political retirement in Corsica. We will look at the part that various historical figures played in this project, directly or indirectly. And of course, the relationship between Jacobites and Pasquale de Paoli will also be studied.

Finally, in the period between the French invasion of Corsica and the end of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, we will look at the continued work of the Jacobite networks that maintained political proximity with Corsica and the Paolists in particular. It is by the meandering of these networks that the last of the Stuart line would come to fade away in Corsica.

This book aims to give the reader a way of ascertaining the scope and influence of the Jacobite networks in Corsica, and to give the Stuart royal family the place that they deserve in this country's history.

Desideriu Ramelet Stuart

PART I - Jacobite diplomacy in Europe and the Mediterranean

The Jacobite movement that emerged in support of the Stuart dynasty has a complex structure closely linked to the history of political factions in the British Isles. Stereotypes must be left behind in order to properly interpret the various historical and diplomatic events in which they were involved:

Not all Jacobites emerged in 1689. Indeed, many clan leaders considered that with Mary II Stuart ruling in the same capacity as her German-born husband, this was more of a temporary period than the end of the Royal House of Stuart, and such was the case for the Scottish nobility. Some became involved later while others, on the contrary, distanced themselves from the actions of the Stuart rulers from their various places of exile.

Although Irish Catholics formed the majority of the Jacobite diaspora, there were also many Scots and English citizens, including Protestants.¹ Indeed, the Scottish highlanders' clan mentality as regards the 'Chieftan' provides one explanation for the support for the Head of State arbitrarily deposed by force.

Another exaggeration would be to claim that all senior Jacobite soldiers joined the Freemasons movement in St-Germain en Laye from the end of the 17th century, something difficult to quantify due to the modus operandi of the traveling Masonic lodges at that time.²

While all Jacobites supported the exiled Stuart monarchs, whom they saw as victims of a foreign coup, they might also have had other short-term motives.

Last but not least, the political machinery installed by the British state and stemming from the institutions founded by William III of Orange made use of individuals with a particular profile. They were state servants loyal to the King, but who had remained close to the exiled Stuart pretenders for one reason or another.

With the various diplomatic crises in Europe, it was important for London to maintain distant links with the Jacobite opponent, and British patriotism, or working 'for the country's best interests' could be the winning force in such political duality.

1 /n CLARKE DE DROMANTIN P. (2005) - Les réfugiés jacobites dans la France du XVIIIe siècle: l'exode de toute une noblesse "pour cause de religion", Bordeaux, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2005, p 31.

2 /n BEAUREPAIRE P. Y. (2002) - L'Europe des francs-maçons (XVIIIe-XXIe siècles), Paris, Belin, collection Europe et Histoire, p 27.

Loyalty to their host countries may have generated major internal contradictions among the Jacobites. When the first Duke of Berwick, Marshal of France, attacked Spain in 1719, he directly jeopardised the chances of James Stuart III, his half-brother and an ally of Madrid, of being restored to the throne. People at the time pointed out the paradox of this personal position. To which he replied, "*I have no human feelings.*" His own son, the Duke of Liria, commanding a Spanish regiment, asked him if "*he should fight his own father*", to which Berwick told him, "*you must serve the King of Spain and be prepared to fight any enemy that comes on the battlefield.*"³ Duty and loyalty came before family.

We have here an overview of the different factors contributing to the complex nature of Jacobitism. As such, it is clear that any Jacobite action relating to Corsica must be viewed within the specific prism of the period concerned and the individuals involved.

In SHIELD A., LANG A. (1907) - *The King over the water*, London, Longmans Green & Co, p 133.

The war of the Spanish Succession and the Jacobite rising of 1715

On September 20th and 21st 1697, the Treaties of Ryswick ended the war between the League of Ausburg and Louis XIV. This peace had two negative consequences for the Jacobites: Louis XIV agreed to officially recognize William III of Orange as the legitimate sovereign of England, and many Irish soldiers in the service of France were demobilized and deprived of employment in a host country where the economic situation was very poor.

One of the disbanded Irish regiments was the Dublin Regiment, where the former Governor of Belfast Colonel Edward de Warren served. He went on to serve Leopold I of Lorraine,⁴ and his son Edward later became director of fortifications and artillery for the Grand Duke of Tuscany. He was present in Portoferraio from 1753 to 1756 to oversee improvements to the town's fortifications.⁵

The year 1701 changed the political landscape for the Jacobites. On November 1st 1700, Charles II of Spain died, having named Philip of Anjou, Louis XIV's grandson, his successor. While this succession satisfied the interests of the Kingdom of Leon and Castille, it clashed head-on with the rights of succession of the Crown of Aragon, a centuries-old ally of the Holy Roman German Empire. By choosing to support his grandson, Louis XIV provoked the War of the Spanish Succession, which set Europe ablaze in February 1701.

On June 12th 1701, William III of Orange had the English Parliament pass the Act of Settlement, a decree which laid down in law that the succession to the crown was to remain in a Protestant line and that it would go to the descendants of the German Electress Sophia of Hanover, granddaughter of James I Stuart.

On September 7th, England declared its support for the Imperial cause. In retaliation, on the death of James II Stuart on 16 September 1701, Louis XIV recognized his son James III as King of England, Scotland, and Ireland. Diplomatic relations with England were cut off and Jacobite troops returned to service. Amongst them was James FitzJames 1st Duke of Berwick, half-brother of James III Stuart, who distinguished himself in battle throughout the War of the Spanish Succession, particularly in Catalonia.

In England, William III of Orange died on March 8th 1702, to be succeeded by his sister-in-law, Anne I Stuart. On May 15th 1702, England, the United Provinces, and Austria officially declared war on France and the new King of Spain.

4 In CLARKE DE DROMANTIN P. (2005) - Les réfugiés jacobites dans la France du XVIIIe siècle: l'exode de toute une noblesse "pour cause de religion", Bordeaux, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, p 391.

5 In FARA A. (1997) - Portoferraio : Architettura e Urbanistica 1548-1877, Torino, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, p 39.

The prospect of depending on rulers from the House of Hanover was very unpopular with the Scots, whom London had not consulted on the matter. On May 6th 1703, the Scottish Parliament put to the vote the Act for the Security of the Kingdom, which provided that on the death of Queen Anne, Scotland could settle succession on a different monarch from England. In 1704, at a time when London was exerting very heavy fiscal pressure on Scottish trade to finance participation in the War of the Spanish Succession, this Act was promulgated. Unable to allow the union of the two crowns established in 1603 to come to an end, Queen Anne, very irritated by this situation, negotiated with the Scots on tax and trade issues in particular. The safest and quickest solution was to absorb the Scottish Parliament to counter any hint of independence.⁶

Under the Treaty of Union of 22 July 1706, the two kingdoms merged, and on 1st May 1707, the Scottish and English Parliaments merged into the Parliament of Great Britain, based in London at the Palace of Westminster. Many Scots joined in the political resistance against the threat to their independence.⁷

The emergence of this new power was detrimental to French interests, so in 1708, Louis XIV provided the young James III Stuart, then aged 20, with a fleet of 6,000 men to raid Scotland. It was a failure, however, as the Royal Navy dispersed the fleet, and the Jacobites could not contemplate a military coup in Great Britain for several years. From then on, and for over half a century, the French Crown used the Jacobites as a diplomatic tool when dealing with Great Britain.

Exhausted by 11 years of war, the European powers fighting in the War of the Spanish Succession put an end to the conflict by signing the Treaties of Utrecht in 1713. The treaty signed between France and Great Britain on April 11th 1713 recognized Queen Anne and her successors as legitimate sovereigns, in exchange for acknowledging Philip V of Spain as the rightful ruler of Spain. Under British pressure, France expelled James III Stuart, who found refuge in Lunéville with the Duke of Lorraine, Leopold 1st.⁸

The last battle of the War of the Spanish Succession pitted Catalonia, loyal to Austria, against the Spanish and French sovereigns Philip V and Louis XIV, whose armies laid siege to Barcelona.

6 *In* MILLER J. (2006) - *The Stuarts*, London, Hambledon Continuum, p 230.

7 *In* DESCHAMPS Y. (2012) – Résistances écossaises à l'union de 1707 : essai historiographique *In* Dix-huitième siècle - Numéro 44, Paris, Société Française d'Étude du Dix-Huitième siècle / La découverte, p 608.

8 *In* Historical Manuscripts Commission (1902) - *Calendar of the Stuart papers* - Vol. I, Windsor Castle, H. M. Stationery Office, p 262.

After 11 months of siege, Barcelona capitulated on 11 September 1714. James FitzJames 1st Duke of Berwick, who had entered into Spanish service in 1711, played a major part in this victory. The following year, his son, James Francis FitzJames, Duke of Liria, was appointed Colonel of the Irish Regiment of Limerick, an important factor in what was to come.

Philip V of Spain now reigned over a kingdom that was undivided, but that had become a secondary power. Spain had ceded all of its European territories and Gibraltar and Menorca had become British territories. This situation strengthened the ties between Madrid and the Jacobites, especially as many Irish troops fighting for France remained in Spain at the end of the war, in addition to the five Irish infantry regiments already in Spain (including the Limerick regiment).

On August 1st 1714, Queen Anne of England died, leaving no natural heir. Under the 1701 Act of Succession, the throne passed to her closest Protestant cousin George, son of the late Electress Sophie of Hanover. James III Stuart rushed to Versailles to assert his rights but was ordered to return immediately to Lorraine. The Jacobites could no longer hope for any official support from France.

George I of Hanover was crowned King of Great Britain and Ireland on 20 October 1714. On the advice of the Whigs, he removed many English and Scottish Tories from government posts. Supported by the King, the Whigs then won the 1715 general election. To make things worse for the Scottish, Scotland's economy was deteriorating, contrary to what had been promised by the Union.⁹ Within this context, the Jacobite movement found renewed sympathy in Great Britain.

James FitzJames, 1st Duke of Berwick, played a central role in secret correspondence with opponents of George I, as well as in maintaining the presence of Irish regiments within the French army.¹⁰ Such were his preparations for a new military campaign in Scotland, where discontent was such that the time was right.

With Louis XIV at death's door, the Earl of Mar left London for Scotland, where he gathered together a Jacobite war council. On September 6th 1715, at Braemar, he raised the royal standard of James VIII of Scotland and III of England.

9 *In* SZECHI D. (2006) - 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion, London, Yale University Press, p 12.

10 *Ibid*, p 46.

The response of George I was immediate: by royal decree, he transferred ownership of English lands belonging to known Jacobites to the tenant farmers of said lands; he sent the army to occupy pro-Stuart towns; had many Jacobites arrested; and handed over command of all Scottish-based troops to the Duke of Argyll. From September 20th, proclamations accusing prominent Jacobites of high treason were published in the London press.¹¹ First to be arrested was William Wyndham, leader of the English Jacobite party, who was imprisoned on October 2nd.

In Scotland, a Jacobite army of 20,000 men won many battles without gaining a decisive advantage, due to the repeated tactical errors of their commander John Erskine, Earl of Mar (Jacobite Duke of Mar). The mass uprising was furthered by the pledge of the Scottish clergy to support James VIII of Scotland.¹² The English uprising was smothered in the first half of October, but the turning point in the war came between November 12th and 14th. The Jacobite forces lost the battles of Sheriffmuir, Preston and Inverness simultaneously. The victory of the Hanoverian troops was sealed at the battle of Sheriffmuir.

On December 22nd 1715, James Stuart III left Lorraine and landed in Scotland at Peterhead before joining the Jacobite army in Perth on January 9th 1716. The next day, King James issued a proclamation urging his subjects to take up arms and join him in Perth.¹³ The Jacobite army only managed to muster 5,000 men, while the Hanoverian troops were being reinforced with powerful artillery. The Jacobite troops had to evacuate Perth on January 30th and on February 4th, James Stuart III was forced to leave Scotland.

Fighting continued in Scotland until April. Hanoverian repression was severe, with many prisoners being condemned to death and a major part exiled to the North American colonies. Equally important was the number of Lords and Peers of Great Britain hit with the Attainder Acts, laws decreeing the forfeit of their lands and title as punishment for their involvement with the Jacobites (laws still currently in force!). Amongst them were Englishmen such as James Radclyffe, 3rd Earl of Derwentwater and William Widdrington, 4th Baron Widdrington.

¹¹ In The London Gazette, Numéro 5366, 20 septembre 1715, p 1.

¹² In LANG A. (2012) - The History Of Scotland - Volume 12 : From Jacobite Leaders To The End Of Jacobitism, Altenmünster, Jazybee Verlag, p 4.

¹³ In Historical Manuscripts Commission (1902) - Calendar of the Stuart papers - Vol. I, Windsor Castle, H. M. Stationery Office, p 486.

Greater still was the number of Scottish Jacobite Lords forced into exile, including the Scot Lord John Eskirne, Earl of Mar. A whole new generation of Jacobite supporters joined the Stuart Pretender in his European exile. In this reinforced diaspora, the political aims pursued by the English, Scottish and Irish Jacobites could be very different, even divergent.¹⁴

Among the ranks of these new Jacobites were members of Clan Keith, of whom the two most high-ranking members had won renown in battle.¹⁵ These were George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, and his brother James Francis Edward Keith. George Keith bore a hereditary title of the old Scottish nobility, the title of Earl Marischal, Lord Protector of Scotland. He later played a key role in the attempts to restore the House of Stuart, but he also played a key role in the issues we are concerned with in this book, as he was in one way or another involved on many occasions with the Corsicans and Corsica.

¹⁴ In SZECHI D. (2006) - 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion, London, yale University Press, p 58.

¹⁵ In National Library of Scotland - A114 f.7, Histories of Scottish families, Memoir of Marshal Keith, with a sketch of the Keith family, p 13.

The Stuart Court at the start of the 18th century: an exiled State apparatus?

Whether in Saint Germain-en-Laye, Lunéville, Avignon, Urbino, or Rome, the pretenders James II and James III Stuart were welcomed by their respective Courts as legitimate sovereigns in exile. As such, they enjoyed official status, with all the attendant protocol and etiquette. For example, at an official ceremony at Notre Dame de Paris, James II Stuart bestowed Lauzun with the title of Knight of the Garter for services rendered, the highest and noblest distinction in England since 1348.¹⁶ It is worth noting that as historian Michel Vergé-Franceschi has correctly pointed out, the grandson of this same Lauzun, the Duc de Lauzun, facilitated Pasquale de Paoli's escape from Corsica in 1769. However, it is one thing to retain the privileges and comforts of a veritable court in exile (225 pensioned servants in 1696); it is quite another to have an embryonic state apparatus and real diplomatic influence.

There were clearly two phases in constructing the Jacobite state apparatus in exile. In 1692, after the failure of the Irish War, James II Stuart was supported by a small army of mainly Irish Catholic soldiers (30,000 to 40,000 men), in addition to his first circle of loyal supporters. Although they served the sovereign of their host country, the military capacity of the armed supporters of the Stuarts was an important factor in European conflicts and, therefore in the diplomatic game. However, there were very few potential statesmen in his entourage, mainly because the Stuart courtiers, exiled in the times of Charles II Stuart, had perfectly reintegrated Scottish and English society,¹⁷ where they pursued their political and economic careers under the benevolent and calculated eye of London.

With the first wave of exiled Jacobites was Lord Edward Drummond, tutor to the young James III,¹⁸ whose family, originally from Perth in Scotland, played an important role in Corsican affairs.

Now the King's coffers during his exile in France and Lorraine were already well-stocked,¹⁹ and he had far greater financial capacity than other sovereigns who had experienced periods of temporary exile, or those of small states ruined by costly wars. Despite these assets, James II was treated with indifference by Versailles, which ordered him not to interfere in the affairs of the Kingdom of France, particularly in the drafting of peace treaties²⁰ following his failure in Ireland against William III of Orange.

¹⁶ In SHIELD A., LANG A. (1907) - *The King over the water*, London, Longmans Green & Co, p 35.

¹⁷ In CORP E. (2004) - *A Court in Exile: The Stuarts in France, 1688-1718*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press p 1.

¹⁸ In CORP E., CARPEGNA FALCONIERI T. (2013) - *I giacobiti a Urbino*, Bologna, il Mulino, p 38.

¹⁹ In CORP E. (2004) - *A Court in Exile: The Stuarts in France, 1688-1718*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 5.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p 30.

It was only after the failure of the rebellion of 1715 that James III Stuart's political, financial and diplomatic staff was considerably strengthened, particularly by the arrival of former English and Scottish counsellors and parliamentarians condemned and prosecuted by George I of Hanover.

These new arrivals included the Keith brothers we have already mentioned and James Butler, second Duke of Ormond and first Peer of Ireland. Numerous military officers of Scottish origin strengthened James III Stuart's potential in this area and above all revealed their prowess in battle on behalf of France, Spain, Prussia, and the Holy Roman Empire. London sent a request to "*drive out the rebel leader*" to Paris, who answered that he would no longer find refuge either in France or in Lorraine.²¹

Negotiations were held between Jacobite emissaries and representatives of the Kings of Spain and Sweden, asking them to receive the newly banished sovereign, but they came to nothing. James III Stuart found refuge only on Papal soil in Avignon, where all the Jacobite leaders we have mentioned followed him, in April 1716. Nevertheless, his prestige remained high and Englishmen hostile to George I of Hanover secretly offered him their services. Such was the case of the Marquis of Wharton, who wrote to James on August 21st 1716 to organise his coming to Avignon: yet another character whose path would cross that of the history of Corsica. James III Stuart asked him to keep his intentions secret and to return to England.²²

James III's choice is understandable, as George I's unpopularity in England was such that he preferred to maintain local contacts to prepare for his return, still a credible plan in 1716.

The economic power of the Jacobites exiled in France was also a source of financial support for the cause. The community of Jacobite merchant and shipowning families in Bordeaux was very large (Clarke, Lynch, Mitchell, Quin).²³ Some members of the deposed Irish nobility went into business, as in the case of Jacques Sarsfield, a shipowner in Nantes. This powerful network of Jacobite shipowners and merchants was also to be found in Spain, such as in the port city of Cadiz, where the Jacobites, who had evacuated Ireland in 1692, were very well established. Such was the case of the Clan Lee, descended from Irish nobility.²⁴ And when Tuscany came under the administration of Vienna, the same thing would happen there.

21 In SHIELD A., LANG A. (1907) - *The King over the water*, London, Longmans Green & Co, p 263.

22 In Historical Manuscripts Commission (1904) - *Calendar of the Stuart papers* - Vol. II, Windsor Castle, H. M. Stationery Office, p XIX.

23 In CLARKE DE DROMANTIN P. (2005) - *Les réfugiés jacobites dans la France du XVIIIe siècle: l'exode de toute une noblesse "pour cause de religion"*, Bordeaux, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, p 63.

24 In FERNANDEZ PEREZ P. (2000) - *Comercio y Familia en la Espana Pre-Industrial*, in VILLAR GARCIA M. B. - *La emigración irlandesa en el siglo XVIII*, Malaga, Universidad de Malaga, p 135.

It can be said that James III Stuart was able to benefit from the active support of a naval and commercial infrastructure of devoted supporters, which is far from secondary when one claims to maintain sovereign prerogatives.

Another aspect of this Jacobite community-based in European ports was that it covered the activities of James III Stuart's spies. Wine merchants such as Charles Smith in Boulogne-sur-Mer and John Brown in Livorno played a central role in the success of Jacobite intelligence.

Finally, although it cannot be called a State prerogative, it is impossible not to mention Freemasonry when talking about Jacobite networks of influence. At the beginning of the 18th century, the Irish military spread Masonry through traveling lodges as their regiments moved about.²⁵ The influence of Stuardist Freemasonry was particularly significant in the mid-18th century.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that, considering all the means at his disposal at the beginning of the 18th century, James III Stuart was not only a symbolically recognized sovereign but also a true head of state. Had circumstances been more favorable, he would have been able to re deploy a new state apparatus in Great Britain rapidly. With this aim in mind, all of his emissaries implemented specific diplomacy with the Courts who were potential allies, or with those offering unofficial support.

25 In BEAUREPAIRE P. Y. (2002) - L'Europe des francs-maçons (XVIIIe-XXIe siècles), Paris, Belin, collection Europe et Histoire, p 14.

The emergence of a Jacobite diplomatic network in Europe

Jacobite diplomacy had the strategic objective of restoring the Stuarts to the throne of Great Britain, a goal that was subject to the vagaries of alliances and conflicts in Europe. Alliances with sovereign courts are often alliances of circumstance against a common enemy but the parties involved rarely pursue the same goals. Jacobite diplomacy therefore needed to be ready for sudden political developments, maintain confidential links with each Court of interest, and try to anticipate the true intentions and reliability of all potential allies. With this aim in mind, James III's emissaries had formed a veritable intelligence network, as we have already seen. This was nothing new; even in the time of Louis XIV, his ministers saw James II's court at Saint-Germain-en-Laye as a nest of spies.²⁶

When it came to the Jacobite movement's relationships with France, no single connection was favored. Family ties between sovereigns need not be considered, as most European monarchies had family ties, and this did not prevent wars. There was, of course, the romantic myth of the Auld Alliance that had linked the fate of the Scots and the French since 1295, but in the context of modern colonial competition, it had to give way to Real politics. This had been true since the Glorious Revolution; in 1689, Louis XIV was reluctant to invest money in a hopeless struggle.²⁷ Political and military support from Versailles came into play whenever there was a tactical interest against a common enemy, as was the case in the Irish War. When the Stuart cousin, monarch though he was, became a nuisance in this establishment of peace and trade treaties, he was banished from the Kingdom of France altogether, as was the case in 1714. The Duke of Orléans, who acted as regent for Louis XV, had exactly the same attitude towards James III Stuart, which explains his forced exile to Avignon in 1716.

As for underground diplomacy, James III Stuart maintained excellent relations with French aristocrats well placed in the clergy, in the army or in administration. This was not a problem for Versailles, which had always wanted to maintain links with all potential interlocutors. James III Stuart could also count on the reports provided by the Irish senior officers in the service of France, such as when, in a coded letter dated May 27th 1716, the Duke of Mar asked Lieutenant General Dillon, owner of an Irish infantry regiment in France, about the private correspondence between the Regent of France and George I of Hanover.²⁸

²⁶ In CORP E. (2004) - *A Court in Exile: The Stuarts in France, 1688-1718*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press p 30.

²⁷ In SHIELD A., LANG A. (1907) - *The King over the water*, London, Longmans Green & Co, p 45.

²⁸ In Historical Manuscripts Commission (1904) - *Calendar of the Stuart papers - Vol. II*, Windsor Castle, H.M Stationery Office, p 183.

James III Stuart's entourage also included characters worthy of spy novels. Such was the case of Nathaniel Hooke, a Jacobite soldier who became a leading French diplomat. In 1715, he did not participate in the Jacobite rebellion and maintained diplomatic correspondence with the British ambassador. Perceived as a traitor by many Jacobites, he was, in fact, a spy for James III Stuart.²⁹

Jacobite diplomatic activity also concerned other European courts. In 1716, relations with Duke Leopold I of Lorraine were not broken off, and several Jacobites served in his army. It was under diplomatic pressure from the Regent of France that the latter refused to welcome James III Stuart back to Lorraine. However, the Duchy of Lorraine was itself in a delicate diplomatic situation, having to maintain a balance in its relations with Versailles and Vienna.

The Jacobite networks could be useful in this respect.

In a letter from James III Stuart to Thomas Southcott on May 26th 1716, the sovereign partially explained his diplomatic strategy towards Lorraine and the Empire to his emissary, who was leaving for Vienna. He also sent him a sealed envelope for the Duke of Lorraine.³⁰ Thomas Southcott typically embodied the profile of those shadowy Jacobite diplomats who had no official title in their dealings with the sovereigns but whose activity was real.

Polish Silesia was home to a large British community of courtiers who had followed Elizabeth of England, daughter of James I Stuart, when she was Queen of Bohemia in 1619 and 1620. In 1716, the Jacobites had many supporters there, and just as many agents who could play a role in Central Europe.

This old alliance led to the marriage of James III Stuart to the daughter of the Prince of Poland, Princess Maria Clementina Sobieska, on September 3rd 1719.

The Jacobite emissaries maintained contacts with Sweden, Switzerland and Russia in order to obtain their support, but above all they were looking for a powerful ally on whom they could once again rely in their reconquest of Great Britain. An attempted military operation, aided by Sweden, was foiled in early 1717, London having intercepted the secret correspondence.

At this time, military force in conjunction with an anti-Hanover revolt in England was still the most realistic option considered by the majority of Jacobite leaders. The only Catholic power on which the Jacobites could then hope to rely seemed to be Spain.

29 In CLARKE DE DROMANTIN P. (2005) - Les réfugiés jacobites dans la France du XVIII^e siècle: l'exode de toute une noblesse "pour cause de religion", Bordeaux, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, p 243.

30 In Historical Manuscripts Commission (1904) - Calendar of the Stuart papers - Vol. II, Windsor Castle, H.M Stationery Office, p 188.

The alliance of Urbino and Madrid

The Jacobite Court was in Avignon and in Papal territory, but the Duke of Orléans, who was clearly hostile to the Jacobites, had no intention of allowing rebel British subjects to establish a base within the borders of France. Since January 11th 1717, he had been an ally of George I of England and consequently threatened James III Stuart with cutting off all subsidies received from Versailles, on which he then depended. Faced with diplomatic pressure and financial blackmail, James III Stuart found refuge in the Italian Papal States, in Urbino. Relatives of his mother, Mary of Modena, still alive at the time, were living there.

Meanwhile, there was considerable tension in Madrid between Philip V of Spain and the Duke of Orléans, whose aim, as Regent of France, was to come between the Spanish sovereign and his young nephew, King Louis XV and prevent a relationship from forming. Duke Philippe of Orléans was trying to prevent the establishment of a new Versailles-Madrid axis and maintain his succession rights over those of the Spanish Bourbons.³¹

James III Stuart wrote directly to the Spanish Prime Minister, Alberoni, on June 5th 1717, to tell him all the good he thought of his family and of the Duchy of Parma, Cardinal Alberoni's home.³²

The subsequent Spanish military invasion of Sardinia did nothing to improve the situation with Versailles, and the Italian party at the Court of Madrid, led by Alberoni, convinced Philip V of Spain to fully restore Spanish presence in Italy. The rapid success of the Spanish military expedition to Sardinia rallied the most skeptical to the idea.

The Jacobites initially examined the situation cautiously, to check whether Spain's offensive in the Mediterranean was in their interests. Choosing to support Spain in this adventure could certainly lead to the support of the allied power they sought, but this choice also made the Jacobites de facto enemies of Vienna.³³ The situation was made even more delicate by fact that the Pope himself disliked the idea of imperial presence in Italy, something that could threaten the Papal States in the event of conflict in Italy. James III decided to take his time and see how the situation in the Mediterranean developed.

However, two factors would tip the balance in Spain's favor for James. Firstly, the formation of a Triple Alliance between England, France, and the Dutch United Provinces, making Madrid the Jacobites' only recourse against the Hanoverians.

31 In HELIE J. (2008) - Les relations internationales dans l'Europe moderne : Conflits et équilibres européens 1453-1789, Paris, Armand Colin, p 170.

32 In Historical Manuscripts Commission (1910) - Calendar of the Stuart papers – Vol. IV, Windsor Castle, H. M. Stationery Office, p 318.

33 In CORP E., CARPEGNA FALCONIERI T. (2013) - I giacobiti a Urbino, Bologna, il Mulino, p 24.

Furthermore, opposition to the Whigs and George I in England grew, encouraging James Stuart III to take action again. The rapprochement between London and Versailles was unpopular in English society. James Stuart III therefore decided to ally with Spain and made it known. On August 31st 1717, Cardinal Alberoni wrote to him that he had “(...) understood that his Majesty would be pleased to join his good offices to those of his Spanish Majesty (...)”.³⁴

Throughout the following year, the alliance between the Courts of Urbino and Madrid took shape. The announcement of the deployment of the English fleet in the Mediterranean made the King of Spain hesitate on a new military campaign in Italy, especially with the Roman Emperor’s announcement that he would renounce his claims to the Spanish throne in exchange for an agreement. This was not good news for the Jacobites, but one man’s proposal changed everything. The Irish-born Captain of the Royal Navy, George Cammock, sent a memorandum to the King of Spain proposing a British fleet in the service of both the King of Spain and James Stuart III: a Jacobite squadron.

On May 3rd 1718, James Stuart III, convinced by Cammock’s plan, sent a letter to Cardinal Acquaviva in Madrid asking him to do all he could with the King of Spain to obtain a rapid response to Cammock’s proposal.³⁵ And so it was, for on May 16th, Philip V of Spain appointed George Cammock ‘Squadron Chief’ and asked him to assemble his forces in Barcelona. Irish regiments from Spain, Jacobite privateers, and many Jacobite officers resident in several European states moved towards Barcelona.

On June 14th 1718, Lieutenant General Dillon wrote to the Duke of Mar that this scheme of military alliance with Spain had to succeed, that the greatest secrecy should surround the Jacobite preparations for war and that the best places to discuss these matters were Genoa and Leghorn.³⁶

We have no details to explain the choice of these places, where, as we shall see later, sensitive Jacobite discussions took place. But note that these are the two principal mainland ports for the Corsicans of the time.

Cammock’s squadron consisted of 10 ships and 6,000 men. He himself commanded a powerful ship of the line or warship, the San Fernando, armed with 60 cannons. Landside, the Jacobite commander was James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormond.

On June 18th 1718, 400 Spanish ships sailing from Barcelona set sail for Sicily.³⁷ On July 1st, the Spanish army landed in Sicily and Palermo was taken on July 3rd. De facto, Philip V of Spain and James III Stuart were at war with Roman Emperor Charles VI, also ruler of the Austrian Habsburg monarchy.

34 *In Historical Manuscripts Commission (1910) - Calendar of the Stuart papers –Vol. IV, Windsor Castle, H. M. Stationery Office, p 556.*

35 *In Historical Manuscripts Commission (1916) - Calendar of the Stuart papers –Vol. VI, Windsor Castle, H. M. Stationery Office, p 397.*

36 *Ibid, p 525.*

37 *In Gaceta de Madrid, n° 30, 26 July 1718, p 118.*

The Triple Alliance established peace between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, bringing Vienna into the war against Spain. This led to the formation of the Quadruple Alliance on August 2nd 1718.³⁸ From then on, Charles VI was prepared to send an Austrian army to Sicily on condition that England, which had an interest in securing its trade in the Mediterranean, found and destroyed the Spanish fleet. The English admiral Byng was given this task. On August 11th, the English fleet, whose country was not yet officially at war with Spain, came face to face with the Spanish fleet, waiting for a provocation before engaging in combat. This was the start of the naval battle of Cape Passaro, the southernmost cape of Sicily, in which the English fleet was victorious and the Spanish army isolated in Sicily. We will come back to the aftermath of this battle, which is directly relevant to the subject of this book.

James III Stuart experienced a period of insecurity during the War of the Quadruple Alliance due to his alliance with Spain. There were real threats from enemy spies. This fear, voiced by James III's treasurer William Ellis at the start of the conflict, prompted Cardinal Salviati to send a captain with his Corsican company of papal troops to Urbino to reinforce the corps of Swiss Guards already present there.³⁹ The Corsican troops had not been part of the papal army since 1664 but remained responsible for internal security missions. The Corsicans were placed directly under the authority of the *Prefetto della Congregazione della Sacra Consulta*, Cardinal Fabrizio Paolucci. They were additionally placed under the authority of papal legates to secure roads and towns. Corsican soldiers provided security for the Jacobite Court for a year and gave protocolary salutes to all Jacobite officials. Did they confine themselves to the strict performance of their duties? A mystery worthy of solving, although if human nature is taken into account, one can assume that people who spend months together end up exchanging views on various subjects.

In October 1718, the Pope asked the Jacobite Court to leave Urbino and move closer to Rome, to Castel Gandolfo.⁴⁰ The reason for this request was to prepare for James' marriage to Princess Maria Clementina Sobieska and to choose a place more suited to the comfort of a Queen and her retinue. James III Stuart agreed and asked, "*that the Colonel of the Corsicans be informed that he will not be returning to Urbino this winter*".⁴¹ This attention shows the closeness between the two men.

38 In HELIE J. (2008) - Les relations internationales dans l'Europe moderne : Conflits et équilibres européens 1453-1789, Paris, Armand Colin, p 171.

39 In Royal Archives, The Stuart and the Cumberland Papers, Windsor Castle, RA SP/MAIN/21 f.16

40 In CORP E., CARPEGNA FALCONIERI T. (2013) - I giacobiti a Urbino, Bologna, il Mulino, p 127.

41 In Historical Manuscripts Commission (1923) - Calendar of the Stuart papers -Vol. VII, Windsor Castle, H. M. Stationery Office, p 400.

Corsica and the strategic conflict between the Spanish Bourbons and Habsburgs.

In continuity with the political balances in the Mediterranean and the conflicts marking the Renaissance period, Corsica was of major diplomatic importance in that modern era. Mediterranean trade routes were of vital importance to European economies. In this competitive context, Corsica, by its geographical location, was at the crossroads of the interests of Spain, France and the Italian powers, including their imperial possessions.

The continental states considered Corsica a possible military operational base and a safe-haven amidst the various dangers of shipping. Proof of the case in point, at the very start of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Genoese Governor of Corsica spoke of a plan for the English fleet to make a military raid on Corsica to replenish its grain supplies. This rings true, given that between 1702 and 1705, England, the United Provinces, and Austria were planning various landing operations in Spain to re-establish the rights of the Habsburgs. In 1705, the situation was reversed, as the English got Genoa to rally to the cause of the House of Habsburg and demanded that it raise 6,000 men to fight alongside the Alliance against Philip's Spain.⁴²

So there were Corsicans in the service of Genoa, but also Corsicans in the Spanish units in Italy. And Corsican military force was not overlooked by Madrid: on April 4th 1712, Philip V of Spain ordered Corsican Colonel Giovanni Antonio Franchi to raise three regiments in Italy to occupy Gibraltar and Porto Longone, as part of the invasion of Sicily and Sardinia.

The Corsicans were, therefore, above all, subject to Genoese diplomacy and its positioning in European conflicts. When Philip V of Spain began the siege of Barcelona, the Republic of Genoa proclaimed a ban on supplies to Barcelona from all parts of its domain, including Corsica. As a result, Genoa's Corsican subjects were obliged to support Spanish interests once again.

After the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the cards were reshuffled in the Mediterranean. Spain was the big loser, as it no longer had any territories in Italy, and the island was once again of interest for its future plans. The France of Louis XV respected the rights of the Republic of Genoa over Corsica. In 1685, representatives of Genoa, then allies of the Spanish, bowed down to Louis XIV at Versailles to prevent the city from being bombarded again by the French navy (a memorable bombardment).

42 In SEGURA GARCIA G. (2014) - Guerra de Sucesion Espanola : Campanas Militares en la Peninsula (1702-1714) in Revista de Historia Militar - N° II, Madrid, Instituto de Historia e Cultur Militar, p 162.

The Habsburgs compensated for the loss of Catalonia by taking possession of the Kingdom of Naples and Sardinia. Corsica was therefore not a central issue for Vienna, as the Genoese guardianship could be seen as a buffer power in relation to the Bourbons of France and Spain.

On February 6th 1715, the appointment of Giulio Alberoni of Parma as minister for Philip V of Spain marked the start of Spanish redeployment in the Mediterranean. In June, the Spanish army captured the island of Majorca. Cardinal Alberoni worked on new alliance strategies to push the advantage further. Multiple treaties were signed with England, in whose possession Gibraltar had become a first-rate naval base. Encouraged by his second wife, Elisabeth Farnese, and his Minister Alberoni, Philip V of Spain decided to regain a foothold in Italy. On July 24th 1717, a Spanish fleet set sail for Sardinia to drive out the Austrians. By September, Spanish galleys were cruising along the Corsican coast.⁴³ Among the Spanish units deployed in Sardinia was the Basilicata regiment, which had returned to Spain from Italy with Duke Reistano Cantelmo Stuart (of an old Stuart family branch in Naples) ten years earlier.

This Corsican branch of the Spanish army was a tradition dating back to Gaspar Leca de Cinarca's incorporation into the Spanish army in Italy in 1596, precisely in the Italian region of Basilicata. This former '*Tercios de Basilicata*' infantry unit became a fully-fledged regiment on June 29th 1658. It became a permanent Spanish regiment by Royal Decree on February 27th 1707.⁴⁴

What we can say of this short period is that the fate of Corsica was linked above all to the conflict of interests between the Bourbons of Spain and the Habsburgs of Vienna and their respective allies. In this vast European conflict, the slightest diplomatic error on the part of Genoa could have led to war in Corsica.

43 In Gaceta de Madrid, N°42, 19 October 1717, p 166.

44 In PEREZ FRIAS P. L. (2003) - Unidades extranjeras en el ejército borbonico español del siglo XVIII, in M. B. VILLAR GARCIA Y P. PEZZI CRISTOBAL dir, Los extranjeros en la España moderna – Tomo II, Actas del I coloquio internacional de Malagan p 639.

PART II - Corsica, Genoa and Jacobitism

Corsicans and Jacobites in the War of the Quadruple Alliance.

The invasion of Sardinia marked the start of the War of the Quadruple Alliance, the event that sealed a lasting bond between Corsican and Jacobite soldiers in the service of Spain. Many Corsicans went over from the service of Venice to that of Spain, including Giapicconi, Vittini, Battaglini, Seta, etc.⁴⁵ On September 8th 1717, the Basilicata regiment landed in Sardinia.⁴⁶ The Basilicata regiment would spend the entire Sardinian campaign alongside the four Irish infantry regiments: Irlanda, Ultonia, Hibernia, and Limerick, and the Edinburgo Dragoon regiment.⁴⁷ The commander of the mainly Corsican Basilicata regiment was Niccolò Giovenni. These regiments attacked Alghero on October 2nd 1717, and remained stationed in Alghero for nine months.⁴⁸

A decree made by the King of Spain on February 10th 1718 transformed the Basilicata Regiment into the *Regimiento Corcega*, still commanded by Colonel Niccolò Giovenni. At the start of the summer, the *Corcega* Regiment received orders to leave Sardinia and head for Sicily, embarking at Cabo Pulla. A *Corcega* Regiment battalion of 600 men arrived in Sicily on July 28th 1718.⁴⁹ There, it was integrated into the Walloon Guards, an infantry brigade of 2,400 men. This strange decision made by the Spanish military administration makes life difficult for historians, because to track the *Corcega* regiment's movements during the military campaign, we must follow the Walloon Guards (*Guardias Valonas*).

Corsicans were often positioned on the front line with the Irish Jacobite regiments: Irlanda, Ultonia, and Hibernia.⁵⁰ Between August 25th and 30th, while defending their trenches during the siege of Messina, the Walloon Guards lost 150 men (including Corsicans), and the Irish 84.⁵¹ The Corsicans had arrived in Sicily with the Spanish fleet, which, as we saw earlier, was defeated on August 11th 1718 by the English fleet. Specialists in naval battle agree at least on the following: that had George Cammock given more thought to his battle plan, the Royal Navy would not have had such an easy victory.

45 In GIAPPICONI T. (2018) - De l'épopée vénitienne aux révolutions corses ; engagements militaires et combats politiques insulaires, XVe-XVIIIe siècle, Ajaccio, Albiana, p 176.

46 In Biblioteca Nacional de España – MSS 6310 - Guerra de Cerdeña y Sicilia en los años 1717 1720. Primera parte, Jaime Miguel de, Marqués de la Mina, Madrid, p 175.

47 In Biblioteca Nacional de España – MSS 5590 V.1 - Memorias sobre la Guerra de Cerdeña, Sicilia y Lombardia [Manuscrito] / con reflexiones militares del Excelentísimo Jaime Miguel Dávalos Spinola, Marqués de la Mina, Madrid, p 53.

48 In BACALLAR Y SANNA V. (17—) - Comentarios de la guerra de España, e historia de su rey Phelipe V desde el principio de su reinado, hasta la paz de 1725 - Tomo 2, Genova, Matheo garvizza, p 162.

49 In Biblioteca Nacional de España – MSS 5590 V.1 - Memorias sobre la Guerra de Cerdeña, Sicilia y Lombardia [Manuscrito] / con reflexiones militares del Excelentísimo Jaime Miguel Dávalos Spinola, Marqués de la Mina, Madrid, p 113.

50 In Biblioteca Nacional de España – MSS 6408 - Colección de cuadros y planos sobre la guerra de Cerdeña y Sicilia, en los años 1717 a 1720, Madrid, plan N° 12 (1718).

51 In Biblioteca Nacional de España – MSS 5590 V.1 - Memorias sobre la Guerra de Cerdeña, Sicilia y Lombardia [Manuscrito] / con reflexiones militares del Excelentísimo Jaime Miguel Dávalos Spinola, Marqués de la Mina, Madrid, p 207.

The next day, August 12th, following a daring maneuver, the bulk of Cammock's Jacobite squadron fled to Malta. His ship *the San Fernando*, and a few hours later, *the Perla*, were the first ships to find refuge in the port of Malta.⁵²

George Cammock himself openly admitted the disastrous results of the battle for his small fleet.⁵³ Not only was damage to the ships extensive, but the battle had also sparked determination in the English Captain Matthews to capture Cammock himself. Admiral Byng received information that Cammock still had 6 fighting ships.⁵⁴ Several English sources of the time attest to the arrival of the Jacobite squadron in Malta, and its departure from the island on September 24th of that year. A letter written by Don Gabriel Perès de Alderete, Captain of the *Perla*, confirms the information. He gives a very detailed description of the other ships in Cammock's squadron present in the port, namely. ship of the line *San Pedro*, war frigates *La Galera*, *El Conde de Tolosa*, *San Juan el Chico* and *San Fernando el Chico*, a bombardment ship, and two transport ships, to a total of 8 ships.⁵⁵ During his stopover in Malta, Cammock only had time to refit four fighting ships.⁵⁶ The *San Fernando* had suffered significant damage and the English captured the frigate *Conde de Tolosa* a few days later.

Cammock needed to find a port where they would be safe from their English pursuers and could recover their strength, quickly. No easy problem to solve, as after the disaster at Cape Passaro, English ships had set sail for Spain to secure the trade routes. It is understandable that in this uncertain military context, James III Stuart was concerned about the fate of Cammock and his small squadron. On October 3rd, Lieutenant General Dillon wrote to James III Stuart informing him that he had received a letter from Sir Peter Redmond stating, "*Cammock and other ships are safe in Corsica*".⁵⁷

A dispatch from Naples dated September 30th of that year, which arrived in Madrid at the end of October, mentions fragments (sic) of several warships and transports that had run aground on the Corsican coast!⁵⁸ It would seem that a military convoy of the Quadruple Alliance had run into a storm and that some of its ships had run aground or taken refuge in Corsica. The English convoys faced more than just gales, as Cammock's privateers attacked them

52 In Biblioteca Nacional de Espana – MSS 6408 - Colección de cuadros y planos sobre la guerra de Cerdeña y Sicilia, en los años 1717 a 1720, Madrid, plan N° 15 (1718).

53 In FERNANDEZ DURO C. (1900) - Historia de la armada española desde la union de los reinos de Castilla y de Aragon - T 6 (1701-1758), Madrid, Sucesores de Rivadenestra, p 151.

54 In ARKSTEE et MERKUS (1768) – Histoire universelle, Depuis le Commencement du Monde, jusqu'a présent : La suite de l'Histoire d'Espagne et celle de Portugal – Volume 29, Paris, Arkstée et Merkus, p 252.

55 In Gaceta de Madrid, N°41, 4 October 1718, p 160.

56 In CORBETT T. (1739) - An Account of the Expedition of the British Fleet to Sicily, In the Years 1718, 1719 and 1720, London, J & R Tonson, p 47.

57 In Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, Stuart papers, RA SP/MAIN/37 f.29-31a.

58 In DE ATITZIA J. (1718) - Continuacion del diario y progressos de las armas de Espana, en Sicilia, y del feliz sucesso, que logrado en la batall, que el dia 15 de Octubre de 1718, se dio junto à Melazo, Madrid. Juan de Atitzia

constantly, over a period several months.⁵⁹ During the last week of November 1718, there were reported sightings of five Spanish warships and two frigates in Cagliari, and a Genoese source stated that they “*daily disturbed the trade of the English who trafficked along these coasts and those of the kingdom of Naples.*”⁶⁰ It seems plausible that Cammock’s squadron used Cagliari as an operational base and the Corsican shores as a temporary refuge during sea races.

We have to imagine the significance of four ships of the line arriving on the Corsican coast. Of course, the troops had been unloaded and left in Sicily, but they were still crewed. Cammock’s squadron still numbered 950 men.⁶¹

The <i>San Pedro</i>	60 cannons	450 men
The <i>La Gallera</i>	30 cannons	200 men
The <i>Juan el Chico</i>	20 cannons	150 men
The <i>Ferdinando el Chico</i>	20 cannons	150 men

Although the War of the Quadruple Alliance against Spain was already a reality, the declaration of war wasn’t made official until December 17th.

What did the Republic of Genoa think about the presence of this squadron in Corsica?

At that precise moment, given the neutral position of the Genoese in this conflict, the temporary refuge of armed ships in its Corsican territory did not implicate Genoa’s implicit support, and respected the concordat of 1691 on the neutrality of Genoese ports, including for warring privateers. The Genoese diplomatic corps was informed of London’s anger at the decision of the Spanish Court to have naval forces attack any neutral merchant ship coming from or going to enemy ports.⁶² In this context, it is therefore unlikely that Cammock’s squadron would have been welcomed in one of the island’s main ports, which would have given their presence in Corsica an official character, and no sources indicate this. It is much more plausible to think that these ships anchored in coves or in secondary landing stages on the island.

⁵⁹ In RIVIERE H. (1859) - *La marine française sous le règne de Louis XV*, Paris, Le Normand, p 29.

⁶⁰ In *Le Nouveau Mercure de France*, Janvier 1719, p 192.

⁶¹ In Biblioteca Nacional de España – MSS 6408 - Colección de cuadros y planos sobre la guerra de Cerdeña y Sicilia, en los años 1717 a 1720, Madrid, plan N°9 (1718)

⁶² In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2281, A.S.G / Litterarum, Letter, 2 January 1719

How long did this Spanish and Jacobite force remain on the island? Did Corsica also serve as an operational base for Jacobite Rear Admiral George Cammock?

Cammock did not stay long in Corsica, as in mid-October 1718, he and the *San Pedro* took part in the naval blockade of Milazzo. In December that year, Captain Matthews' ships attacked part of the Jacobite squadron at Messina, blockading it in the harbor. At the end of December, the Jacobites attempted a surprise attack and were pursued by the Royal Navy. The *San Pedro* ran aground on reaching the Gulf of Taranto. Cammock, who was on the *Santa Rosalia*, was forced to scuttle her.⁶³

Early the following year, on February 6th 1719, he was found aboard a 22-gun frigate in the Gulf of Taranto. Caught by Matthews, he escaped on a longboat and took refuge in Catania, Sicily. However, his abandoned ship was boarded, and a letter from James III Stuart was found in his belongings citing him as Admiral of The White Squadron fleet.⁶⁴ Which fleet was this, if not the few forces left in Sardinia and Corsica? The activity of Spanish privateers in an area between the Gulf of Genoa and the coast of Corsica had been a topic of discussion in Genoa for several weeks. On March 11th, a Spanish ship returned to the port of Genoa carrying bounty seized from an English ship, as reported by diplomatic sources at the time.⁶⁵ On March 13th, the British Consul in Genoa, Sir Henry Davenant, sent a memorandum in which he identified the Spanish privateers: "*Deserters, bandits and marauders are the Frenchmen who, against the obedience due to their legitimate sovereign, take sides with the Spaniards and who, under cover of a foreign flag, race against the subjects of his British Majesty*".⁶⁶ We have confirmation that these were mainly members of the French-Irish Brigade who had gone to Spain to join Cammock's squadron.

Within this context, the Royal Navy was watching Corsica carefully, as at least one clearly established fact allows us to verify. One month later, on April 13th, an English ship intercepted a *tartane* captained by Pietro Bianchi and coming from Corsica, just before it could dock in Genoa. Bianchi was given a harsh interrogation, as the English officer wanted to check his cargo. They threatened to take him prisoner aboard the English frigate and burn his *tartane*.⁶⁷ Some Genoese diplomats then took offense at such behaviour, which was hardly in keeping with the rules of neutrality and hospitality. There was clearly real tension when it came to Corsica.

63 In Arkstée et Merkus (1768) – Histoire universelle, Depuis le Commencement du Monde, Jusqu'à présent : La suite de l'Histoire d'Espagne et celle de Portugal – Volume 29, Paris, Arkstée et Merkus, p 256.

64 In CORBETT T. (1739) - An Account of the Expedition of the British Fleet to Sicily, in the Years 1718, 1719 and 1720, London, J & R Tonson, p 25.

65 In Gazzetta di Bologna, N° 12, 21 March 1719, p 2.

66 In Public Record Office - SP79/11 f. 74 / State Papers Foreign, Genoa - Henry Davenant - Mémoire adressée à la République de Gênes, 13 March 1719, p 1.

67 In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2281, A.S.G / Litterarum, Letter, 17 June, 1719.

Two days later, on April 15th, a Spanish privateer was sequestered in the port of La Spezia by two English frigates.⁶⁸ It managed to escape by night. Was it from Corsica? One very specific fact leads us to believe so. How else can we interpret the letter dated May 1st 1719 from the English Consul to Genoa, which once again calls into question the neutrality of the Republic of Genoa when “*ships from Corsica are armed in order to destroy our commerce*”.⁶⁹

It is little likely that it was the Genoese arsenals who armed warships to push against the forces of the Quadruple Alliance. The last time the Republic of Genoa had taken part in a major naval conflict in the Mediterranean in this way, Louis XIV had fired 13,000 cannonballs at the city. After the English fleet’s show of force at Cape Passaro, this attitude would have been provocative to say the least, if not suicidal. It is, therefore, much more realistic to put forward the hypothesis that Corsica served as an operational base for a small part of Cammock’s White Squadron. More specifically, for the two light and fast 20-gun frigates perfectly suited to piracy. If such was the case, there must be traces of their presence in Corsica. And on May 2nd, the Duke of Ormond congratulated Cammock on his zeal in serving James III Stuart.⁷⁰

In the meantime, the Jacobites had once again turned their attention to Scotland, relegating Corsica’s strategic position to a minor issue. Since October of the previous year, Cardinal Alberoni had given James III Stuart his assurances of a new military expedition to Scotland.⁷¹ By March 1719, a new Spanish armada had assembled and James III Stuart was planning to travel incognito to Catalonia.⁷² On March 18th, Domenico Maria Viceti, Genoa’s Secretary of State to the London Court, wrote to his counterpart in the Vienna Court, the Marquis Doria. He informed him that London was concerned that, on the night of March 13th 1719, in Livorno, the Duke of Tuscany had allowed “*Earl Marischal and his King*” to embark for Spain, without any reason being known.⁷³ In another letter, Viceti reported that a dispatch to the London Court dated March 17th stated that Lord Marischal’s galley had taken refuge for a day at Portofino near Genoa due to contrary winds. For this trip at least, we have learned the reason: a conference with Cardinal Alberoni.⁷⁴

68 *In Gazzetta di Bologna*, N° 17, 25 April 1719, p. 2.

69 *In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2217, A.S.G / Litterarum*, Letter, 1st May 1719.

70 *In* DICKSON W. K. (1895) - *The jacobite attempt of 1719*, Edinburgh, Scottish History Society, p. 122.

71 *In* CORP E., CARPEGNA FALCONIERI T. (2013) - *I giacobiti a Urbino*, Bologna, il Mulino, p. 26.

72 *In* SHIELD A., LANG A. (1907) - *The King over the water*, London, Longmans Green & Co, p. 317.

73 *In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2281, A.S.G / Litterarum*, Letter, 18 March, 1719.

74 *In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2281, A.S.G / Litterarum*, Letter, 25 March 1719.

The entire British diplomatic corps in Italy was on the alert for the slightest information on the movements of the Stuart Pretender. Multiple copies of the spy reports were sent to all the consulates and embassies. The British consul in Genoa quoted an Irish officer in the service of Spain as saying that the Pretender had arrived by boat in Sardinia, where he boarded the Genoese ship '*La Cambiasina*' bound for Spain.⁷⁵ The ship arrived in Spain on the following March 21st.⁷⁶

The plan was to send a small Jacobite army to Scotland and land 6,000 men in the south of England. The Jacobite troop commanded by Earl Marischal did land in Scotland, with 307 Spanish soldiers at its side. No sooner had they landed than he and Brigadier Campbell lead the march to Inverness. At the same time, due to a storm, most of the Spanish fleet was scattered and their invasion strategy ultimately failed.

On April 30th 1719, the Court of Madrid confirmed that its fleet bound for England, which had suffered extensive damage, was returning to Castilian ports.⁷⁷ The Spanish Jacobite troops in Scotland assembled only a modest army. They were crushed by the troops of George I of Hanover at the Battle of Glen Shiel on June 10th. After the failure of this umpteenth attempt to restore the Stuarts, George Cammock found himself in great poverty in Madrid and was rescued and protected by James Keith (a famous Jacobite exile of Clan Keith mentioned earlier), to whom he was very grateful.⁷⁸ We do not know whether the two Jacobite warlords spoke of Corsica together.

In April 1720, after a long series of twists and turns, James' brother George Keith found himself back in Genoa, a city from which he was forcibly expelled, as the Genoese feared an English bombardment worse than that of the French because of the activities of the Jacobites.⁷⁹

Meanwhile in Sicily, military operations continued and ties were strengthened. During the imperial siege of Palermo on May 2nd 1720, Corsican and Irish soldiers defended the same trench in the northern part of the city.⁸⁰ At the end of the Sicilian campaign, casualty figures reveal the high level of involvement of the Walloon Guards (769 dead, 32% of the workforce) and the three Irish regiments (1,038 dead, 53% of the workforce).⁸¹

75 In Public Record Office - SP79/11 f 66 / State Papers Foreign, Genoa - Henry Davenant - Letter, 13 March 1719, p 4.

76 In Gazzetta di Bologna, N°18, 2nd May 1719, p 2.

77 In Gaceta de Madrid n° 20, 16 May 1719, p 80.

78 In DICKSON W. K. (1895) - The Jacobite attempt of 1719, Edinburgh, Scottish History Society, p 19.

79 In National Library of Scotland, Histories of Scottish Families - CONSTABLE T. (1843) - A Fragment of a memoir of Field-Marshal James Keith written by himself (1714-1731), Edinburgh, Splading Club, p 58.

80 In Biblioteca Nacional de España - MSS 6408 - Colección de cuadros y planos sobre la guerra de Cerdeña y Sicilia, en los años 1717 a 1720, Madrid, plan N° 2 (1720).

81 Ibid, plan N° 3 (1720).

It is reasonable to estimate Corsican losses at between 150 and 200 dead, but this figure is impossible to determine precisely, because fallen Corsican soldiers were assimilated into the Walloon Guards, while yet other Corsicans were enlisted in Italian military units; such as Captain Antonio Francesco Giappiconi, a Captain in the Liguria regiment who was decorated for his feats of arms. In June 1720, he was released after being held captive by Imperial troops in Sicily for eleven months.⁸²

We can take it for granted that from 1718, James III Stuart had accepted the idea that if the need arose, Corsica could provide sanctuary, and it is highly probable that he sailed down the coast of Corsica when making a pit stop in Sardinia. However, we need to quantify the extent and duration of this Jacobite presence in Corsica during the War of the Quadruple Alliance. There are many unanswered questions. Did Cammock's sailors make contact with the locals there? Might some Jacobites have stayed on the island while waiting for the end of the Quadruple Alliance War? Could Corsican soldiers who were still in Sicily sent word recommending and introducing these Jacobites to their relatives on the island? There is little information available in written sources about this particular episode, but there are nevertheless clues to this passage.

When the War of the Quadruple Alliance had ended, an Irish merchant ship, *The Susannah*, sailed to Corsica. On its return journey it called at Falmouth, Cornwall, on October 20th 1720, before heading for Cork.⁸³ We can only speculate that this transport evacuated the last remaining Jacobites from the island. But there are other avenues to explore. For example, there is an oral family tradition in the Corsican village of Lozzi according to which a person from northern Europe was the source of a branch of the Flori family.

The main fact to retain from this period is that during the War of the Quadruple Alliance, Corsicans and Jacobites in the service of Spain were in every battle, and often side by side, for three years. It's hard to imagine that no personal relationship developed between these islanders.

82 In GIAPPICONI T. (2018) - De l'épopée vénitienne aux révolutions corses ; engagements militaires et combats politiques insulaires, XVe-XVIIIe siècle, Ajaccio, Albiana, p 176.

83 In Stamford Mercury, Vol. XVI, N°18, 27 October 1720, p 10.

Exploring Jacobite heritage in the Corsican mountains.

Comparing against oral tradition is a viable means of testing out hypotheses, but it comes with its own challenges. When no written sources are identified, it is difficult to verify the myths and legends conveyed within village communities from the point of view of historical science. There is however a single archival document that fuels multiple speculations.

On August 28th 1820, a Stuart from Castifau village (the Corsican Stuart family branch) went to the village of Lozzi to attend the funeral of a relative from the Flori/Acquaviva family.⁸⁴ Working with professional genealogists and going back to the 16th century, it was determined that there is no familial connection between the Stuarts of Castifau and the families from Lozzi.

To solve this enigma, and as part of a multi-disciplinary approach, genetic genealogy tools have been mobilized within rigorous research framework. Our working hypothesis is that an individual from the Floris of Lozzi family is linked to the Corsican branch of the Stuarts and descends from a British Jacobite who was present in Corsica between 1718 and 1720.

DNA from 10 individuals was compared (5 Floris from Lozzi and 5 Stuarts from Corsica). The comparison study was conducted from October 2015 to July 2017.

Initial statistical data indicates that the common ancestor of the Floris of Lozzi and the Stuarts of Corsica lived 8 or 9 generations ago. In fact, Emmanuel Stuart, the ancestor of the Stuarts of Corsica, was born in 1735, 8 generations back, and the same applies to a certain Batista Flori, who was born in 1721. Thus someone from Manuel Stuart's close matrilineal family could be the father of Battista Flori. This is interesting but inconclusive, as it would be necessary to ensure that this Flori branch of Lozzi was indeed of British origin.

A Y-STR 111 test carried out on November 12th 2016 indicates that this Flori family was descended from Haplogroup R-DF98, which appeared in the British Isles in 1500 BC. This initial result seemed to support the presence of a man who came with Cammock's squadron and left a lasting imprint on the Corsican population. However, a test on STR markers, whose mutation rates are highly random, cannot be used to make a definite scientific conclusion.

On February 13th 2017, we obtained the results of a BigY DNA test (familyTreeDNA) that enabled us to identify an initial match between this Flori branch of Lozzi and a person bearing the surname Smith. However, with 31 unshared Y-STR markers out of 111, this match with this Smith cousin seemed too far away in time and probably purely coincidental.

⁸⁴ In Archives Départementales de la Haute Corse - 2 E 2-86/1, État Civil, Lozzi.

We decided to implement a more ambitious research protocol. We, therefore, called on scientific and academic expertise to carry out all of these DNA comparisons and identify more precisely the common ancestor of the Floris of Lozzi and the Stuart of Corsica.

Evaluation of DNA evidence concerning the patrilineal family origin of the Battista Flori Family in Corsica

Under the supervision of Professor Alasdair Macdonald, from the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, we followed a very rigorous research protocol based on comparisons of autosomal chromosomes. We assumed that the common ancestor of the Floris and Stuarts could have come from a Smith family. We also considered the maximum technical limits that can be reached in this type of research, taking into account that in rare cases, two cousins could still share a DNA fragment from a common ancestor who lived more than 10 generations ago.⁸⁵

By comparing the autosomal DNA of 5 Floris and 5 Stuarts with more than two hundred genetic profiles of people bearing the surname SMITH, we were able to show that for both the Floris and Stuarts, around fifteen people descended from Smiths shared a specific segment of DNA on chromosome 15. At this stage, this result was somewhat encouraging but not significant. To ensure that Flori, Stuart and Smith individuals share the same common ancestor, it is necessary to carry out what are known as autosomal triangulations:

- *The Flori individual tested shares an identical segment of DNA with the Stuart individual tested*
- *The Flori individual tested shares an identical segment of DNA with the Smith individual tested*
- *The Smith individual tested shares an identical segment of DNA with the Stuart individual tested*

And so on for all the individuals compared. Acceptance of common ancestry requires all of these conditions to be met. Failure to meet any one of them will render proof of common ancestry invalid.

During 6 months of research, with the technical stages that we will not go into here, we could triangulate the Floris and Stuarts selected with twenty different Smith individuals. The final step was to compare the written genealogy of these Smith individuals to confirm that they were indeed descended from the same patrilineal ancestor. We therefore carried out correlation tests between genetic data and genealogical sources.

85 In Speed, Doug & Balding, David J. (2015) - Relatedness in the post-genomic era: is it still useful? Nature Reviews Genetics. 16 (1). pp. 33-44.

On two occasions, we arrived at the same result, namely that the Smith ancestor common to the Floris, Stuarts, and Smiths compared was descended from Lieutenant Thomas Christopher Laurence Smith, born in 1592 in Stonirakes, parish of Burnley, in the county of Lancashire in England. A region that, historically speaking, has been particularly favorable to the Royal House of Stuart.

The results underwent validation in July 2017.⁸⁶ Because of the importance of this result, as of April 2019, numerous additional checks have been conducted. All the other collateral relatives compared, including a Stuardi branch from Corsica, produced positive triangulations with the Smiths and Floris. As a culmination of these final checks, in June 2019, Mr Samuel Christopher Smith, a resident of the USA, contacted the Stuart family in Corsica, not understanding why he was discovering DNA matches with Stuardi and Flori from the island of Corsica. We sent him the research report. He gave us a very enthusiastic response, understanding much better why his great-great-uncle was called Duke Burnley Smith, Burnley being the name of the English parish of his ancestors. The family link between the Stuarts of Castifau, the Floris of Lozzi, and the Smiths of Burnley has been confirmed without a doubt.

From a historical point of view, there are things to take in consideration. James I Stuart appointed Thomas Christopher Laurence Smith's father, Sir Thomas Smythe, as England's ambassador to Russia. The proximity to the Stuart royal family did not end there. With this family background, it becomes much more plausible that a Jacobite from this Smith branch could have joined Cammock's squadron in Spain (remember that Cammock's ambition in 1718-1719 was to rally English officers and sailors to the Stuart cause). If this individual has descendants in Lozzi today, this would tend to objectively demonstrate the temporary refuge of part of Cammock's squadron in Corsica. It is important to remember that James III Stuart called upon many British pirates operating in the Caribbean and with Jacobite sympathies to join Cammock's squadron. They included Richard Hancock and the Irishman Richard Holland. Like many other Jacobite sympathisers, Holland deserted the Royal Navy. He left the English ship *Suffolk*, which was calling at Naples, and took refuge in a convent.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ In <http://www.stuart-corsica.com/flori-dna-report.pdf>

⁸⁷ In Captain Johnson C. (1726) – A general history of the pirates, 4th Edition, London, T.Warner, p 43.

Richard Holland was then placed under the command of George Cammock as the 'English Captain' of a mixed Anglo-Spanish ship commanded by Don Benito (the famous Spanish pirate Benito Socarras Y Aguero).

The ship was crewed by 14 Englishmen, including John Smith and John Moore, both of whom had extensive experience of piracy.⁸⁸ There is no proof today that this particular John Smith was the father of Battista Flori, but it at least attests to the presence of English Smiths within Cammock's squadron.

We better understand Giovanni Stuart's presence at the funeral of a cousin in the village of Lozzi. It is likely that he received information from his father, Emmanuel Stuart (1735-1780), of the presence of his Smith/Flori cousins in Lozzi.

⁸⁸ In FOX E.T (2010) - Jacobitism and the "Golden Age" of Piracy 1715-1725, p 277-303, in *International Journal of Maritime History*, XXII, No. 2, SAGE Publications, p 293.

The House of Stuart in search of new alliances.

To understand the new situation in which the Royal House of Stuart found itself, it is necessary to look back at the consequences of the end of the War of the Quadruple Alliance. As early as August 1719, when the United Provinces decided to take part in the war against Spain, Philip V recognized that the military balance of power had become too unfavorable and that it was necessary to end the war. The allies set the dismissal of Cardinal Alberoni as a condition, and the dismissal was executed by Madrid in December. On February 20th 1720, the warring parties signed the peace treaty of The Hague. Spain joined the alliance, in return for which the infant Carlos would receive Italian territories (Parma, Piacenza, Tuscany) once his maternal Farnese family lineage had died out in Italy.⁸⁹

Despite the military setback of 1719, the Jacobites were determined to take up the political offensive again, and they built up various networks throughout Europe to extend their influence.

In a letter dated January 8th 1720, James III indicated that he planned to make Lucca his new residence.⁹⁰ We know that this choice was influenced by the proximity of the port of Genoa, a strategic place to go to England in the event of a political change of heart. Spain also remained a first-rate operational base, and George Keith returned to Madrid in July 1720, where he stayed with George Cammock. This was another opportunity for the two men to exchange views on the Corsican episode.

Politically isolated, the Jacobites realised that new military action was impossible. All their hopes lay in a political shift in London. On December 31st 1720, Prince Charles Edward Stuart was born in Rome. The birth was celebrated by all of the Stuart supporters in Europe, and gave the English Jacobites added motivation,⁹¹ especially as the Whigs' government was hated in England.

The English Jacobites secretly proposed a general uprising to James III Stuart during the elections of 1722. The event in English history is commonly referred to as the Atterbury Plot, from the name of its instigator, the Bishop of Rochester.

James III Stuart was convinced of the wisdom of this plan and sent part of his Court, including Queen Clementina Sobieska, to the baths of Lucca on July 20th 1722.⁹² James III Stuart arrived at the baths on the following August 7th.⁹³

89 In HELIE J. (2008) - Les relations internationales dans l'Europe moderne : Conflits et équilibres européens 1453-1789, Paris, Armand Colin, p 172.

90 In SABBATINI R. (2018) – Una Repubblica tra due Re. La visita a Lucca del Pretendente Stuart Nelle Settimane dell'Atterbury Plot in *Mediterranea, ricerche storiche* – Anno XV, Palermo, p 100.

91 In SHIELD A., LANG A. (1907) - *The King over the water*, London, Longmans & Green, p 351.

92 In SABBATINI R. (2018) – Una Repubblica tra due Re. La visita a Lucca del Pretendente Stuart Nelle Settimane dell'Atterbury Plot in *Mediterranea, ricerche storiche* – Anno XV, Palermo, p 104.

93 *Ibid*, p 113.

Despite its best intentions, the Republic of Lucca found itself in a delicate diplomatic situation, arousing the curiosity of all the European courts. Worried by his presence in Lucca, the Court of London did all it could to find out why the Stuart Pretender was being welcomed to that city.

But in the meantime, the English government had uncovered the Bishop of Rochester's plot, leading to the arrest of several individuals. In both England and Scotland, the Jacobites felt "*broken, embittered, irritable and abandoned*".⁹⁴ On July 4th 1722, Lord Carteret, Secretary of State for Southern Affairs, received a letter from an English agent in Italy. The contents of the letter were as follows: "*Cardinal Francesco Acquaviva and the Pretender will proceed to Bagnani, as soon as the Duke of Ormond and his retinue have arrived at Porto Longone, in a warship from Corsica*".⁹⁵ Other warships were awaiting James III Stuart's arrival off the Corsican coast to escort him to Spain.⁹⁶ It is highly likely that these ships were under the command of George Cammock, who was familiar with Corsica. On 9 October 9th 1722, the Jacobite ship *Revolution*, with Cammock on board and a crew of 40 English, Scottish, and Irish men, was spotted by the Naval Intelligence Service in the Port of Alicante, but it was impossible to establish its origin.⁹⁷

In England, the Irishman George Kelly was one of the main Jacobite agents unveiled; after being imprisoned and deposed, he managed to escape and flee England. James III Stuart was unaware of the failure of the plot until September 10th 1722. He then departed from Lucca, arriving in Rome on September 21st.⁹⁸ As we have already seen, the Jacobites often saw the north of Italy as a place where they could talk and could organise journeys, even from Corsica, as attested to by British intelligence services. It is important to note that not all English Jacobites were apprehended. Among them was a famous sleeper agent, Phillip Warthon, 1st Duke of Warthon, who became Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of England in 1723.⁹⁹ He went to Rome in 1724, where he founded a Masonic lodge, "*A Loggia Gorgomonica*", without any organic link to the Grand Lodge of London, a Roman lodge whose members would have included the Jacobites Ramsay, Charles Radclyffe and Lord Winton.¹⁰⁰

94 In LANG A. (2012) - The History Of Scotland - Volume 12: From Jacobite Leaders To The End Of Jacobitism, Altenmünster, Jazybee Verlag, p 11.

95 In Public Record Office – SP 35/71/92, State Papers Domestic, George I, Letter to Lord Carteret, 4 July 1722.

96 In (1803) – Reports of Committees of House of Commons – Vol I: Miscellaneous subjects 1715-1735, Letter from Rome, 4 July 1722.

97 In Public Record Office – SP 42/17/173, State Papers Domestic, Letter from Lord Beauclerke, 13 October 1722.

98 In SABBATINI R. (2018) – Una Repubblica tra due Re. La visita a Lucca del Pretendente Stuart Nelle Settimane dell'Atterbury plot in *Mediterranea, ricerche storiche* - Anno XV, Palermo, p 124.

99 In NAUDON P. (2000) - Histoire générale de la Franc-maçonnerie, Paris, Office du Livre, p 36.

100 In CAZZANIGA G. M. Dir. (2006) - Storia d'Italia. Annali 21. La Massoneria, Roma, Einaudi, p 484.

In June 1725, James III Stuart asked the Duke of Warthon to travel to Austria to persuade the Emperor to support his cause.¹⁰¹ On August 23rd 1725, the Duke of Warthon arrived in Vienna and was introduced to the Court by the Irishman Thomas Sherridan as an ambassador for James III Stuart. He begged Count Sinzendorf, Grand Chancellor of Roman and Austrian Emperor Charles VI, for "*the Holy Empire to protect the English people from the tyranny of the Hanoverians*".¹⁰² Warthon saw many Jacobites in the service of Austria, and it is possible that he established a lodge in Vienna during his time there. Additionally, he was responsible for introducing Freemasonry to Spain.

By October, his mission was accomplished and the Duke of Warthon had become a favourite of the Emperor, enjoying great popularity at the Viennese Court. It wasn't until nine months later in London that the agreements between the Emperor and the Pretender were made public; James III Stuart had undertaken to cede Gibraltar and Minorca to the Habsburgs when he regained the English throne.¹⁰³ From that moment on, the interests of the Jacobites were incorporated into the Empire's foreign policy, which was not a secondary consideration when it came to Corsica.

101 *In* MELVILLE L. (1913) - *The life and writings of Philip Duke of Warthon*, London, John Lane, p 152.

102 *In* Public Record Office – SP 85/15 f.82, *State papers foreign, Italian States and Rome*.

103 *In* MELVILLE L. (1913) - *The life and writings of Philip Duke of Warthon*, London, John Lane, p 188.

Some aspects of Jacobite Freemasonry

The opposition between Jacobite and Hanover supporters continued through Freemasonry. If we take the case of France, of the more than one hundred lodges created up to James III Stuart's death in 1766, only six or seven were affiliated with the Grand Lodge of London.¹⁰⁴

The traveling lodges and the chapters set up on the spot provided a framework for the majority of the Jacobite military elite in their various countries of exile and employment.

In Rome in 1722, James III Stuart wanted to establish an order of chivalry based on primitive Scottish rite. Many symbolic lodges claimed to be Templar in heritage, but were placed under the authority of unknown superiors. Phillip Warthon played an important role in spreading the order of strict Templar observance, but even more interesting is the role of brothers George and James Keith. In 1754, George Keith, Earl Marischal, became leader of the order.¹⁰⁵

In Spain, high-ranking Jacobites, including the Duke of Warthon, again crossed paths with the Corsicans. At that time at least 2,500 Corsicans were serving in Spain. Since 1721, the Corcega Regiment alone numbered 1,464 men, divided into 2 battalions of 733 & 731 men.¹⁰⁶ On December 31st 1724, Colonel Niccolò Giovenni was reappointed to lead the Corcega Regiment.

The regiment was stationed in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in Morocco.¹⁰⁷

In March 1726, James III Stuart gave Warthon a letter of recommendation to be delivered to the Spanish Secretary of State, the Duke of Ripperda, on his arrival in Madrid.¹⁰⁸ On May 1st, he celebrated his birthday at the home of the Duke of Liria in the company of a hundred Jacobites.¹⁰⁹ On August 8th 1726, George Lockhart informed the Pretender that he had received confirmation that the Duke of Warthon had converted to Catholicism.¹¹⁰ This baptism would enable Warthon to rise rapidly through the ranks in Spain.

Meanwhile, European foreign policy relations deteriorated again, particularly over international trade questions. A major conflict was prevented thanks to the signing of new treaties; however, naval battles pitted Spain against England in the Caribbean. Madrid, wishing to avenge the affront of the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, made the recapture of Gibraltar from the English its main objective. For their part, the Jacobites speculated that the fall of Gibraltar would considerably weaken the Whigs' government in London. With this in mind, the English Jacobites were particularly active.

104 *In* KERVILLA A. (2019) - Le Baron de Hund et la Stricte Observance Templière, Hyères, Editions la Pierre philosophale, p 13.

105 *Ibid*, p 138.

106 *In* RICCI J.B (2012) – Les soldes et les indemnités des mercenaires corses au service des puissances européennes, au cours de la modernité in De l'histoire militaire de la Corse, Actes du colloque de Bastia du 23/11/2013 – BSSHNC N° 744-745, Bastia, p 150.

107 *In* NUNES J. M. B. (2016) - Presencia italiana en la milicia española, Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire - Numéro 94, Madrid, CHISMI / Ministerio de Defensa, p 16.

108 *In* MELVILLE L. (1913) - The life and writings of Philip Duke of Warthon, London, John Lane, p 173.

109 *Ibid*, p 176.

110 *Ibid*, p 196.

Corsicans and Jacobites at the siege of Gibraltar.

In February 1727, Philip V of Spain sent an expeditionary force of 12,000 men to lay siege to Gibraltar, including all the Irish regiments and a battalion of the Corcega regiment. Let's note that there were also Corsicans present within the Naples Regiment.

Unlike Warthon, George Keith could not find a posting in the Spanish Catholic army because of his Protestant religion. He volunteered as an individual for the siege of Gibraltar, about which he recounted, among other things, the action of the Corcega Regiment, integrated, as is always the case in operations, into the *Guardias Valonas*.

The diary of the Siege of Gibraltar does however allow us to follow the Corsicans closely. Every morning, the General Staff met in the presence of the officers whose units were assigned to the day's military operations, making it possible to distinguish the actions of the Walloon soldiers from those of the Corsicans. Among the Corsican officers were Colonel Francesco Ricchieri (?), Lieutenant Colonel Patricio Leca, Lieutenant Colonel Giuseppe Pinelli, Lieutenant Giovanni Marisi (or Marfisi) for the Corcega Regiment and Colonel Francesco Rocca for the Naples Regiment. Sometimes these Corsican officers planned the nocturnal trench warfare alongside the Jacobite officers. Colonel Francesco Rocca co-led two offensives: one with Colonel Raymond Burke (Limerick Regiment) and another with Lieutenant Colonel David Erskine (Edimburgo Regiment).¹¹¹ It is George Keith's information that tells us that the Corsicans had occupied a trench very close to the fortress defended by 1,000 British soldiers.¹¹² Several hundred workers had been mobilised to dig this trench, an action that took place on the night of February 22nd to 23rd.¹¹³ Earl Marischal was joined by his brother James – Keith, who went to Gibraltar to participate in the battle for the Spanish party by his own choice, and thus without pay.¹¹⁴

While in Barcelona, another prominent Jacobite, and an English subject at that, spontaneously offered his services to the King of Spain: Duke Philip Wharton. Arriving in Gibraltar, he was appointed aide-de-camp to the Earl of Las Torres, as second officer of the Irish Hibernia Regiment. He was in charge of negotiations with the enemy. This position kept him in the trenches, with the help of some alcohol, as his detractors would say.¹¹⁵

111 *In* Biblioteca Nacional de Espana - MSS 5643 - Papeles referentes a Gibraltar, Diario del sitio de Gibraltar, fechado entre el 21 de febrero y 17 de junio de 1727, p 113 and p 151.

112 *In* CONSTABLE T. (1843) – A Fragment of a memoir of Field-Marshal James Keith written by himself (1714-1731), Edinburgh, Splading Club, p 73.

113 *In* Dodd J. S. (1781) - The ancient and modern history of Gibraltar. With an accurate journal of the siege of that fortress, Feb. 13 to June 23, 1727, London, John Murray, p 90.

114 *In* CUTHELL E. E. (1915) - The scottish friend of frederic the great, The last Earl Marischall – Vol. I, London, Stanley Paul, p 41.

115 *In* IMPARTIAL HAND (1732) - The Life and Writing of Philip Late Duke of Warton, London, John Wilford, p 20.

According to George Keith, the trench closest to the first British outpost was the one held by the Corsicans. During night-time attacks by other Spanish units, the Corcega Regiment was positioned so close to the English lines that they were mistakenly fired upon twice by Corsican forces who thought they were English raids. The Corsicans distinguished themselves in battle many times throughout the English bombardment. On the night of April 1st 1727, the Corcega Regiment lost 12 men (including a lieutenant), with 16 wounded.¹¹⁶ On April 19th, the Naples Regiment lost 4 men, including Captain Camillio Tani; 12 were wounded.¹¹⁷

One of the more memorable moments was on the night of May 14th, when a Corsican company was at the side of the Duke of Wharton. The Duke of Wharton, a great brandy lover, was said to have shouted “*Long live the Pretender*”¹¹⁸ just next to the British line for most of the night. He was interrupted by powerful enemy fire, and a bomb exploded, killing 9 soldiers and wounding 23 others, including Wharton himself and Lieutenant Giovanni Marisi(?).¹¹⁹ The fate of this great Jacobite figure and the Corsican lieutenant was reported in the Madrid gazette.¹²⁰

On the Irish side, it was the Limerick Regiment, owned by the Duke of Liria, that was most involved, on five occasions, in the military operations. It is clear that Corsican soldiers once again spent time with these men, including Sergeant Major John O’Dea, whom we will discuss later. Several members of this regiment had already rubbed shoulders with the Corsican soldiers ten years earlier, and this special link between the Limerick Regiment and Corsica will have repercussions to which we shall return.

On June 11th 1727, George I of Hanover died. On June 23rd, a general ceasefire was declared in Gibraltar following negotiations. In November, the siege of Gibraltar came to an end. It was not until November 9th 1729, with the Treaty of Seville, that the official end of the Anglo-Spanish War was proclaimed. After negotiations, England kept control of Gibraltar and Minorca while Spain formed a new alliance with England, France, and the Netherlands. This alliance agreed to protect the leadership of the Duchess of Parma and a younger branch of the Spanish Bourbons over the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza and Tuscany. This objectively foreshadowed new tensions to come with Roman Emperor Charles VI.

116 In Biblioteca Nacional de España - MSS 5643 - Papeles referentes a Gibraltar, Diario del sitio de Gibraltar, fechado entre el 21 de febrero y 17 de junio de 1727, p 54.

117 In Archivos Estatales – OSUNA,CT.198, D55, Archivo Histórico de la Nobleza, Crónica de la Guerra de Gibraltar, narrando todas las operaciones militares desarrolladas entre el 17 y el 25 de abril de 1727, p 14.

118 In MELVILLE L. (1913) - The life and writings of Philip Duke of Warthon, London, John Lane, p 205.

119 In Biblioteca Nacional de España - MSS 5643 - Papeles referentes a Gibraltar, Diario del sitio de Gibraltar, fechado entre el 21 de febrero y 17 de junio de 1727, p 136.

120 In Gaceta de Madrid n° 21, 27 May 1727, p 127.

What we will remember about the siege of Gibraltar in 1727 is that a few Corsican soldiers in the service of Spain fought alongside central figures in Jacobitism for four months. In the context of the times, the brothers George and James Keith were seen as the most valiant war leaders in the Stuart camp. George Keith, Earl Marischal, had been elevated to the rank of Knight of the Garter by James III Stuart, and the Corsicans' closeness in the trenches to Phillip Wharton, who was responsible for spreading Jacobitism through Freemasonry, cannot be ignored. Wharton set up a Masonic lodge in Madrid in 1728 to continue his work.¹²¹

What are we to make of the place occupied by the Corcega Regiment in the Keith brothers' memories?

Did they see it as just another unit?

Did closer contacts develop between Jacobites and Corsicans, echoing those already established between 1717 and 1720?

George Keith, Earl Marischal, writing to Jean Jacques Rousseau, wrote a phrase heavy with meaning: "*I have been Corsican several times*".¹²²

During the siege of Gibraltar, James Francis Fitz-James, Duke of Liria, was appointed ambassador of the Spanish Court to Russia. He quickly announced that he would visit James III Stuart on his way to his new post. He arrived in Genoa on April 25th. On April 29th, he traveled to Bologna to the Palazzo Fantuzzi, where he stayed with James III Stuart until May 4th.¹²³ On this occasion, he was elevated to the rank of Knight of the Garter. But these five days must have been used to discuss concrete political prospects for the future of the Royal House of Stuart. The Duke of Liria was to become a central figure in Jacobitism, at the heart of all sensitive discussions. During this period, there was talk of the emergence of a "*Scottish Crusade*" throughout Europe, led by spies, Masons, members of secret societies, or all at once, to convince various governments to support the Stuart cause. This vast Jacobite enterprise produced results in Sweden and Vienna in particular.

During this period, Chancellor Sinzendorf informed the Jacobite spy Theodore de Neuhoff of "*the Austrian government's involvement in a project aimed at the restoration of the Stuarts*", continuing the agreements made with the Pretender. From this period onwards, Théodore de Neuhoff became a spy in the imperial service, carrying out missions in most of the Italian states.¹²⁴ His precise role as a Jacobite spy, imperial spy or double agent is of little importance, since, having been placed under Sinzendorf's tutelage, he continued de facto to work directly or indirectly for the Stuart cause.

121 In PITTOCK M. (2013) - Material Culture and Sedition, 1688-1760 : Treacherous Objects, Secret places, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, p 111.

122 In CUTHELL E. E. (1915) - The scottish friend of frederic the great, The last Earl Marischall – Vol. II, London, Stanley Paul, p 208.

123 In CORP E. (2011) – The Stuart in Italy 1719-1766, a royal court in permanent exile, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 186.

124 In PIRIE V. (1939) – His Majesty of Corsica, The True Story of the Adventurous Life of Theodore 1st, London, D. Appleton & Co, p 221.

Earl Marischal helped found a secret society in Spain, the Order of Toboso (Tobosan Order). The Duke of Liria was also one of its initiators. In January 1728, on his arrival in Saint Petersburg as Spanish ambassador, James Francis Fitz-James, Duke of Liria, became Grand Master of the Russian chapter of the Tobosan Order.¹²⁵

With the help of James Keith and Admiral Thomas Gordon, the Duke of Liria extensively used the brotherhood for political activity and espionage missions on behalf of his uncle James III Stuart. They kept up a regular and close correspondence with Earl Marischal.

125 /n MACINNES A. I. GERMAN K. GRAHAM L. (2015) – Living with Jacobitism, 1690-1788 : The three kingdom and beyond, Routledge, Ebook Edition, London – 288 p - p 177.

The Order of Toboso (1726-1739)

The Order of Toboso was a fraternity of “knights errant” whose members were high-ranking Jacobite officials with various motivations.

The jubilant, self-deprecating reference to Toboso’s Dulcinea, Don Quixote’s love, shows that the desire to restore the golden age of the Stuarts was akin to wanting to build a castle in the sky. But at the same time, the identification with Don Quixote refers to the virtuous principles of a character that rights wrongs. It is a symbolic way of contrasting the Hanoverian order with a chivalric camaraderie upholding the highest notions of nobility, humanity, charity, and benevolence.

Some of its most eminent members are also Freemasons. A particular feature is the presence of women within the fraternity, a particularly progressive practice for the time.

In fact, its members formed a powerful pan-European network stretching from the Baltic to the eastern Mediterranean, via the Atlantic seaboard, all in the service of the Stuart royal family. This is no joke, as some would have us believe.

All of its members wore a green ring with the words “*To a fair meeting on the green*”, the motto of this Jacobite fraternity. In 1732, Princes Charles Edward and Henry Benedict Stuart joined the Order and became its protectors.

The « Malcontents » of Corsica, potential allies for Jacobites?

In the first quarter of the 18th century, Corsican relations with the Republic of Genoa deteriorated considerably for many reasons. In their minds, the Corsicans no longer saw themselves as subjects of the Genoese power, which in their eyes had lost much of its credibility in the game of European powers; the humiliation they had suffered at the hands of French Louis XIV had left its mark.

The Corsicans saw themselves more as associates on an equal footing with the Genoese than their subordinates. Added to this was the pressure of taxation and the excesses of the tax collectors, against a backdrop of corruption, facts denounced by the Genoese governor Spinola as early as 1718. Finally, the vagaries of the climate in 1727 and 1728, the agricultural calamities that followed, and the great grain shortage further fuelled Corsican resentment against Genoese tutelage, foreshadowing a period of revolution.

In January 1729, Luigi Giafferi asked the Magistro Supremo di Corsica for an urgent meeting of the Nobles Twelve, the council representing the Corsicans in the Genoese administration. Luigi Giafferi belonged to the clan of “*Venetians*” who were hostile to the continued Genoese tutelage.

Many Corsicans, having pursued military or commercial careers abroad, had nothing but contempt for Genoa, and some were determined to stir up unrest and armed revolt. Luigi Giafferi’s brother-in-law, Andria Ceccaldi, had armed supporters in his entourage whose plans caused Genoa enough concern that on 27 September 1729, the Genoese governor Felice Pinelli asked all his troops stationed at the island’s landing stages to intercept Fabio Vinciguerra, a member of the Ceccaldi clan.¹²⁶ In December 1729, during the collection of *Taglie* (taxes), Corsicans revolted against the Genoese in *Bozio* (a Corsican region).¹²⁷ This event is considered to be the founding act of the Corsican Revolutions that followed.

During this period, any sail that crossed the coast of Corsica attracted the attention of the Genoese navy, and it was within this context that an armed Genoese barque intercepted a *tartane*. On board was George Keith, Earl Marischal. The Genoese soldiers probably didn’t know who they were dealing with and simply ordered him to leave Corsican territorial waters.

But George Keith is precise: it was in 1729 “*that he embraced Corsica*” for the first time, and only for a short time at that.¹²⁸

126 In LUCIANI E., TADDEI D. (2012) - Les pères fondateurs de la nation corse (1729-1733), Ajaccio, Albiana, p 37.

127 In GRAZIANI A. M. (2002) - Pascal Paoli, Père de la patrie Corse, Paris, Tallandier, p 39.

128 In CUTHELL E. E. (1915) - The scottish friend of frederic the great, The last Earl Marischall – Vol. II, London, Stanley Paul, p 208.

George Keith's presence in Corsica in 1729 raises many questions. Did he receive a recommendation from Corsicans he had encountered during his time in Spain? Did he have contacts with Corsican clan chiefs hostile to Genoa, whom he himself did not remember fondly? Was he able to assess the general situation on the island and gauge its potential from the point of view of Jacobite interests? Did he prepare the ground for other contacts? Lastly, did he happen to observe the initial uprisings in Corsica?

It is difficult to find sources that would allow us to know more about this episode. However, we have been able to verify that in 1728 the Bishop of Atterbury, in exile in Paris, had indeed asked James III Stuart to order George Keith, Earl Marischal, to leave Spain and go to him in Rome.¹²⁹

Moreover, George Keith often spoke of the impossibility of getting any kind of promotion in Catholic Spain. It is entirely credible that he traveled through Corsica on his way to Italy, which would support his statement. Coincidentally, shortly after Earl Marischal's arrival in Rome, Chancellor Sinzendorf sent orders from Vienna for Theodore de Neuhoff. The spy's mission was to investigate the causes of the Corsican revolt against Genoa.¹³⁰

A few months later, Don Carlos, son of the King of Spain, traveled to Italy to monitor the negotiations surrounding the application of the provisions of the Treaty of Seville, which provided for establishing his rights over the States of Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany. Earl Marischal returned to Spain shortly after these negotiations.

On January 25th 1730, the Corsicans began an armed uprising against Genoa. A militia made of the local Corsican population marched on Bastia on the 29th. The events significantly impacted Europe and were carefully monitored by the different courts. In the press of Frederick William I of Prussia, news from Corsica in the summer of 1730 was treated with equal importance to other international political events, particularly in relation to the Treaty of Seville.¹³¹ We learn that the Malcontents feared that the Republic of Genoa would call in foreign aid.

This fear was justified; while the Corsicans began to pin their hopes on the Spanish Court intervening on their behalf, Genoa turned to the Habsburgs in Vienna.¹³²

129 *In* CORP E. (2014) - *The Stuarts in Italy, 1719-1766: A Royal Court In Permanent Exil*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 199.

130 *In* PIRIE V. (1939) – *His Majesty of Corsica, The True Story of the Adventurous Life of Theodore 1st*, London, D. Appleton & Co, p 222.

131 *In* Gazette de Berne, Wednesday, 16 August 1730, p 1.

132 *In* LUCIANI E., TADDEI D. (2012) - *Les pères fondateurs de la nation corse (1729-1733)*, Ajaccio, Albiana, p 163.

The Jacobites no longer hoped to receive foreign military aid to attempt a new expedition to Great Britain, and James III Stuart's finances were so dilapidated that the Vatican had to come to his financial aid, and sumptuously at that. Europe was more concerned with the future of relations between Vienna and the new allies than with the fate of the Stuart Pretender. Faced with this terrible isolation, the Jacobites paid close attention to what was happening in Corsica, a territory whose strategic potential they knew and where they necessarily had, if not relays, at least acquaintances, and had had for several years.

Professor Murray Pittock, as specialist in the Jacobite movement in all its political, cultural, and philosophical aspects, sheds light on this question. According to his extensive research, Jacobites often identified with European rebel movements. Some of them directly contributed to and/or participated in these movements. This was also the case for the Corsican movement from at least the 1730's.¹³³ In other words, if the Stuart Pretender had made any plans with the Corsican revolutionaries, many Jacobites would have joined the movement without question.

On a mission to Rome from the Corsican leaders, Canon Orticoni met the French Ambassador, Cardinal de Polignac, and told him: "*The Corsican people were ready to place themselves under the protection of any sovereign who would grant it to them, and even to recognize him as King, provided he was a Catholic*".¹³⁴ Cardinal de Polignac explained why his Court could not support an uprising and set a bad example in Europe. After this French refusal, the Catholic King James III Stuart became a de facto potential interlocutor for the Corsicans.

133 /n PITTOCK M. (2006) - Poetry and Jacobite Politics in Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 82.

134 /n De FLASSAN (1809) - Histoire générale et raisonnée de la Diplomatie Française, Tome Cinquieme, Paris, Lenormant, p 10.

Part III - The Stuarts Pretenders and their view of Corsica (1731-1765)

The Earl Marischal's plans for the Stuart and Corsica.

James Francis FitzJames Stuart, also known as the Duke of Liria, was appointed as the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Spanish Court to Habsburg Emperor Charles VI in Vienna on January 23rd, 1731. His main task was to ensure the application of the provisions of various treaties guaranteeing Spain's suzerainty rights over certain Italian territories. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, Jean-Gaston de' Medici, summoned the *Infante* Don Carlos of Spain to join him as his heir. At the same time, and quite unusually for a Protestant, Earl Marischal was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel of the King's Guard (*Guardias del Rey*), an eminent political position and a sign of great confidence on the part of Catholic Spain. No doubt, some of the beneficial effects of activities linked to emerging Freemasonry in Spain.

The correspondence between the Duke of Liria and Earl Marischal seems to have been impacted by the Duke's departure for Vienna. In a letter to his brother James, dated February 21st 1731, George expressed concern about lost letters that had gone unanswered.¹³⁵

James III Stuart ordered George to return to his Court in Rome.

On March 6th 1731, Earl Marischal wrote again to his brother to express his reservations about returning to Rome, which he would do in any case, but he wrote, "*I do not see how I could make any progress on the grand design and I do not wish to work on it in a small way.*"¹³⁶

From all his correspondence with his brother, it is clear that he was more concerned with practical work in the field (with the Duke of Liria?) than with wasting his time on social occasions at the Jacobite Court in Rome. From Rome, Earl Marischal explained the project he was working on. It was a plan that would have made him Prime Minister of Corsica on behalf of the Stuart dynasty regarding this project.¹³⁷ In his coded letters he specified that he planned to get "*James, or in any case Prince Charles*" to Corsica.^{138 139}

Many English Jacobites, including George Kelly, would have supported this project. Phillip Wharton may also have subscribed to it, shortly before his death.¹⁴⁰ For these Protestant Freemasons, Corsica was a preferable destination to Rome.

135 *In* Historical Manuscripts Commission (1884) – Ninth Report – Part II - Appendix and Index, London, Eyre and Spotswoode, p 200.

136 *Ibid*, p 201.

137 *In* SHIELD A., LANG A. (1907) - *The King over the water*, London, Longmans Green & Co, p 386.

138 *In* LANG A. (1898) - *The companions of Pickle*, London, Longmans Green & Co, p 29.

139 *In* DRUMMOND NORIE W. (1903) - *The Life & Adventures of Prince Charles Edward Stuart* - Volume 1, London, Caxton publishing Company, p 40.

140 *In* SHIELD A., LANG A. (1907) - *The King over the water*, London, Longmans Green & Co, p 387.

This idea was far from unrealistic, as Corsica would have provided a base from which to restore the political weight of the Royal House of Stuart. However, the Corsicans must still be consulted and approve the project to proceed. It was, therefore, necessary to find key men to negotiate with the Corsican malcontents, while preserving good relations with the Vatican, Spain, and Vienna.

Meanwhile, in Genoa, Theodore of Neuhoff carried out his mission under the false identity of an English Earl. He encountered Merchant Smith, whose shop was a haunt for Corsican patriots passing through. Not only was Theodore of Neuhoff able to gather much information about the political situation in Corsica, but he also openly supported the Corsican rebels.¹⁴¹

The Republic of Genoa was well aware of the Jacobite activity and the help given to the Corsicans by Royal Navy officers. On May 1st 1731, its Secretary of State in London, Giambattista Gastaldi, sent the Duke of Newcastle an important memorandum addressed to the King.¹⁴² He explained that the Republic of Genoa did not have the means to guard all the holds in Corsica and that British subjects were supplying the rebels against the advice of their Sovereigns, including the English.

Canon Orticoni had been in Rome on behalf of the Corsican rebel leaders Giafferi and Ceccaldi since May 2nd 1731.¹⁴³ On May 4th 1731, Spanish officers from Porto Longone travelled to Rome, and on the same day James III Stuart had an audience with the Pope before leaving Rome.¹⁴⁴ On May 22nd 1731, he arrived in Naples and nobody knows why he went there. He met many Englishmen, Scotsmen and Irishmen in the service of Spain garrisoned there.¹⁴⁵

But the Gazette de Berne revealed the real reason for his visit a few days later: *"It is said that an islander people call the Chevalier de St George to be their King, and that he has already left Rome to go there"*.¹⁴⁶

M. de Campredon, the French King's envoy in Rome, provided more detailed information to Versailles. He believed that *"the sudden travels of the Pretender may have been planned by the Pope and the Spanish Court, possibly relating to Corsica. It is suspected that His Holiness will aid in the pretender's attempt to gain control of the island. The recent journey of rebel general Giafferi to Livorno or Porto Longone is also suspected to be connected to this plan"*.¹⁴⁷

141 In PIRIE V. (1939) – His Majesty of Corsica, The True Story of the Adventurous Life of Theodore 1st, London, D. Appleton & Co, p 227.

142 In Public Record Office – PC1/5/1 f.7, Privy Council.

143 In VERGE-FRANCESCHI M. (2005) - Paoli : un Corse des lumières, Paris, Fayard, p 111.

144 In Gazette de France, N° 22, 2 June 1731, p 229.

145 In Gazette de Berne, Mercredi 13 June 1731, p 1.

146 In Gazette de Berne, Samedi 16 June 1731, p 3.

147 In Archives Diplomatiques - 41CP87 - Gênes / Correspondances Politiques Lettre du 29 Mai 1731, M. Campredon à M. Maurepas.

In London, on the advice of his Privy Council, King George II issued an important proclamation about Corsica on June 12th 1731.¹⁴⁸

The proclamation stated, in particular concerning the Corsican rebels:

“that they could not have survived so long in their revolt if ships from different nations had not delivered arms and war supplies to them, against the advice of their sovereigns. (...) We ask our naval officers not to send any more ships to Corsica with war supplies, but also that the ships belonging to our subjects must abstain from pursuing such a trade, which only tends to support the said rebels in their revolt (...)”.

The King of Great Britain recognised the direct involvement of individuals of British origin in assisting the Corsicans.

June 20th, James III Stuart had a long conversation with the Pope about his stay in Naples.^{149 150} The following day, the Pope received Canon Orticoni.¹⁵¹ Whether in Naples or Rome, if Canon Orticoni and James III Stuart met, it could not have happened without the approval of Pope Clement XII, who supported the Pretender financially (with a pension of 10,000 scudi per year) and logistically.¹⁵²

Finally, on June 27th, the Duke of Liria went to Florence to negotiate the installation of Spanish regiments in Livorno and Portoferraio, the two ports closest to Corsica.¹⁵³ It's hard to see all this Jacobite political turmoil as just a series of coincidences, as the sequence of events is so perfectly coherent. Then, on July 17th, James III Stuart and his son Prince Charles Edward had a long meeting with the Pope, about which nothing is known.^{154 155}

In this new period, when Earl Marischal's project seemed to be taking a more concrete shape, it was time to enter a more active phase and send emissaries to Corsica. But a foreseeable event was to put a stop to the Corsican project.

On July 19th, an assistance agreement was signed in Milan between Emperor Charles VI and the Republic of Genoa, which had called on Vienna for help as early as April 20th. It was a hard blow for the Jacobite Court, but certainly not a surprise. They had to maintain communication channels with the Corsicans and find officers to leave for the island. Without betraying the Emperor, they could continue to negotiate secretly with the Corsican malcontents if the opportunity arose.

148 *In* The London Gazette, N° 6995, Saturday, 12 June 1731, p 1.

149 *In* Diario ordinario di Roma, N° 2167, 23 June 1731, p 7.

150 *In* Caledonian Mercury, Thursday, 12 August 1731, p 4.

151 *In* Gazette de Berne, Saturday, 14 July 1731, p 4.

152 *In* CORP E. (2014) - The Stuarts in Italy, 1719-1766: A Royal Court In Permanent Exil, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 215.

153 *In* BERWICK (1890) - Duque de Berwick « Conquista de Nápoles y Sicilia y Relación de Moscovia », Madrid, Tello, p III.

154 *In* Diario ordinario di Roma, N° 2179, 21 July 1731, p 4.

155 *In* Caledonian Mercury, Thursday, 12 August 1731, p 4.

The Austrian regiments landed at Bastia on the night of the 9th to 10th of August 1731, where they fought fierce battles. During the months of September and October 1731, during the Austrian offensive on Vescovato, there were many talks between the Corsicans and the Austrians, which to the great displeasure of the Genoese, led to the signing of a protocol with the Corsican malcontents.¹⁵⁶ During this period of calm, on September 16th 1731, the Pope received Cardinal Giovanni Battista Spinola (legate of Parma and Piacenza) to discuss the situation in Corsica, and during the same audience, he also received the "*Knight of St George accompanied by the Prince his son.*"^{157 158 159} It would be completely fanciful to imagine that the Pretender Stuart did not discuss Corsican affairs with the Pope.

However, on September 28th, a battalion of the Austrian O'Neillan Regiment landed in Corsica and headed for Vescovato.¹⁶⁰ In this regiment was Lieutenant Colonel of Grenadiers Ulysses Maximillian Browne.

Ulysses Maximillian Browne came from an ancient family in County Limerick in Ireland. His father Ulysses and his uncle George, both staunch Jacobites, had left Ireland in 1691 to follow James II Stuart into exile. George Browne commanded the 57th Imperial Infantry Regiment from 1723 until he died in Pavia on October 10th 1729. Since January 15th 1731, the regiment had been under the command of his cousin Francis Patrick O'Neillan, also a staunch Jacobite. Both the men and their regiment were stationed in Italy for extended periods, giving them many opportunities to meet messengers from the Jacobite Court and/or its more enterprising supporters.

The Corsicans tried to put the Emperor in a position to mediate between them and the Genoese. It was most likely during this period of temporisation that Ulysses Maximillian Browne and other Jacobites of the O'Neillan Regiment were able to continue secretly pleading the cause of James III Stuart. The Papal press reported a fact of the utmost importance: Count Philipp Ludwig Wenzel von Sinzendorf, Grand Chancellor to Emperor Charles VI, arrived unexpectedly in Rome on 14 October 1731 and went to King James III Stuart at the Villa Mondragone in Frascati.¹⁶¹

It is perhaps worth remembering that Sinzendorf, a Protestant Freemason, had been in close contact with the Duke of Warthon and the Jacobite Court since 1725, that he himself was pro-Jacobite, and that he commissioned Theodore of Neuhoff. Things now seem a little clearer.

156 In LUCIANI E., TADDEI D. (2012) - Les pères fondateurs de la nation corse (1729-1733), Ajaccio, Albiana, p 301.

157 In Diario ordinario di Roma, N° 2206, 22 September 1731, p 4.

158 In Gazette de France, N°41, 13 October 1731, P 487.

159 In Caledonian Mercury, Thursday, 14 October 1731, p 2.

160 In GERBA R. (1901) - Guerre in Sicilia e in Corsica negli anni 1717-1720 e 1730-1732, Torino, Edizione dello Stato Maggiore Generale, p 227.

161 In Gazzetta di Bologna, N°43, 23 October 1731, p 1.

Not all these dealings and rumors were lost on the Republic of Genoa. On October 18th 1731, the Secretary of State of the Republic of Genoa in London, Giambattista Gastaldi, rushed to see George II at Hampton Court. He introduced the Marquis of Spinola, who carried a memorandum on the Corsican rebels for the King.¹⁶²

On November 5th 1731, the Genoese secretary Sorba mentioned a rumor that the Corsican rebels were “*very obstinate and strong in the desire for a sovereign.*”¹⁶³ Information sent to London told of secret negotiation, and the rumor that “*the island of Corsica would become a kingdom for the Knight of St George.*”^{164 165} After the offensive on Vescovato, the Austrian Imperialists took up winter quarters in Bastia.

Meanwhile, in Barcelona, an Anglo-Spanish fleet of 48 ships, carrying the Infant Don Carlos and 7,438 Spanish soldiers, set sail for Italy on October 17th 1731. The first ships arrived in Livorno on October 26th.¹⁶⁶ The Grand Duke of Tuscany authorised the Spanish troops to take possession of the fortresses of Livorno, Pisa and Portoferraio.

On 2 November 1731, the Naples Regiment of the Spanish army provisionally took possession of the fortress of Livorno.¹⁶⁷

This regiment, which employed a large number of Corsicans, incorporated the remaining battalion of the Corcega Regiment.¹⁶⁸ In other words, all the Corsicans who had been close to the Irish Jacobites were in Italy. At the time, the Regiment had 88 officers and 1,380 soldiers. This Corsican reinforcement came at just the right time for the Jacobites’ plans.

In January 1732, hostilities resumed in Corsica, with the famous battle of Calenzana, during which Ulyse Maximilian Browne had his thigh pierced by a sword. On April 7th 1732, the second battalion of the O’Neillan Regiment landed at San Fiorenzo.¹⁶⁹ Earl John Sigismund Maguire commanded it, whose father James had fled Ireland with James II Stuart. With the full regiment of Jacobite infantry from Austria on Corsican soil, the Corsican revolutionaries once again sought mediation.

On May 1st 1732, the imperial officers were all in Castifao and the advance guard was camped in Moltifao.¹⁷⁰ This was the day that a delegation sent by the Corsican leader Giafferi delivered a memorandum for the Prince of Württemberg.

162 *In Gazette de Berne*, 3 November 1731, p 2.

163 *In GRAZIANI A. M. (2004) -Vistigue Corse, Guide des sources de l’histoire de la Corse dans les archives génoises (1483-1790) - Tome 1, Volume 2, Ajaccio, Piazzola / A.D de la Corse du Sud*, p 65.

164 *In The Dublin University Magazine - Volume 44, 1854, Dublin, Mc Glashan*, p 739.

165 *In GRANT J. (1858) – The Cavaliers of fortune or british heroes in foreign wars*, London, Routledge & sons, p 114.

166 *In The Monthly Intelligencer*, November 1731, p 452.

167 *In Gazette de berne*, 21 November 1731, p 2 et p 4.

168 *In Biblioteca Nacional de Espana – 3/68905 – SAMMANIEGO J. A. (1738) - Disertacion sobre la antiguedad de los regimientos de infanteria, cavalleria, y dragones de España / quadernillo primero [segundo] de los dos, que para servir de prontuario à la respuesta fiscal, escrivia*, p 376.

169 *In GERBA R. (1901) - Guerre in Sicilia e in Corsica negli anni 1717-1720 e 1730-1732*, Torino, Edizione dello Stato Maggiore Generale, p 249.

170 *Ibid*, p 257.

Immediately afterwards, the four Corsican leaders, Giafferi, Ceccaldi, Aitelli and Raffali, surrendered to the imperials. Perhaps providing an occasion to pass on messages. On June 6th 1732, with the gradual departure of the Austrians from Corsican soil, the O’Neillan regiment left Corsica.

When the four Corsican leaders were held captive in Genoa, Theodore of Neuhoff sent a very favorable report of the Corsicans to Sinzendorf. He used all of his recommendations from Vienna and those of his friend, the Prince of Wuttemberg, as leverage on the Doge of Genoa.¹⁷¹ This led to the transfer of the Corsican leaders to Savona, where their imprisonment was far less strict. Giovanni Guicciardi, ambassador of the Holy German Empire in Genoa, passed on the discontent of the Genoese, but the Austrian Court replied that the release of the Corsican chiefs was a matter for “*maggiore intelligenze*”,¹⁷² i.e. directly for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Sinzendorf! With a direct mandate from the Court of Vienna, Theodore de Neuhoff obtained their definitive release on April 22nd 1733.¹⁷³

During the autumn of 1733, James III Stuart received word of a plot to abduct his two sons, Princes Charles Edward and Henry Benedict Stuart.¹⁷⁴ Within this context, Earl Marischal once more encouraged James III Stuart to send Prince Charles Edward to Corsica.¹⁷⁵

Thus Corsica would appear more safe for the Stuart Princes than Rome. For a military expert such as Earl Marischal to come to this opinion suggests that he could rely on the support of many Corsicans and was assured of safety there.

After the end of the Austrian campaign in Corsica, Ceccaldi and Orticoni tried to place Corsica under the direct protection of Spain. That said, the Jacobite Court still had solid support at the Court of Madrid. From Rome, the Earl Marischal designated an abbey near Avignon as a meeting place for sensitive discussions.¹⁷⁶

171 In PIRIE V. (1939) – His Majesty of Corsica, The True Story of the Adventurous Life of Theodore 1st., London, D. Appleton & Co, p 228.

172 In Archivio di Stato di Milano, Carteggi Consolari –Busto 46, Letter, Ebenstein to Guicciardi, 19 April 1733.

173 In The Dublin University Magazine - Volume 63, 1864, Dublin, George Herbert, p 595.

174 In CORP E. (2014) - The Stuarts in Italy, 1719-1766: A Royal Court In Permanent Exil, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 217.

175 In LANG A. (1903) - Prince Charles Edward Stuart: The Young Chevalier, London, Longmans & Green, p 32.

176 In Archives Diplomatiques - 7MD/84 f. 30 - Angleterre / Mémoires et documents, Letter, Earl Marischal to Lord Sempil, 10 October 1732.

Corsicans and Jacobites in the War of Polish Succession

In September 1733, the War of Polish Succession broke out between France, Spain, and Sardinia on one side and Austria, Russia, Saxony, and Prussia on the other. Giafferi was called to Turin for a confidential meeting with the leader of the Spanish military, Count de Charny.¹⁷⁷

The Infante Don Carlos of Spain moved towards the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies at the head of a powerful army, including the new Corcega Regiment, reconstituted on February 10th 1734 and placed under the command of Colonel Bartolomeo Seta Bastelica.¹⁷⁸ The Spanish military administration states that this regiment was one of three infantry regiments in the Walloon Guards...

Brigadier General James Francis FitzJames Stuart, Duke of Liria, led this army. The 40,000-strong army invaded the Papal States and then the Kingdom of Naples, unopposed. Don Carlos seized the throne of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies after entering Naples on May 7th 1734. The Spanish army then moved towards the Adriatic coast to meet and confront the Austrian army. During this military campaign, the Jacobite Court was able to measure the Corsicans' worth in battle.

The Battle of Bitonto occurred on May 24th 1734, with the Walloon Guards in the front line. According to a French officer, "*The Walloon Guards had the honors of this decisive day for the fate of the Kingdom of Naples; it was they who knocked down the Austrians' right wing and put it to such a rout that it dragged the bulk of the army with it*".¹⁷⁹ The toll of this heroic action was high, with the loss of 300 soldiers. All of the Spanish, Italian, and French sources consulted confirm the same facts. This feat of arms was highly publicized in Spain. Captain Giovanni Battista Tasso, of the Corcega Regiment, was promoted to Governor of Bari.¹⁸⁰ For a month, the Madrid press would talk about the exploits of the Corsicans (*Los Corzos*) and the French in the Italian campaign.

After the battle of Bitonto, the Chief of Staff of the Spanish army in Italy, the Count of Montemar, had emphasised the decisive role of the grenadiers. He decided to bring together all the grenadier companies of the Walloon Guards and set up an elite unit, the *Grenadiers Réunis*. The bulk of the Spanish army headed for the Mediterranean coast to lay siege to the stronghold of Gaète. The siege began in July, with a classic progression of trench digging and artillery support.

177 In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2491, A.S.G / Lettere Ministri, Torino, Letter, 24 September 1733.

178 In Biblioteca Nacional de España – 3/68905 – SAMMANIEGO J. A. (1738) - Disertacion sobre la antigüedad de los regimientos de infanteria, cavalleria, y dragones de España / quadernillo primero [segundo] de los dos, que para servir de prontuario à la respuesta fiscal, escrivia, p 217.

179 In DU BOSQ DE BEAUMONT (1904) - La garde wallonne (1702-1822) : officiers français au service de l'Espagne, Paris, Conseil héraldique de France, p 20.

180 In Gaceta de Madrid, n° 34, 24 August 1734, p 168.

The entire Spanish general staff scrutinised the operations, and Don Carlos had a front-row seat. The 20-year-old King was in the presence of his Brigadier General, James Francis Fitz-James, Duke of Liria, but several distinguished guests who had their first war experience also joined him. These included Prince Charles Edward Stuart then aged 14, and his valet, John Stuart de Bute.¹⁸¹ The latter was the future Prime Minister of Great Britain who ended the Seven Years' War in 1763. We will return later to the Stuarts de Bute and their links with Corsica and the Jacobites.

The Duke of Liria was honored to welcome his young cousin at the request of James III Stuart, explaining the military operations, and instructing him in the art of war. He reviewed the actions of each unit with him as of July 31st 1734.¹⁸² On August 6th 1734, troops from the Walloon Guards were positioned at the front line. These were the Hainaut Regiment, the Corcega Regiment and the *Grenadiers Réunis*.¹⁸³

It was precisely on that day that the Austrians capitulated. It was, therefore, in a moment of great enthusiasm shared in abundance with Don Carlos that Prince Charles Edward Stuart crossed paths with Corsican soldiers for the first time in his life.

The Corcega Regiment moved to Sicily to continue Don Carlos's military campaign, whose victory was certain. This situation encouraged the Spanish party in Corsica to send a delegation to Madrid.

After lengthy negotiations, Canon Orticoni failed to obtain Spain's agreement to bring Corsica into the territory of the young king of Naples and Sicily. A member of the Corsican delegation, Agostino Ceccaldi, deeply disappointed, then enlisted in the Spanish army.

In September 1734, the Duke of Liria was informed of his father's death in Germany and took the title of Second Duke of Berwick.

181 *In* CORP E. (2014) - *The Stuarts in Italy, 1719-1766: A Royal Court in Permanent Exil*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 310.

182 *In* BERWICK (1890) - *Duque de Berwick « Conquista de Nápoles y Sicilia y Relación de Moscovia »*, Madrid, Tello, p 108.

183 *In* Biblioteca Nacional de España – MR/43/278 - *Plano del Frente de Tierra de la Plaça de Gaète con los Ataques formados por las tropas de S.M.C. la que se rendió el dia 6 de agosto de 1734*, Madrid.

Theodore I of Corsica and the Jacobites.

In January 1735, the Corsicans gathered in Orezza to proclaim Corsican independence and appoint Don Luigi Giafferi, Giacinto Paoli and Andrea Ceccaldi as General Protectors of the Nation. This news aroused curiosity in all the European Courts. Hanover's England showed renewed interest in the Corsican insurgents, and so too the French, with the envoy from Versailles, Campredon, also instructed to form a French party in Corsica. The Jacobites therefore had serious competitors in their plans for Corsica.

Earl Marischal's project was still on the cards. Cardinals in Rome circulated the news that "*there is serious talk of one of the Stuart Princes being made King of Corsica, currently in revolt against Genoa*".¹⁸⁴

It was now clear that the Jacobites would try a more direct approach with the Corsican revolutionaries. Whenever the Jacobites went on a political offensive, they prepared the ground several months in advance by sending their spies and emissaries to establish a bridgehead to obtain maximum guarantees.

The Jacobites were able to draw on a large number of human resources in Tuscany, mainly Corsican and Irish soldiers. Regiments of the Spanish army in Italy began to see their numbers reduced.

At the beginning of February 1735, the Corcega Regiment was in Florence¹⁸⁵ and the Naples Regiment in Livorno. Many of these soldiers had frequented the Jacobites, but some were beginning to return to Corsica. A Corsican Captain of the Regiment of Naples brought with him several debauched officers from their regiment to the island, along with a lot of arms and ammunition.¹⁸⁶

It gets even better: the Irish Limerick Regiment had been stationed in Portoferraio since 15 January 1735 and remained there until July 1737.¹⁸⁷ This regiment, linked to the Second Duke Berwick, was then under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John O'Dea, an old acquaintance of the Corsican military!

The presence of several hundred Irish Jacobites, including several dozen officers at Portoferraio, should not be undervalued in terms of the logistics and operational aspects of the Corsican project.

184 In SHIELD A. (1908) - Henry Stuart Cardinal of York and his times, London, Longmans & Green, p 33.

185 In Gaceta de Madrid, n° 10, 8 March 1735, p 38 et 39.

186 In WITTELIB J. (1738) - Histoire des révolutions de l'île de Corse, et de l'élévation de Théodore 1er sur le trône de cet état, tirée de mémoires tant secrets que publics, La Haye, Pierre Paupie, p 175.

187 In Royal Irish Academy - Notes on Some Irish Regiments in the Service of Spain and of Naples in the Eighteenth Century, The Marquis MacSwiney of Mashaughlass in Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature - Vol. 37 (1924 - 1927), Dublin, p 163.

Irish officers who May have been present at Portoferraio:¹⁸⁸

Lieutenant Robert Barnewall, Second Lieutenant Charles Bourke, Captain Thomas Creagan, Captain Christophe Dillon, Second Lieutenant Denis Dwyer, Captain Gerard Fitzgerald, Captain Phillip Kennedy, Captain Nicholas Lalor, Adjutant Major Robert Linch, Captain Denis Long, Captain Reynald MacDonnell, Subaltern Captain John MacKenna, Lieutenant-Colonel John O’Dea, Captain John Peter O’dea, Lieutenant Guillaume O’Kelly, Captain Emanuel O’Shiell, Captain Daniel O’Shiell.

These officers, most of whom were affiliated with Jacobite Freemasonry, had privileged relations with both Earl Marischal, the Second Duke of Berwick, and many Corsican officers in the service of Spain.

70 kilometers off the coast of Corsica, they constituted the ideal bodyguard to enable Charles Edward Stuart to pass through Corsica, but this was not yet on the agenda, as it was first necessary to assess the welcome that the Corsican nation would give to a foreign Prince.

It is also necessary to consider the geopolitical upheavals of the War of Polish Succession. On July 3rd 1735, Don Carlos became King of Sicily and Jerusalem. The peace negotiations held in Vienna led to the following territorial redrawing: Don Carlos became legitimate King of the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. In exchange, the Spanish Court would cede the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza to the Hasbourgs and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany to Duke François Étienne of Lorraine. Given the historical proximity of the Duchy of Lorraine to the Stuart royal family, the general context in Italy at the time was rather favorable to the Jacobites.

From January to March 1736, the Count of Sizendorf and the pro-Jacobite Swedish spy Emmanuel Swedenborg (Svedberg) were in Amsterdam for regular discussions with the Jewish community.¹⁸⁹ Theodore of Neuhoff was brought back, in this specific context. According to Swedenborg, Theodore of Neuhoff acted for the Jacobites, but the notes he had about his time in Corsica were stolen and never recovered.¹⁹⁰

This character is so complex and so adept at doublespeak and posturing, according to his interlocutors, that it is difficult to determine whether he was directly missioned by the Jacobite Court in 1736. But is it not the sign of a good agent to invent stories within stories so that no one can understand his true objectives?

188 *In* O’HART J. (1892) - List of Irishmen who have served in the Spanish army in Irish Pedigrees 5 Edition in two volumes – Vol. II, James Duffy and Co. Dublin, p 659.

189 *In* KEITH SCHUCHARD M. (2011) - Emanuel Swedenborg, Secret Agent on Earth and in Heaven: Jacobites, Jews and Freemasons in Early Modern Sweden, Brill, Leyde, p 227.

190 *Ibid*, p 278.

What is undeniable is that both Earl Marischal and James III Stuart had used him in the past for his skills as a spy. It is reasonable to assume that he remained an important playing card in the Jacobite game.

Theodore of Neuhoff disembarked in Corsica on March 25th 1736 and on April 15th, proclaimed himself Theodore I, King of the Corsicans; leaving the historians of the time circumspect. Among the rumors circulating about him in Corsica, some claimed, "*It was the son of the Chevalier de St George who had just landed*".¹⁹¹ It is important to mention that the ship that transported him was commanded by the Scottish Captain John Dick, violating his country's laws on non-assistance to Corsican rebels. Also on board the ship was the chaplain of the Limerick regiment stationed at Portoferraio.¹⁹² According to the Count of Rivera, Consul of Turin in Genoa, Theodore used this chaplain to maintain useful links.¹⁹³ But there were also other interesting people on the trip. In a letter dated April 12th to an Irish friend with whom he had served in Spain, Theodore of Neuhoff wrote that "*he has raised 6 regiments and is busy disciplining them with his friend MacDonald*".¹⁹⁴

This 'friend' was almost certainly Captain John MacDonald of the Spanish Edimburgo Regiment, who had fought with Corsicans in the service of Spain in the Sicilian campaign a year earlier. Another source says that he was a Captain of the French Irish Brigade, a member of a Jacobite lodge, who left the service in 1734. Either way, he was a Jacobite officer.

Giovanni Guicciardi, the ambassador of the Holy German Empire in Genoa, confirmed the presence of foreign officers who spoke multiple languages.¹⁹⁵ Guicciardi investigated the true identity of Theodore of Neuhoff and in particular his activities as a spy in Genoa, using a false identity: Theodore of Sterlinghen. This is the point at which the Count of Sizendorf began direct correspondence with his Ambassador in Genoa to warn him of "*Maggiore Intelligenze*" (supreme intentions) concerning Theodore of Neuhoff.¹⁹⁶

Objectively speaking, the new King of Corsica was therefore in direct contact with his former Jacobite comrades-in-arms and protected by Sizendorf. In such conditions, how could we fail to see that behind the arrival of Theodore of Neuhoff in Corsica, there was a concerted plan with James III Stuart?

191 In The Dublin University Magazine - Volume 63, 1864, Dublin, George Herbert, p 597.

192 In WITTELIB J. (1738) - Histoire des révolutions de l'île de Corse, et de l'élévation de Théodore 1er sur le trône de cet état, tirée de mémoires tant secrets que publics, La Haye, Pierre Paupie, p 227.

193 In Archivio di Stato di Torino, Mazzo 1 – Corti Straniere, Corsica, Letter, 8 September 1736.

194 In The Genteman's Magazine - volume VI, May 1736, p 260.

195 In Archivio di Stato di Milano, Carteggi Consolari –Busto 32, Letter from Guicciardi, 14 April 1736.

196 Ibid, Letter, Guicciardi to Zizendorf, 28 April 1736.

Several sources attest to the fact that prior to his departure for Corsica, Théodore of Neuhoff was in contact with Jacobites. For example, he was in contact with a Jacobite in command of the imperial troops in Tuscany, Quartermaster, and Lieutenant Colonel Callan.¹⁹⁷

The papal press reported that on his arrival in Corsica, he was in possession of *“Patents from the Emperor and the most Christian and Catholic Kings”*.¹⁹⁸ This could include a patent from James III Stuart, but not George II of Hanover. Let’s take into consideration this commentary in the English press, extracted from correspondence originating in Amsterdam: *“It is not hard to believe that Baron Theodore of Neuhoff has managed to establish himself as King. However, we believe he will relinquish his title as soon as the prince backing him openly declares his support for the Corsicans. This declaration will only come after the situation in Italy has been completely pacified”*.¹⁹⁹ This could have been Don Carlos of Spain, but all speculations were open at the time. All this was confirmed in a memorandum written by the Turin Consul in Genoa, in which he wrote: *“Neuhoff’s arrival in this Kingdom, and his presence to this day, emanates from powerful people”*.²⁰⁰

As early as May 1736, an insistent rumor circulated in Europe: *“There is talk of the Knight of St George or the Duke of Ormond, as concerns the sovereignty of Corsica”*.²⁰¹²⁰² At the same time, Captain Dick, who had transported Theodore of Neuhoff and his men to Corsica, having been warned in Smyrna that the King of England wanted to have him arrested, shot himself in the head.²⁰³ He was nevertheless kept prisoner a certain while. On June 16th, the Queen Regent of Great Britain, Caroline of Ansbach, at Genoa’s request, reissued the public proclamation of 1731 concerning the non-assistance of her subjects to the Corsican rebels.²⁰⁴

It was the Corsican historian Antoine Franzini, whom we must thank here, who identified a Venetian source according to which: *“There were some who thought that the game was rigged in favor of James Stuart, also known as the Pretender of England, with the help of the Court of Rome. This suspicion arose because Baron Theodore visited Rome and was seen with the Prince, who then bestowed upon him the title of Earl as a reward for his services. This led some to believe that the Court of Rome was trying to maintain the Prince’s reign by giving him the Crown of Corsica.”*²⁰⁵

197 In GASPER J. (2008) - Theodore von Neuhoff, King of Corsica: The Man Behind the Legend, Newark, University of Delaware, p 92.

198 In Courrier d’Avignon, N° 36, 4 May 1736, p 2.

199 In Ipswich Journal, 3 July 1736, p 2.

200 In Archivio di Stato di Torino, Mazzo 1 – Corti Straniere, Corsica, Mémoire ‘Il vengo di Teodoro in Balagna’.

201 In Derby Mercury, Thursday, 3 June 1736, p 1.

202 In Caledonian Mercury, Monday, 7 June 1736, p 1.

203 In WITTELIEB J. (1738) - Histoire des révolutions de l’île de Corse, et de l’élévation de Théodore 1er sur le trône de cet état, tirée de mémoires tant secrets que publics, La Haye, Pierre Paupie, p 243.

204 In Public Record Office – PC1/5/31 f.1, Privy Council.

205 In PITTERI.F (1737) – La Storia dell’anno MDCCXXXVI, Amsterdam, Francesco Piterrri Libraio in Venezia, p 202.

This version could therefore correspond to Lord Marischal's plan, a version in which Theodore de Neuhoff's role would be to test the viability of the project in Corsica on behalf of the Stuart royal family. Firstly, was there any direct correspondence between Theodore of Neuhoff and the Jacobite Court? Secondly, if we consider the Venetian source reliable, when could Theodore of Neuhoff have met James III Stuart? At the same time, Earl Marischal went to Avignon, the nerve center of the Jacobite networks, in June 1736.²⁰⁶

In August 1736, Théodore of Neuhoff received 8,000 gold piastres from Rome, a sum of money conveyed by the Corsican poet Salvetti, who was living there then.²⁰⁷ Where did these Roman funds come from? According to a Church historian: *"Some thought that this game was being played in favor of James Stuart, not without knowledge of the Court of Rome, and that the Roman Curia wished to get rid of the costs incurred by the residence and maintenance of this Prince by assigning him to the Crown of Corsica"*.²⁰⁸

In September 1736, we learned from the Genoese envoy to the King of Sardinia, Giambattista De Mari, that Theodore of Neuhoff had asked the merchants of the Jewish community in Middelburg for reinforcements in arms and munitions.²⁰⁹ It is difficult not to establish a direct link with the pro-Jacobite activities of Sizendorf and Swedenborg in Holland.

We also know that on November 10th 1736, Theodore of Neuhoff left Corsica, entrusting the regency of the Kingdom to the Marquis Giacinto de Paoli, Luiggi Giafferi and Lucca d'Ornano, precisely in order to seek arms and subsidies. The Second Duke of Berwick left Naples to join James III Stuart in Albano on November 10th, where he remained until the 23.^{210 211}

The papal press reported the presence of the Second Duke of Berwick and the Duke of Ormond in Albano on November 17th.²¹²

According to a Dutch author who met Theodore of Neuhoff in Amsterdam: *"having arrived in Livorno on November 12th, according to certain rumours he went to Albano to place his crown in the hands of the Chevalier de St George"*.²¹³

During this period, Louis XV's main Minister, Cardinal de Fleury, played an ambivalent and decisive role in these manoeuvres.

206 In Archives Diplomatiques - 7MD84 f.169 - Angleterre / Mémoires et documents - Letter, Earl Marischal to Lord Sempil, du 18 June 1736.

207 In Archives Diplomatiques - 41CP98, Gênes / Correspondances Politiques, Letter from Bastia, 23 August 1736.

208 In BERAULT-BERCASTEL (1834) - In Historia De La Iglesia, Tomo XXIX, Valencia, Benito Monfort, p 350.

209 In Archivio di Stato di Genova - Reg n. g. 398 / Litterarum Finium, Letter from Genova, 21 September 1736.

210 In Courrier d'Avignon, N°95, Tuesday, 27 November 1736, p 1.

211 In Courrier d'Avignon, N°98, Tuesday, 11 December 1736, p 1.

212 In Gazzetta di Bologna, N°48, 27 November 1736, p 1.

213 In WITTELIB J. (1738) - Histoire des révolutions de l'île de Corse, et de l'élévation de Théodore 1er sur le trône de cet état, tirée de mémoires tant secrets que publics, La Haye, Pierre Paupie, p 288.

During the last week of November in London, various sources attributed to the Cardinal de Fleury a project concerning Corsica and James III Stuart. It was an editor from Boston who gave the most detailed description: *“The Cardinal de Fleury has found an opportunity to relieve the Pope and the Court of France of the pensions they pay to support the Pretender, by placing him at the head of Corsica; It is said that the Cardinal holds this project dear, and that it is possible that the Emperor and the King of Spain might lend their aid to this project”*.²¹⁴

The following year saw Prince Charles Edward Stuart become more directly involved in the project for his visit to Corsica. In May 1737, Charles Edward Stuart was in Genoa, more precisely, at the convent of Santa Caterina on the city’s heights. Closer to the port, in Via Degli Orefici, was the Grimble Inn, an establishment frequented by Jacobite agents and easily accessible to visiting islanders. The reason for his presence in Genoa caused quite a stir, and the news even spread across the Atlantic. The Boston Gazette wrote: *“It is generally reported that the Genoese have destined the island of Corsica for him.”*²¹⁵

Unfortunately for Prince Stuart, the Cardinal de Fleury changed his position on Corsican affairs and went along with the idea of Campredon, who in October 1735 had suggested military intervention by his Court, and then to develop a French party in Corsica in order, in time, to lay siege to this strategic island. Genoa insisted on obtaining help from the King of France, and here is the position that Cardinal de Fleury explained to the young Louis XV: *“Perhaps Corsica is destined to become one of our provinces too. We must not let slip any means of extending the limits of the beautiful Kingdom of France. My advice is, therefore, to use, not only negotiations but the force of arms. Let us send troops, not so much to help the Genoese as perhaps to turn the sedition and misfortunes of Corsica to our advantage.”*²¹⁶

On July 27th 1737, the agreement signed at Versailles between France and the Republic of Genoa stipulated that France would intervene in Corsica if Genoa so requested. This considerably complicated the plans of Theodore of Neuhoff and the House of Stuart. As early as October 1737, links between Théodore of Neuhoff and the Jacobite Court became apparent. Theodore of Neuhoff contacted his former military chief, George Keith, Earl Marischal. He informed him that: *“Corsica, as a Kingdom, could be a permanent and honorable retreat for Prince Charles Edward Stuart, provided the maritime powers could be persuaded to agree”*.²¹⁷

Theodore of Neuhoff was prepared to accept the post of Viceroy or a military command and asked the Jacobites for a loan of a thousand pounds to persuade the Corsicans to accept this solution.²¹⁸

214 In The Boston Gazette, N° 888, Monday, 10 January 1737, p 2.

215 In The Boston Gazette, N° 915, Monday, 18 July 1737, p 2.

216 In BIGNAN A. (1833) – Louis XV et le Cardinal de Fleury, Paris, Librairie de Werdet, p 245.

217 In GASPER J. (2008) - Theodore von Neuhoff, King of Corsica: The Man behind the Legend, Newark, University of Delaware, p 198.

218 Ibid.

On October 23rd 1737, Earl Marischal wrote to William Hamilton in the following terms: “(...) I have told you, I think, of a project I had to see the Pretender leave Rome, where his affairs are reduced to little. If I could have a thousand pounds at my disposal, I am convinced that I could make good use of it to allow the pretender to pass to Corsica (the place we talked about) and thus place him in a better position for his business (...)”.²¹⁹

Earl Marischal was convinced of this project and thought that this solution, which would compensate the Stuarts for the loss of Great Britain, could also lead to a peaceful solution to the crisis with England. Although they agreed in principle, some Jacobites expressed reservations during this uncertain period in Corsica. Although British and North American researchers who have worked on the question agree that central figures in Jacobitism indeed supported Earl Marischal’s Corsican project until 1737, a temporary halt moderated this enthusiasm.

The Jacobites who had taken refuge in France were worried about the consequences of the agreement between Versailles and the Republic of Genoa. In December 1737, one of the project’s main supporters, George Kelly, expressed his fears to William Hamilton. Regarding Neuhoff’s request, he said: “He might reign for a time partly with his son (Charles Edward Stuart), but do you think Corsica is very suitable for his residence?”²²⁰

The Consulta²²¹ of Corti on December 27th 1737 allowed the Corsican chiefs Giafferi, Paoli, Matra, Ornano, and Murati to renew their allegiance to King Theodore. Despite these political guarantees, the island’s situation was becoming too uncertain.

Given the difficulties encountered in implementing it, the Corsican plan was not mentioned temporarily anymore in Jacobite correspondence. For a short time, it was established that Theodore of Neuhoff’s initiative to make Corsica an independent Kingdom was fully in line with the Earl Marischal’s plan to put a Stuart prince on the Corsican throne. This was without considering French interests in the Mediterranean; an independent Corsica would have posed a serious threat to trade from the ports of Marseille and Toulon.

Twenty years later, a month after the death of Theodore of Neuhoff, Sir Horace Walpole wrote to the Minister of State in Tuscany, Sir Horace Mann: “You may suggest to the Pretender, that if he has but to pile titles on the two or three medals he has struck, he has nothing to do but pay the debts of King Theodore, and he may have very good claims on Corsica”.²²²

219 In CUTHELL E. E. (1915) - The scottish friend of frederic the great, The last Earl Marischall – Vol. I, London, Stanley Paul, p 183.

220 Ibid.

221 Corsican Assembly

222 In Horace Walpole à Horace Mann, Arlington Street, Londres, Letter, 17 January 1757.

The consequences of the first French intervention in Corsica

Theodore of Neuhoff worked to gather the resources promised to the Corsicans, but in February 1738, the arrival of five French regiments in Corsica under the command of the Comte de Boissieux changed everything.

Just as the Second Duke of Berwick was preparing to negotiate with France, through the intermediary of Venice, he fell ill (he let those around him know that he knew he was doomed). He died at the age of 44 in Naples on June 2nd 1738. It was a very hard blow for the Jacobite Court. One can only remain skeptical when one reads about it in an article in the English press “[...] *The Knight of St George and his Irish troops abroad have lost a very dear friend. [...] Now how far will the Cardinal de Fleury take his projects! He has hooked Genoa with more dexterity than a fisherman who wants to catch a trout [...]*”.²²³

When Theodore of Neuhoff finally reappeared in Corsica on September 15th 1738, despite his help and the enthusiasm of some of the population, several Corsican chiefs, including Giacinto de Paoli and Erasmo Orticoni, no longer gave him any credit, preferring to turn to Spain. At the same time, the Comte de Boissieux dropped his mask and issued two public proclamations threatening to raze to the ground the homes of any Corsicans who followed the German adventurer. Against this unfavourable backdrop, Theodore of Neuhoff had to leave. This fierce battle waged by Comte de Boissieux to keep Theodore of Neuhoff away from Corsica was ordered by Cardinal de Fleury, Louis XV's chief minister. Fleury became a fierce supporter of the Hanoverians,²²⁴ which did little to encourage the Jacobites living in France to have their Pretender move to the island. Unlike the Genoese policy of terror, Fleury drew out the situation by conducting skillful negotiations, initially with the Corsican nationals. In December 1738, the Corsican nationals rose up against the French troops, inflicting serious setbacks on them. Very ill and defeated in the military field, the Comte de Boissieux asked to be replaced. However, the French intervention in Corsica did not mean the end of all Jacobite communication channels in Corsica, for several reasons.

First, the French army employed many Jacobites who were members of the Irish Brigade, some of whom were deployed to Corsica. In addition, James III Stuart always had spies he could count on at Versailles. Moreover, since 1735, Jacobite Freemasonry was a reality in Rome.²²⁵ It was able to use specific channels to correspond with the Jacobite lodges in France that we have already mentioned, such as Irish Lodge No. 37 in Toulouse and St Thomas Lodge No. 1 in Paris.²²⁶

223 *In* Newcastle Courant, N° 688, Saturday, 1st July, p 1.

224 *In* CORP E. (2014) - *The Stuarts in Italy, 1719-1766: A Royal Court In Permanent Exil*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 223.

225 *In* CAZZANIGA G. M. Dir. (2006) - *Storia d'Italia. Annali 21. La Massoneria*, Roma, Einaudi, p 485.

226 *In* BEAUREPAIRE P. Y. (2002) - *L'Europe des francs-maçons (XVIIIe-XXIe siècles)*, Paris, Belin, collection Europe et Histoire, p 29.

On March 21st 1739, the Marquis de Maillebois took command of the French expedition to Corsica. His aide-de-camp was John Vera O’Sullivan, an Irish Jacobite. Like many other Jacobite soldiers, O’Sullivan found himself in an ambivalent position. He served France loyally in Corsica and was responsible for several feats of arms against the Corsicans, but he also remained a useful Jacobite intermediary for possible negotiations with the islanders. The Irish troops in Corsica also included James Hooke, the son of Nathaniel Hooke, James III Stuart’s master spy. It is hard to imagine that he did not play a role in Corsica.²²⁷

After a three-week military campaign, the Marquis de Maillebois authorized the exile of 27 Corsican chiefs on French ships bound for Naples, including Giacinto de Paoli and his son Pasquale de Paoli. The marriage of Marie Louise Elizabeth of France to Prince Philippe of Spain on August 29th 1739 was no doubt a factor in this measure of clemency.

Corsica remained a subject of discussion in the secret correspondence between James III Stuart and his spies. From London, a Jacobite spy told him how pleased he was that English foreign policy had not succeeded in influencing the Spanish Ambassador against Corsica - just before being recalled to Madrid.²²⁸

In December 1739, James III Stuart was concerned by a rumour that the Duke of Ormonde and Charles Edward Stuart were travelling incognito to Corsica. London was also trying to verify the information.

On January 27th 1740, Count James Waldegrave, the English Ambassador in Paris, informed Lord Newcastle that, according to Cardinal de Fleury, the Duke of Ormonde and Charles Edward had travelled to Spain. He states that he has also heard rumours of their passage to Corsica on board a Spanish merchant ship carrying pears. However, he was assured (Fleury?) that this was false, because as long as French troops were in Corsica no foreign merchant ship could land on the coast.²²⁹

This is the official version, but in reality, given the presence of Jacobites in Corsica and the island’s thousand kilometers of coastline, it is difficult to know whether this voyage to Corsica really took place.

227 *In* DUNN McRAY W. (1870) - *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke: Agent from the Court of France to the Scottish Jacobites, in the Years 1703-1707*, Partie 1, London, Nichols & Sons, p IV.

228 *In* Archives Diplomatiques - 7MD86 f.329 - Angleterre / Mémoires et documents – Letter to Jacques III Stuart, 9 January 1740.

229 *In* Public Record Office - SP78/222/21 f 54 / State Papers Foreign, France – Letter, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 27 January 1740.

Corsica in the orbit of the House of Stuart during the 1740s.

On September 20th 1740, at the death of Emperor Charles VI, and as per the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, his eldest daughter succeeded him. Against a backdrop of territorial disputes over control of Silesia, Frederick II of Prussia did not recognize this succession and initiated the War of the Austrian Succession.

At first, France was not yet involved in the conflict and could still take an interest in Corsican affairs. The time was ripe for mediation, which began with the creation of the Royal Corsican Regiment on 1 January 1741, a regiment of 739 islanders, some of whom came from demobilized Spanish regiments. Cardinal Guerin de Tencin, who owed his cardinal's biretta to the interventions of James III Stuart, then intervened directly in the Corsican dossier. As Versailles' representative in Rome, he proposed offering the rights of suzerainty over Corsica to Prince Charles Edward Stuart "*as a wedding gift guaranteed by the Courts of Spain and France*",²³⁰ a marriage that was to unite this Stuart Prince to the Princess of Massa. It is possible that this fact was connected to the order of May 9th 1741 from Madrid to transfer the 650 men of the Real Corcega regiment to Porto Longone and demobilize them.

It is clear here this represents continued political action concerning Charles Edward Stuart's plan to go to Corsica, including during the period of the first French intervention on the island. This time, the project was given official diplomatic framework and was no longer restricted to the clandestine politics of the Jacobites.

With regard to Tencin's proposal, Charles Edward Stuart felt that the bride did not meet the expectations demanded by his rank. As for Corsica, James III Stuart was undecided at a time when a new conflict was breaking out in Europe. In any case, France's entry into the war alongside Prussia on 5 June 1741 ended this new attempt.

Towards the end of 1741, the whole of Europe was at war. The War of the Austrian Succession pitted broad coalitions of countries against each other. On one side were Prussia, France, Spain, the Kingdom of Naples, Sweden and Genoa. On the other side were Austria, Great Britain, the Dutch United Provinces, the Electorate of Hanover, Russia and the Kingdom of Sardinia. In this new configuration, the Stuarts had once again become a useful card for the French game against England. The death of Cardinal de Fleury on January 29th 1743 and the appointment of Cardinal de Tencin as Minister precipitated matters, and many Jacobites converged on Paris.²³¹

230 In MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 70.

231 In LANG A. (1903) - Prince Charles Edward Stuart: The Young Chevalier, London, Longmans & Green, p 54.

On December 23rd 1743, James III Stuart sent Earl Marischal a memorandum containing his instructions to be given to the King of France when everything was ready for the execution of the plan to raid Scotland. He particularly recommended Sir James Campbell of Auchinleck to prepare the uprising in Scotland.²³²

Louis XV promised James III Stuart that he would raise an army to carry out another raid on Great Britain. The latter appointed his son Charles Edward Stuart Regent. He passed to France in January 1744. At this point, Corsica was no longer an objective in the Jacobite plans, all attention was focused on the mother country of origin, but the supporters of the Stuarts and the Corsicans were once again to rub shoulders very closely on the battlefields.

On January 13th 1744, Louis XV ordered the formation of an army to restore the Stuarts in England, which he entrusted to the Comte de Saxe. On January 26th 1744, 16 French infantry battalions were assembled at Dunkirk, totaling 8,980 men, including the Royal Corsican Regiment.

John Baptist Caryll and Francis Sempill, important members of the Order of Toboso, hosted Charles Edward Stuart in Paris in February 1744.²³³

At Dunkirk, the French ship captains had to be guided by English Jacobite pilots. As 6 ships prepared to raise the ink, the Swiss regiment of Diesbach refused to embark.

The Royal Corsican Regiment offered to take their place and sailed towards England.²³⁴ This great motivation on the part of the Royal Corsicans was either a gesture of military bravery or a sign of support for the Stuart cause. On March 1st 1744, the Royal Corsican Regiment was divided into six companies on the Saint Barthélémy and six companies on the Embuscade.²³⁵

It seems incomprehensible that the fleet chose March 6th 1744 to set sail, when a storm raged in the Channel. During the night of the sixth to the seventh, most of the ships were paneled on the coasts, including those of the Corsicans. On March 8th, the Embuscade finally ran aground. On 11 March, it was the turn of the Saint Barthélémy, a shipwreck in which two Corsicans drowned.²³⁶

In his letter dated March 11th, 1744, the Count of Saxony informed Charles Edward Stuart that operations had been abandoned: *“My Lord, the King, my master, orders me to inform Your Royal Highness that the unfortunate circumstances that have arisen require you to suspend the execution of the undertaking at this time and to postpone it to a more favorable time. (...) His Majesty has asked me to have his troops disembark and return to Dunkirk”*.²³⁷

232 In Archives Diplomatiques - 7MD88 f.62 - Angleterre / Mémoires et documents - Letter, Jacques III Stuart to Earl Marischal, 23 December 1743.

233 In MACINNES A. I., GERMAN K., GRAHAM L. (2015) – Living with Jacobitism, 1690-1788: The three kingdom and beyond, London, Routledge, Ebook Edition, p 185.

234 In REID S. (1996) - 1745: a military history of the last Jacobite uprising, Staplehurst, Spellmount, p 8.

235 In COLIN J. (1901) Louis XV et les Jacobites: Le projet de débarquement en Angleterre de 1743-1744, Paris, Chapelot et Cie, p 139.

236 Ibid, p 166.

237 In SMITS J.J. (1794) - Lettres et Mémoires choisis parmi les papiers originaux du Maréchal de Saxe - Tome 1, Paris, J.J. SMITS et Cie, p 68.

Charles Edward Stuart remained confident and determined to pass with the sole support of the Jacobites in Scotland, pending a French landing in England. Some historians have speculated that the Dunkirk fiasco was, in fact, a French diversionary operation designed to get George II of Hanover to clear out his continental troops and repatriate some of them to England.

In a letter to Lord Sempil dated March 15th 1744, Charles Edward Stuart, referring to the Scottish Highlanders, said: *“Is it not better for me to go and perish, if I must, at the head of these brave people, than to drag out a languishing life in exile and dependence?”* He tried to convince as many Jacobite dignitaries as possible to follow him.

Earl Marischal met the Prince at Gravelines, who asked him to leave for Scotland with him without delay.

Although he had taken part in the preparations for the raid on Scotland, Earl Marischal distanced himself from Charles Edward Stuart’s plan once the landing of French troops alongside the Jacobites was no longer assured.

At the end of March, the correspondence between the two men ended in disagreement. Earl Marischal saw in Charles Edward Stuart *“an impetuous young fool ”* and justified his attitude above all by not wanting to provoke *“the ruin of loyal Highlanders by committing them to a hopeless enterprise”*.²³⁸

The Earl Marischal’s withdrawal could be seen as a lucid assessment of the situation based on his own experiences in 1715 and 1719. The military expertise of the Lord Protector of Scotland cannot be questioned in this case.

Earl Marischal was not alone in doubting the success of a Jacobite expedition without French military support in Scotland. As early as October 1744, James III Stuart voiced his opposition to the idea of an isolated initiative in Scotland.²³⁹

Another leading Jacobite figure, Count Patrice François de Neny, was categorical: for him, the whole project was simply a French diversion that had the desired effect: *“The King of England recalled most of the English troops to the British Isles, which halved the army of the Low Countries”*.²⁴⁰

The Royal Corsican Regiment participated in all of the French campaigns during the War of the Austrian Succession. On April 20th 1745, it moved towards Tournai. It was positioned in the front line, as part of the left wing of the French infantry at the Battle of Fontenoy, and it is interesting to note that it was positioned exactly alongside the six Irish infantry regiments (Buckley, Dillon, Lally, Berwick, Rooth, and Clare) and the Normandy Regiment.²⁴¹

238 In LANG A. (1903) - Prince Charles Edward Stuart: The Young Chevalier, London, Longmans & Green, p 69.

239 In MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 41.

240 In NENY P. F. (1785) – Mémoires historiques et politiques sur les Pays Bas Autrichiens et sur la Constitution, Tome 1-, Bruxelles, Emmanuel Flon, p 203.

241 In Bibliothèque Nationale de France – 04403, Collection d’Anville, Plan de la bataille de Fontenoy remportée le 11 May 1745.

This placement in the front line is recognition of military prowess. Was it also a request from Jacobite officers to have soldiers who had been so eager to embark for England and serve the Stuart cause placed alongside them?

We must not lose sight of the fact that this Corsican regiment included many veterans who had served Spain a few years earlier and were known to be close to Jacobite soldiers and officers.

Close to the Corsicans was Captain Henry Lloyd, an important Jacobite figure who we will come back to later.

Regardless, this first pitched battle for the Royal Corsicans provided another opportunity for close contact with exiled Stuart supporters. Because of its strategic and quantitative importance, the Battle of Fontenoy was one of the main events of the War of the Austrian Succession. A landmark event such as this could only strengthen the bonds between brothers in arms, especially as, at the end of the battle, the Marshal of Saxony declared that they owed their victory to the Irish and Normandy Regiments.

On July 1st 1745, the Royal Corsican Regiment followed the Rohan regiment, on the orders of the Comte de Vence. The House of Rohan had had close ties to the House of Stuart ever since Anne de Rohan had been Lady-in-Waiting to Queen Mary Stuart. A banker from the Rohan family directly financed the Jacobite uprising of 1715.

The ties between these two Houses continued into the 1740s, as Charles Edward Stuart became directly connected to the Rohans through Freemasonry.²⁴² His daughter, Charlotte Stuart, married Ferdinand Maximilien Mériadec de Rohan, Archbishop of Bordeaux and Cambrai, from which union came a lineage resulting in the only known descendant of Charles Edward Stuart living in Poland today.

Charles Edward Stuart undoubtedly had the means to recommend this merging of the Royal Corsican Regiment with the Rohan regiment. We have no proof that this was the case, but it would be quite logical coming from a sovereign who had been promised Corsica many times already. In September 1745, the Royal Corsican Regiment was positioned with the Rohan regiment to launch the siege of Ath, culminating in a French victory.²⁴³

Charles Edward Stuart prepared his invasion of Scotland with the greatest secrecy and on June 12th 1745, he wrote the following to Louis XV: *"My uncle, having tried in vain and by all means to reach your Majesty, in the hope of obtaining from your generosity the help necessary for me to play the role that is my birthright, I have resolved to make myself known by my actions, and to undertake alone a plan which but mediocre help would make infallible [...]"*.²⁴⁴

242 In PININSKI P. (2010) - Bonnie Prince Charlie, a Life, Stroud, Amberley Publishing, p 59.

243 In PICHAT H. (1909) – La campagne du Maréchal de Saxe dans les Flandres, Paris, R. Chapelot & Cie, p 349.

244 In ROY J.J.E. (2006) - Le dernier des Stuart, Bonnie Prince Charlie, Tours, Yoran Ambanner, p 41.

Soon afterwards, on July 2nd, Charles Edward Stuart sailed with two ships from Saint Nazaire and reached the north of Scotland on July 24th.

We will not linger here on the Jacobite successes of 1745 and the defeat at Culloden on April 16th 1746. This is a widely studied and documented subject. The Earl Marischal had undoubtedly underestimated the capabilities of Charles Edward Stuart, who came very close to success 160 km from London. George II had his most prized possessions loaded onto a yacht, ready to escape. Until the 1770s, Hanoverian supporters used to say to anyone who underestimated the Jacobites' ability to cause trouble: "*I saw the Pretender at Derby.*" On April 28th 1746, the last Jacobite troops capitulated. After being hunted down for 6 months, Charles Edward Stuart returned to France, where he stayed for some time.

On October 18th 1748, the War of the Austrian Succession came to an end with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which included the following two clauses concerning the Jacobite cause: Louis XV's recognition of George II of Hanover as the legitimate sovereign of Great Britain and the expulsion of Charles Edward Stuart from France.

As the Court of Versailles notified him of his imminent expulsion via friends, Charles Edward Stuart protested against this injustice and replied that he did not wish to comply with the King's intentions, despite his father's insistence that he obey.²⁴⁵

In Paris, on December 10th 1748, the young Stuart Prince was arrested in broad daylight in the street, bound, garroted, and thrown into prison until December 23rd when he was deported to Savoy. He then went to Avignon, where he officially stayed from December 27th 1748 to February 28th 1749.²⁴⁶

This episode left Charles Edward Stuart with a tenacious grudge against France, and he never stopped wanting to exclude France from his affairs,²⁴⁷ which made things difficult for the Earl Marischal and his networks.

Louis XV himself admitted that neither he nor his Council had any real intention of ever restoring Prince Edward to the English throne.²⁴⁸

Frederick II of Prussia, who had welcomed the Earl Marischal in Berlin as early as 1748, confided his opinion on the matter to him: "*I doubt that France ever intended any good in good faith for the House of Stuart.*"²⁴⁹

For the Scots, the defeat at Culloden had the same symbolic significance as the defeat at Ponte Novu for the Corsicans: losing their independence. For the Jacobite movement, this fourth military defeat had a disastrous effect.

245 In Archives Diplomatiques - 7MD82 f.226 - Angleterre / Mémoires et documents Mémoire sur l'arrestation du Prince Charles Édouard Stuart.

246 In VALIN G. (2019) - Les jacobites, la Papauté et la Provence, Paris, Editions L'Harmattan, p 166.

247 In KERVELLA A. (2019) - Le Baron de Hund et la Stricte Observance Tempière, Hyères, Editions la Pierre philosophale, p 118.

248 In De FLASSAN (1809) - Histoire générale et raisonnée de la Diplomatie Française, Tome Cinquieme, Paris, Lenormant, p 171.

249 In Bibliothèque Universitaire de Trèves - Politische correspondenz Friedrich's des Grossen, Letter N° 5907, Postdam, 29 May 1753.

Although they remained loyal to James III Stuart, many of his supporters lost hope for possible restoration in Great Britain. More than the defeat at Culloden, it was his imprisonment in France and a feeling of immense betrayal that finally broke Charles Edward Stuart, in the opinion of his direct descendant.²⁵⁰

Thus the Prince whose destiny once more crossed paths with that of Corsica was weakened, but to think that the Jacobite movement stopped after Culloden is a gross error of assessment that we will not commit here. It was a very fashionable idea in English universities during the nineteenth century, because the victors are often the writers of History. Fortunately, since then, in Scotland as elsewhere, many historians and biographers have debunked this idea.

In truth, the Jacobite inner circle would continue plotting another raid on Scotland. As early as 1749, John Baptist Caryl founded the Oak Society, a secret society modelled on the Order of Toboso which included women, and worked to raise funds for Charles Edward Stuart's new invasion plans.²⁵¹

These shadowy networks continued to operate long after Culloden.

From Avignon, Charles Edward Stuart sent George Lockhart²⁵² to Rome to ask James III Stuart for funds.²⁵³ In September 1749, Charles Edward Stuart was still in Avignon to work out new plans with his most loyal supporters.²⁵⁴

As far as the more moderate Jacobites were concerned, their support for the Stuarts was still assured, for it was one thing to no longer believe in the restoration of the Stuarts in London, but quite another thing to continue working to ensure a political future and an honourable outcome for the Royal House of Stuart. And it was in this new context that Corsicans and Jacobites were to pursue their various and varied relations.

250 *In* PININSKI P. (2010) - Bonnie Prince Charlie, a Life, Stroud, Amberley Publishing, p 61.

251 *In* MACINNES A. I., GERMAN K., GRAHAM L. (2015) – Living with Jacobitism, 1690-1788: The three kingdom and beyond, London, Routledge, Ebook Edition, p 185.

252 George Lockhart was the personal aide-de-camp to Charles Edward Stuart during the Jacobite rising of 1745. Upon the defeat of Culloden, George Lockhart and his young brother James accompanied Prince Charles into exile in Paris and then in Avignon. His grandfather, George Lockhart, was the Scottish agent of James III Stuart during the Jacobite rising of 1715. These Lockhart of Lee and Carnwath family members belong to the first Jacobite circle.

253 *In* Dr. Doran (1876) – Mann's and manners at the Court of Florence 1740-1786 – Vol. I, London, Richard Bentley & Son, p 291.

254 *In* Public Record Office - SP78/233/92 f247 / State Papers Foreign, France – Letter, Albemarle to Newcastle, 27 September 1749.

Closer links between Corsican Patriots and Jacobites during the 1750s.

In February 1751, Charles Edward Stuart was in Berlin for a confidential meeting with Frederick II of Prussia.²⁵⁵ At the beginning of September, the King of Prussia made Earl Marischal the Minister Plenipotentiary to the French Court. This appointment provoked the anger of London, who asked Versailles not to accept this “*Ambassador of the Knight of St George*”. Versailles obtained guarantees from the Earl Marischal and did not comply with the Hanoverian request. James III Stuart was concerned by this estrangement from the Earl Marischal, but once informed of a new project, he sent an agent to Paris. Spied on by the English, neither Earl Marischal nor Charles Edward Stuart traveled to Saint Germain en Laye at the invitation of the Jacobites. Their meetings were rare and totally clandestine.

Charles Edward Stuart was planning to have the Hanover royal family kidnapped on November 10th 1752, a plot known as the Elibank Plot.²⁵⁶ The Earl Marischal gave little credence to this plan, and the facts proved him right, for the scheme was uncovered and the entire overseas network of active Jacobites was dismantled. On a more personal level, he distanced himself from Charles Edward Stuart, judging that his instability represented a danger, including to himself. Another important development was that the Court in London was informed that the Young Pretender had become a Protestant.²⁵⁷

That same year, on February 17th 1752, the Corsican Pasquale de Paoli was appointed second lieutenant in the Neapolitan Real Farnese regiment. What immediately stands out about this appointment is the identity of the *wife* of the regiment’s owner, the Marquis of Arezzo e Zacco. This was Lady Marianna Fitzgerald Browne, second cousin of Ulysses Maximilian Browne, who himself was Fitzgerald on his mother’s side. The Fitzgerald clan came from the high Irish nobility who followed the Stuarts into exile. This woman was also, through her mother Lady Emilia Mary Lennox, a direct descendant of Charles II Stuart.

There are two possible hypotheses here: either Giacinto de Paoli influenced the Marquis of Arezzo e Zacco, or Pasquale de Paoli benefited from the support of Irish Jacobite soldiers whom he must have frequented in Naples. We must take in consideration that in 1734, Spain sent 2,000 Irish soldiers to serve in Naples under the command of the second Duke of Berwick.²⁵⁸ A month after leaving Portoferraio, the Limerick Regiment became the Regimiento del Rey, on August 8th 1737. There were also Irish members of Haynault’s regiment, such as Second Lieutenant Edward Dunn.²⁵⁹

255 In KERVELLA A. (2019) - *Le Baron de Hund et la Stricte Observance Tempière*, Hyères, Editions la Pierre philosophale, p 116.

256 In LANG A. (1898) - *The companions of Pickle*, London, Longmans Green & Co, p 232.

257 In Public Record Office – SP 78/245/77, f. 202, Letter from Albermale, 22 November 1752.

258 In Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane, Anno XXVII - Fasc I, Pierro e Veraldi, 1902, Napoli, p 492.

259 In Royal Irish Academy - Notes on Some Irish Regiments in the Service of Spain and of Naples in the Eighteenth Century, Marquis MacSwiney of Mashanaglass in Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature - Vol. 37 (1924 - 1927), Dublin, p 169.

Charles Edward Stuart spent several periods in Naples, where Stuart Freemasonry was well established. From the end of the 1730s, James III Stuart realized that this means of spreading Jacobitism, as he had originally envisaged it, was compromised by the influence of the Hanoverian Freemasons, who had become very important.²⁶⁰ Within the Jacobite Lodge of Rome itself, a plot against the Stuarts was uncovered in March 1738. James III Stuart intervened with the Pope to have Freemasonry condemned and sacrificed the Roman Jacobite Lodge.²⁶¹

The presence of the Cantelmi-Stuart, an ancient Stuart branch from Naples (whose origin was recognized by Charles II Stuart in 1683), could also explain a link between certain local lodges and the Jacobite Masonic centers of Rome, Florence, and Paris.²⁶² This influence was relative, as Masons loyal to the Grand Lodge of London were also well represented. In Naples, the significant influence of lodges of various denominations, in the context of the papal condemnation of Freemasonry, had forced King Don Carlos III to ban their activities as early as 1751.²⁶³

The Irish Jacobite lodges of the Naples regiments continued to operate in the greatest secrecy, especially as they were used to doing so. Since the Anderson Constitutions in 1721, which had established the rules of modern Freemasonry, the Irish travelling lodges had been relying on earlier patents, sometimes referring to the oldest Scottish lodge, Kilwinning.

The activity of these Lodges in the regiments of Don Carlos III is an established fact,²⁶⁴ but their activities remain unknown. In fact, they did not have a stable affiliation, but one that varied according to the quarters their regiments took up in different ports.²⁶⁵ In the 1750s, the St John of Scotland Lodge in Marseilles oversaw the Irish underground lodges in Naples.²⁶⁶ This Mother Lodge of St John of Scotland in Marseilles played an important role in both Naples and Palermo, especially in the 1760s.

The links between the Jacobites and Corsica therefore also passed through this Neapolitan military Freemasonry.

260 *In* CAZZANIGA G. M. Dir. 2006) - Storia d'Italia. Annali 21. La Massoneria, Roma, Einaudi, p 485.

261 *In* CORP E. (2011) - The Stuarts in Italy, 1719-1766: A Royal Court In Permanent Exil, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 332.

262 *In* DI CASTIGLIONE R. (2011) - La Massoneria nelle due Sicilie: E i fratelli meridionali del '700 – Cita di Napoli, Volume 4, Roma, Cangemi Editore, p 17.

263 *In* CAZZANIGA G. M. Dir. 2006) - Storia d'Italia. Annali 21. La Massoneria, Roma, Einaudi, p 143

264 *In* DI CASTIGLIONE R. (2011) - La Massoneria nelle due Sicilie: E i fratelli meridionali del '700 – Cita di Napoli, Volume 4, Roma, Cangemi Editore, p 21.

265 *Ibid*, p 19.

266 *In* FRANCOVICH C. (1974) - Storia della Massoneria in Italia dalle origini alla Rivoluzione Francese, Roma, La Nuova Italia, op. cit, p 188.

It's hard to believe that Pasquale de Paoli never met Irish Jacobite Freemasons, especially given that he told James Boswell that he had learned English from Irish officers in Naples.²⁶⁷ On this point, Abbé Casanova asserted that Pasquale de Paoli became a Freemason in 1745 at Gallipoli.²⁶⁸ What lends credence to this statement is precisely that it was in the Turkish port cities that, as early as 1717, Europeans set up the first Masonic lodges in the Ottoman Empire,²⁶⁹ including Swiss from Geneva, Italians and Irish from Spain, who were inevitably Jacobites.

Pasquale de Paoli later took up his post in the Neapolitan prefecture of Porto Longone. While the Marquis of Arezzo e Zacco remained at the Palazzo Sanchez in Orbetello, the Real Farnese Regiment and the Hainaut Regiment defended the Neapolitan presidencies of Orbetello and Porto Longone. Here, Pasquale de Paoli was at the heart of the communication channels that linked the Corsican Nationals to their supporters in Italy,²⁷⁰ an eminently strategic position.

In his letter of April 25th 1753, Genoa's envoy in London referred to the extensive English trade in the Mediterranean and the aid given to the Corsican rebels. He predicted a sad fate for the Corsicans if they persisted in following their leaders, while assuring the English that the Republic of Genoa wanted only peace in Corsica. He begged King George II of Hanover to maintain his benevolence towards the Republic of Genoa, to respect the agreements of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and consequently to forbid his subjects from supplying the rebels.²⁷¹ On May 10th 1753, London again promulgated the 1731 edict on Corsica.²⁷²

The following year, Pasquale de Paoli prepared his return to the island. In a letter to his father on 10 August 1754, Pasquale de Paoli stated that he would have no trouble recruiting supporters for his return to Corsica from within the Portoferraio garrison.²⁷³

The Portoferraio garrison depended on the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Two groups were active within it: those close to Edouard de Warren, a Freemason, whose son Henri Hyacinthe was Major to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold I,²⁷⁴ and the Order of the Cavaliers of San Stefano, whose Grand Master was also the Grand Duke of Tuscany.

267 In BOSWELL J. (2015) - Relation de l'Isle de Corse, journal d'un voyage dans cette île, Paris, BNF/Hachette, p 85.

268 In VERGE-FRANCESCHI M. (2005) - Paoli : un Corse des lumières, Paris, Fayard, p 224.

269 In CELAL B. (2007) - L'histoire de la Franc-maçonnerie en Turquie in Dialogue et Démocratie Suisse - Réserve FM / planche CB-1, Genève, p 5.

270 In GRAZIANI A. M. (2002) - Pascal Paoli, Père de la patrie Corse, Paris, Tallandier, p 66.

271 In Public Record Office – PC1/6/32 f.2, Privy Council.

272 In The London Gazette, N° 9269, Saturday, 19 May 1753, p 1.

273 In GRAZIANI A.M., BITOSSI C. (2003), Pascal Paoli Correspondance La prise du pouvoir 1749-1756 – Volume 1, Ajaccio, Alain Piazzola, p 55.

274 In CLARKE DE DROMANTIN P. (2005) - Les réfugiés jacobites dans la France du XVIIIe siècle: l'exode de toute une noblesse "pour cause de religion", Bordeaux, Presses Universitaire de Bordeaux, p 396.

Towards the end of 1753, a deserter from the Royal Navy traveled from Porto Ercole to Orbetello. He was a Protestant of Scottish origin born in Northern Ireland, Emmanuel Stuart. He joined the Hainault Regiment and moved to Porto Longone in 1754, where he converted to Roman Catholicism.²⁷⁵ 20 years later, Emmanuel Stuart married the widow of Captain Mibelli, captain of the Portoferraio garrison and a knight of the Order of San Stefano. His best man at the wedding was Guiseppe Maria Pucci,²⁷⁶ the Master of the Forge, who had a ducal patent to produce and maintain artillery on site.

Of course, we know that some Irish Jacobites had already joined the Hainault Regiment, but this man did not come here by chance. On the one hand, he had a cousin of English origin living in the village of Lozzi in central Corsica, and on the other, he wanted to find an unidentified person in Rome where the Jacobite Court resided. Emmanuel Stuart spent several months with Pasquale de Paoli in Porto Longone. He was a specialist in armaments and artillery, an area of great interest to Pasquale de Paoli.²⁷⁷ Pasquale de Paoli had been a member of the Royal Military Academy of Artillery in Naples from 1745 to 1749.²⁷⁸ We can only speculate on the nature of the relationship between the two soldiers; apart from a shared interest in artillery Emmanuel Stuart was likely commissioned by Paoli during the negotiations in 1753-54. It should be noted that Emmanuel Stuart used his Spanish identity on several occasions, which attests to his links with Spain. We can legitimately wonder whether his actions were not part of a Madrid-Naples Jacobite axis, relying on Colonel John Fitzgerald and the Third Duke of Berwick in Spain on the one hand, and on their relays throughout Italy on the other.

Why is it inconceivable that a Scottish Protestant could have been sent to Paoli to serve the interests of the Royal House of Stuart?

This period in the mid-1750s remains one of the most difficult for studying the clandestine activities of Charles Edward Stuart, who was then at odds with his father, James III, and above all with his brother Henry Benedict. Henry Benedict had been naturalized as a citizen of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1747 by Sovereign Carlos III, a very rare event, and he became a Cardinal in 1748, making him a *bête noire* of English parliamentarians. It was to improve the Stuart's image in Great Britain that Charles Edward Stuart secretly converted to Protestantism in England in 1750.²⁷⁹

275 *In* Archivio della Curia di Massa Marittima - Filze Matrimoniale - Filza Manuel Stuart 04/01/1773, Massa Marittima.

276 *In* Archivio Parrocchiale della chiesa Beata Virginia, matrimoni dal 21/04/1759 al 19/03/1795, Anno 1773 - Atto n°23, Portoferraio.

277 *In* VERGE-FRANCESCHI M. (2005) - Paoli : un Corse des lumières, Paris, Fayard, p 245.

278 *In* ARRIGHI J.M., JEHASSE O. (2008) - Histoire de la Corse et des Corses, Paris, Perrin, p 316.

279 *In* PININSKI P. (2010) - Bonnie Prince Charlie, a Life, Stroud, Amberley Publishing, p 66.

Since the fiasco of the Ellibank plot, Charles Edward Stuart no longer had much credibility among Protestant Jacobites, which was far from being the case of the Earl Marischal and his associates in Rome.

In this context, the activation of a Protestant agent to Paoli via the various transnational Jacobite networks seems plausible, as it was indeed the Jacobite Protestants, it should be remembered, who had taken an interest in Corsican affairs since 1731.

However, even if links were established between Corsican *Naziunali* (patriots) and Jacobites, the situation was no longer the same as in the 1730s.

Pasquale de Paoli sought to establish Corsican sovereignty for the sake of Corsican benefit and Corsican rights.

The Jacobites were not the best-placed contacts at the time when Pasquale de Paoli was preparing to return to Corsica to establish his political authority based on a project for national unity.

1753-1754:

The last official attempt of the House of Stuart concerning Corsica.

In January 1753, John Vera O’Sullivan reappeared in Italy and spoke with James III Stuart’s private secretary, the protestant Andrew Ludmisen. This man knew Corsica well. He had already intervened in the French mediation of 1741 to establish Charles Edward Stuart on the Corsican throne. During this period, James III Stuart could not convince his son, his beloved “*Carluccio*”, to return to Rome.

On October 3rd 1753, Gian Pietro Gaffori, Protector of the Corsican Nation, was murdered. This murder, commissioned by the Republic of Genoa, did not have the desired effect; on the contrary, it strengthened the determination of the Corsican *Naziunali*. Even among the Genoese islanders, some claimed that this death “*was more harmful than useful*”.²⁸⁰ Unfortunately, a large part of the Genoese Senate declared that Corsica was lost and proposed selling it to replenish the coffers of the Bank of St George. During this period, the King of Piedmont-Sardinia, Carlo Emmanuelle III, feared that the Republic of Genoa would sell Corsica to a foreign power that could threaten his kingdom.²⁸¹ The Court of Vienna first came out in favor of making Corsica a sovereign state for the Duke of Parma, who was about to marry. This proposal caused political dissension in Genoa. The Court of Madrid intervened, recalling its rights of suzerainty over Corsica, inherited from the Pope.

The Jacobites were no doubt aware of these dealings. In December, Robert d’Arcy, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, was concerned about Prusso-Jacobite connections. He mentioned several conferences between Earl Marischal and Charles Edward Stuart.²⁸² On October 15th 1753, James III Stuart and his Court met the Pope and 25 cardinals in the church of Santa Maria de Grotta Ferrata.²⁸³ The same day, the Apostolic Chamber took on 50 Corsican soldiers.²⁸⁴ Soon after, on November 17th, the Pope gave a private audience to the Pretender and his son Henry Benedict, the Cardinal of York.²⁸⁵ In November 1753, British Naval Intelligence reported that the Young Pretender had landed in Corsica.²⁸⁶ This Corsican episode can neither be confirmed nor denied, as no other source mentions this important fact.

280 *In* Archivio di Stato di Torino, Mazzo 1 d’adizione – Negoziazioni, Corsica – Letter from Giam Battista Filippi, Bastia, 5 October 1753.

281 *In* CARUTTI D. (1859) – Storia del Regno di Carlo Emanuele III, Torino, Gianini, p 61.

282 *In* Public Record Office – SP 78/248/95 f. 283, State Papers Foreign, France, Letter, Holderness to Albarmar, 6 December 1753.

283 *In* Diario ordinario di Roma, N° 5661, 29 October 1753, p 6.

284 *In* Gazette de Berne, N° 88, 3 November 1753, p 2.

285 *In* Diario ordinario di Roma, N° 5670, 17 November 1753, p 4.

286 *In* MAC LYNN F. (1988) – Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor& Francis, p 385.

It should be noted that logistically speaking, the Young Pretender's cousin, Captain Don Pedro Fitz-James Stuart, was then squadron leader of the Spanish fleet in the Mediterranean. On his father's death, the Second Duke of Berwick, Don Pedro, had been taken under protection by James III Stuart in Rome. He had ample means to organize a clandestine stay in Corsica by Charles Edward Stuart. Whether or not the landing happened, if the Prince was known and appreciated by certain Corsican *Naziunali*, he was not then best placed to conduct direct negotiations with Genoa.

On November 19th 1753, an assembly of Rome's envoys to the Catholic Courts was held in the Quirinal Palace in Rome, after which the Pope gave a private audience to James III Stuart and his son Henry Benedict, Cardinal of York.²⁸⁷

In 1754, the Jacobite networks were still active. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lloyd, a Welsh Jacobite temporarily serving in France, was sent to England to assess the possibilities of a raid. Lloyd was a Jacobite spy working in various European courts.²⁸⁸ He served five European powers during his military career, principally Prussia and Austria. Lloyd is most well-known for his part in the 1745 uprising and for all the clandestine missions he carried out in England disguised as a priest, but was taken prisoner.²⁸⁹ Lord Drummond, cousin of Earl Marischal, intervened to release him from captivity in 1747.

Independently from the activity of his pan-European networks and seeing the poor results obtained by his son Charles Edward in England, James III Stuart took the initiative from Rome.

On February 1754, the Minor Council of the Republic of Genoa recognised the impossibility of quelling the Corsican rebels.²⁹⁰ At the same time, the fate of the Old Pretender seemed to be at the heart of the congregations of Cardinals held in Rome.²⁹¹

On March 20th, James Montresor, an honorable British intelligence correspondent, was in Avignon. The Jacobites he met informed him that: "*The Pretender's son should be put in possession of Corsica*".²⁹² There is no reason why they should have mentioned this project if it did not correspond to reality.

During the summer of 1754, the back and forth between the Vatican and the Jacobite Court multiplied, not unlike the episode of 1731 surrounding the Corsican project.

287 In Diario ordinario di Roma, N° 5673, 24 November 1753, p 13.

288 In PITTOCK M. (2013) - Material Culture and Sedition, 1688-1760: Treacherous Objects, Secret places, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, p 122.

289 In LIDDLE HART B. (1976) – The sword and the pen, New York, Adrian Liddle Hart, p 100.

290 In Archivio di Stato di Torino – Mazzo 1 Fasc. 35, Corti Estere, Corsica.

291 In Scots Magazine, 1754, vol XVI, p 193.

292 In Public Record Office – SP 78/249/83 f.194, State Papers Foreign, France, Report from James Montresor to Albemarle, 17 April 1754.

On July 27th 1754, two cardinals visited James III in his Roman palace: the Neapolitan Enrico Enriquez and the Milanese Fabrizio Serbelloni, former apostolic nuncio in Vienna.²⁹³ Soon after, on August 23rd, the Pope received the Pretender and his son, the Cardinal of York, in a private audience.²⁹⁴

On September 14th, Pope Benedict XIV again granted a private audience to the Chevalier de St George, who retired to Albano 2 days later. Two days later, the latter summoned a few supporters to Albano and summoned his son, the Cardinal of York, Henry Benedict Stuart.²⁹⁵

In the end, it was Pasquale de Paoli who delivered the conclusions of all this political turmoil. On September 17th, while in Portoferraio, he wrote to Franceschi about the fate of Corsica:

*“We know that the Pope has intervened to have Corsica ceded to the Pretender in exchange for a sum of money. Spain, the Emperor, the King of Naples, and all the others agreed to it; and yet, because the Genoese opposed it, the affair went up in smoke”.*²⁹⁶

There is no hostility to this project on the part of Paoli, who seems to know the details of the negotiations that took place. He even seems to have a few grievances against the Genoese, whom he considers solely responsible for the failure. This makes it all the more plausible that Charles Edward Stuart was in Corsica after Gaffori’s death at the end of 1753 to hold direct talks.

But the Old Pretender still wanted to believe it. On September 24th, by order of the Pope, the galley commander Ricci and the knight Caros embarked at Civita-Vecchia for Genoa.²⁹⁷ Their mission was to go and recover a ship built in the Genoese arsenals, but in Genoa was the priest Lercari, the former Valet de Chambre to the Cardinal of York. The two captains of his navy brought him instructions from the Pope.

On October 10th, the papal delegation left Genoa for Civita-Vecchia aboard the frigate newly armed by the Vatican.²⁹⁸

On October 25th, the Pope held an audience with Monsignor Lercari.²⁹⁹ That same evening, after Lercari’s report, the Pope also received the Cardinal of York.³⁰⁰ On October 28th, James III Stuart also visited Benedict XIV.³⁰¹ It was undoubtedly confirmed at this meeting that the negotiations with Genoa for the cession of Corsica to the Royal House of Stuart had definitively failed.

293 *In Diario ordinario di Roma*, N° 5778, 27 July 1754, p 3.

294 *In Diario ordinario di Roma*, N° 5790, 24 August 1754, p 6.

295 *In Gazette de Leyde* du 11 October 1754.

296 *In GRAZIANI A.M., BITOSSI C. (2003) – Pascal Paoli, Correspondance, la prise du pouvoir (1749-1756)*, Ajaccio, Editions Alain Piazzola, p 69.

297 *In Gazette de France* du 19 October 1754.

298 *In Gazette de Leyde*, 5 November 1754.

299 *In Gazette de Leyde*, 22 November 1754.

300 *In Diario ordinario di Roma*, N° 5820, 2 November 1754, p 2.

301 *Ibid*, p 7.

Why were the Genoese so hostile to this proposal?

More than any animosity towards the Stuarts, they were repulsed by the very idea of an independent Kingdom of Corsica.

The international situation deteriorated again: since the beginning of 1755, there had been an increasing number of incidents between the English and French fleets.

At the same time, Silesia became a source of military tension between Prussia and Maria Theresa of Austria. These incidents led to what historians describe as the first world conflict, which pitted European nations against each other on the continent and within their colonial empires. Once again, Corsica was to experience the direct consequences of this conflict, through French and English attempts to exploit it.

James III Stuart fell seriously ill. Since 1752, a Corsican soldier in the Papal army, Antonio Rossi, had been his fixed guard from a room close to his own.³⁰² He fulfilled this role until 1766. This was also the case for Doctor Martino Guidoni-Bianconi,³⁰³ another Corsican who assisted the dying king until the end. In an ironic tone, Horace Walpole referred to the declining health of the old Stuart Pretender in these terms: *"It is a little unlucky for the Pretender to be dying just at the moment when the Pope seems to want to take Corsica into his hands and give it to such a faithful son of the Church."*³⁰⁴

It would not be the first time, nor the last, that Horace Walpole made this link between Corsica and the Stuarts.

Pasquale de Paoli was chosen as the General-in-Chief of the Corsican Nation at the *Consulta di a Casabianca* on 14 July 1755. From 1755, Horace Walpole tried to play the card of Theodore de Neuhoff (during the last moments of his life), then imprisoned in London, to get closer to Paoli.³⁰⁵ The interested relationship between the Court of London and its servants over the fate of the Corsicans proved to be highly fickle.

On September 22nd 1761, George III succeeded his grandfather George II. Various sources state that Charles Edward Stuart secretly attended his coronation, much to the astonishment of George III, who, following the advice of some ministers, did nothing to have him arrested. Having John Stuart, Earl of Bute, as his tutor, he authorized Earl Marischal to return to Scotland for a time.

302 In CORP E. (2014) - The Stuarts in Italy, 1719-1766: A Royal Court in Permanent Exil, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 340.

303 Martino Guidoni-Bianconi, a native of Calenzana in Corsica, joined the first promotion of the Faculty of Surgery at the Roman University of La Sapienza, a faculty set up in 1751 by Pope Benedict XIV. A commemorative plaque in the church of Santa Restituda in Calenzana still reads "MARTINUS GUIDONI BIANCONI IACOBI III BRITANNIAE REGIS MEDICUS CONSULENS".

304 In Horace Walpole to Horace Mann, Arlington Street, Londons, Letter, 20 June 1760.

305 In VERGE-FRANCESCHI M. (2005) - La Corse et l'Angleterre XVIIe – XIXe siècle, Ajaccio, Alain Piazzola, p 173.

On December 29th 1762, at the Genoese ambassador's request and on his Privy Council's advice, George III issued a decree forbidding his subjects to correspond with or assist the Corsican rebels.³⁰⁶ The decree clearly stated that any act of disobedience would result in severe punishment.

On February 10th 1763, the British sovereign signed the first peace treaty with France and Spain, the Treaty of Paris. On the same day, Pasquale de Paoli, disappointed by Britain's position on Corsican affairs, sent a letter to George III in which he compared the fate of Corsica to that of the Netherlands, whose freedom he attributed to the intervention of the British Crown.³⁰⁷ This did not change London's position concerning Corsica.

After this first political setback with George III, the Stuart sympathizers could once again become useful and approachable for Pasquale de Paoli, influencing London's position via their diverse and varied networks.

For the Jacobites still working alongside Charles Edward Stuart, Corsica could once again be seen as an opportunity to restore this ancient dynasty's literal and figurative reputation.

In this new context, at the beginning of 1764, a rumor circulates within the Republic of Genoa, a rumor that evokes "*Paoli's desire to offer the island to Giacomo III Stuart*".³⁰⁸

306 In VERGE-FRANCESCHI M. (2005) - La Corse et l'Angleterre XVIIe – XIXe siècle, Ajaccio, Alain Piazzola, p 173.

307 In GRAZIANI A. M. (2002) - Pascal Paoli, Père de la patrie Corse, Paris, Tallandier, p 99.

308 In MICELLI E. (2024) – Les révolutions corses et l'idée républicaine, Bordeaux, Le bord de l'eau, p 250.

Part IV - Jacobites activities in Corsica (1765-1795)

James Boswell, Jacobite network and Corsica

In order to understand James Boswell's motivation for visiting Italy and Corsica, we must look back at the context of 1764, a year that provoked monumental changes in Corsica and England.

Before acceding to the throne, George III of Hanover had as his tutor John Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute. This was an intentional choice by his father Frederick, made in order to displease his grandfather George II, so deep was the hatred between the two men. The Stuarts of Bute could form a bridge between London and the Jacobite networks, mainly through Freemasonry. William Pitt the Elder, former Secretary of State for War, wrote of John Stuart in his memoirs that he shared with Samuel Johnson "*a fierce Jacobitism*".

At the coronation of George III, John Stuart, Third Earl of Bute, became Prime Minister of Great Britain. He used all of his connections with the Jacobite diaspora to bring about the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, particularly with Patrice François, Count of Nény, who belonged to Vienna's first circle of power. He maintained a long correspondence with Nény, which led to the signing of Treaty of Fontainebleau on November 3rd 1762.³⁰⁹ The newspaper *North Briton* had waged a violent campaign against John Stuart in 1763 based on a letter containing directives from James III Stuart addressed to him.³¹⁰ His ruinous fiscal recovery policy after the Seven Years' War cost him his post on April 8th 1763. James Boswell defended him, saying: "*The political coachman drove a team of bad horses*".³¹¹

In 1764, English society regarded the Stuarts as icons of a bygone era. Although some of those close to George III were still planning to assassinate the Young Stuart Pretender as a preventive measure, there was also a romantic streak running through the Whigs that desired an honorable way out of the crisis with the Jacobites. With France as an enemy, the desire for patriotic unity was also a real factor.

In Corsica, Pasquale de Paoli asserted his power as head of state after ending the civil war with his enemy Matra. The European courts and thinkers of the Enlightenment followed the birth of this young nation with interest, and were particularly attentive to the system of government that the Corsicans intended to adopt. The Corsican Constitution had been constantly evolving since 1735, and was issued from a specific Corsican parliamentary tradition, the *Consulte* system.

309 *In* Archivio di Stato di Torino, Mazzo 3 d'addizione / Fasc. 29 – Corti Straniere, Inghilterra, Note e altre piezze servando alle negoziazione.

310 *In* LOVAT-FRASER J.A (1912) - John Stuart Earl of Bute, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 27.

311 *Ibid*, p 101.

Paoli also intended to draw on the intellectual contributions of the greatest European thinkers, including Jean Jacques Rousseau, to perfect a political system that would guarantee equality and freedom for Corsicans. These republican principles were opposed to the monarchical system of divine right. In his letter of July 15th 1764 to Casabianca, Pasquale de Paoli strongly attacked the Marquis de Cursay, who wanted a monarchical system for Corsica.³¹²

The Genoese, fearing the definitive loss of the island, signed the Treaty of Compiègne with France on August 6th 1764, which provided for the French military occupation of all the Genoese presidencies for a period of four years. It became vital for Pasquale de Paoli to find support to counter this new French intervention.

While the situation was tense in Corsica, James Boswell was on his Grand Tour of Europe. The first important person he met in Prussia on June 19th 1764 was Earl Marischal.³¹³ During the Seven Years' War, the latter gained a significant reputation and became a trusted companion of Frederick II of Prussia. George II of Hanover had rehabilitated Earl Marischal for his contribution to the Anglo-Prussian agreements during the war. Despite this, he remained close to the Royal House of Stuart and, rather than end his old age in Scotland, he preferred to remain in the service of Prussia, where he had just been appointed Governor of Neuchâtel. He had given sanctuary to Jean Jacques Rousseau, a political refugee because of his subversive writings, and Rousseau had befriended him.

James Boswell's position on the Stuarts was ambivalent. On the one hand, he was considered by George III's loyal followers to be a Tory who tended towards modernity. On the other hand, he spoke of his feelings for the Stuarts as something indefinable, a romantic passion for the old rituals.³¹⁴ On his way to visit Jean Jacques Rousseau with a recommendation from Earl Marischal, James Boswell recorded the following in his diary: "*There was something pathetic and generous in Jacobitism, so long as it espoused the disinterested cause of an ancient Royal House (...) I am sorry for the Stuarts, I wish to forget them*".³¹⁵

Another aspect to consider is his Scottish patriotism. When he appeared at the court of Frederick II of Prussia in Scottish dress, the British embassy secretary Alexander Burnet complained loudly about this "*absurd distinction between Scots and English*".³¹⁶

312 In GRAZIANI A. M. (2002) - Pascal Paoli, Père de la patrie Corse, Paris, Tallandier, p 98.

313 In MARTIN P. (2000) - A life of James Boswell, London, Yale University Press, p 164.

314 In LEWIS J.E (1997) - Hamilton's "Abdication," Boswell's Jacobitism and the Myth of Mary Queen of Scots in English Literary History - Vol 64 / N°4, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, p 1081.

315 Ibid, p 1081.

316 In MARTIN P. (2000) - A life of James Boswell, London, Yale University Press, p 171.

At Earl Marischal's house, Boswell learned that James III Stuart's state of health had worsened considerably, and his condition continued to worsen thereafter. Within this context, Charles Edward Stuart renewed contact with his brother, to intercede with the Pope regarding his succession rights after his Father's death. The Vatican had to deal with various political pressures on this matter. On September 2nd 1764, in a letter to the Earl Marischal, James Boswell described himself as 'honest', a well-known code word in Jacobite correspondence that clearly meant that he was trustworthy enough to be introduced to the Jacobite Court.³¹⁷

On September 23rd 1764, James Boswell met Jean Jacques Rousseau for the first time. The philosopher had responded the previous day to a request from Matteo de Buttafuoco, a Corsican officer in the French service, who, at the request of Pasquale de Paoli, had asked him to work on a draft constitution. Boswell read Rousseau's proposals for the government of Corsica with enthusiasm. A political dispute arose between Boswell and Rousseau over the notion of equal rights, but Corsica soon came back to the forefront of discussions, and this romantic idea of the Corsican struggle for freedom won over James Boswell.³¹⁸ On October 24th 1764, Earl Marischal corresponded with Jean Jacques Rousseau, who told him that this request from Paoli and his brave compatriots reminded him of the discussion they had already had together concerning his former project to see Charles Edward Stuart placed on the Corsican throne.³¹⁹

In December 1764 in Rome, at a conclave of Cardinals held in the Quirinale, some Cardinals opposed the recognition of Charles Edward Stuart as his father's royal successor.³²⁰ As a result, the issue remained unresolved and the dynasty's future became highly uncertain. In a letter addressed to George Dempster on December 3rd, Boswell conveyed his frustration about the perceived "*French invasion of Corsica.*"

At a time when Pasquale de Paoli and Charles Edward Stuart were both in a delicate international situation, Earl Marischal strongly urged Alexander Boswell to let his son James continue his Grand Tour of Italy. Once again, Earl Marischal's attention was fixed on Corsica.

At over 70 years of age, did he still have the means to negotiate the slightest arrangement with Paoli for the Stuarts?

317 In PITTOCK M. (2007) – James Boswell, Aberdeen, AHRC Centre for Irish and Scottish studies, p 72.

318 In MARTIN P. (2000) - A life of James Boswell, London, Yale University Press, p 184.

319 In CUTHELL E. E. (1915) - The scottish friend of frederic the great, The last Earl Marischall – Vol. II, London, Stanley Paul, p 208.

320 In CORP E. (2011) - The Stuarts in Italy, 1719-1766: A Royal Court In Permanent Exil, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 239.

Earl Marischal had a close friendship with Frederick II of Prussia. The latter had written secretly to Charles Edward Stuart on 12 February 1747: *“You are frequently the subject of my conversation with General Keith (...) Nothing binds me more entirely to him than his devotion and the same feelings I may have concerning your Royal Grace”*.³²¹ The King of Prussia’s feelings for the Pretender Stuart were not known to the public, but they were still relevant in 1764.

Moreover, Lord Marischal had funds at his disposal and could rely on powerful networks. He was on very good terms with Scots from former Jacobite families serving in the British diplomatic corps, such as Andrew Mitchell in Berlin and John Dick in Livorno. This great Protestant Freemason could also count on the support of the Lodges of Saint John of Scotland. These lodges supported Dutch and Prussian trade³²² and were established in Marseilles, Genoa, Livorno, Naples, Palermo, and Smyrna.³²³

At the very start of 1765, James Boswell crossed the Swiss Alps to Italy. In Venice, he met Lord Mount Stuart, son of the 3rd Earl of Bute, with whom he became friends and remained in contact until July.³²⁴ Lord Mount Stuart is credited with playing a central role in the spread of Masonic literature in Italy.³²⁵ During this period, the situation became less and less favorable for Charles Edward Stuart. Sir Horace Mann, Britain’s envoy in Florence, regularly communicated with Cardinal Albani and actively worked to thwart Cardinal Henry Benedict Stuart’s efforts to gain recognition for his brother from the Roman Curia. It was unlikely that the Cardinals in Louis XV’s circle would provide any assistance, since their Head of Government, the Duc de Choiseul, was widely known for being strongly opposed to Charles Edward Stuart and inflexible in his stance.³²⁶

On March 1st 1765, James Boswell arrived in Naples, the stronghold of the Irish Jacobite officers. The next day he began a correspondence with Andrew Ludmisen, the private secretary of the old Stuart Pretender.³²⁷ On March 24th 1765, he reached Rome. On April 26th, he went to Frascati to attend a meeting presided over by Charles Edward Stuart in the presence of his brother, the Cardinal of York. On this occasion, he became friends with Andrew Ludmisen.³²⁸

321 In FORBES R. (1896) -The Lyon in Mourning- Vol. III in Publications of Scottish History-Vol XXII, Edimbourg, Scottish History Society, p 254.

322 In CAZZANIGA G. M. Dir. 2006) - Storia d’Italia. Annali 21. La Massoneria, Roma, Einaudi, p 432.

323 In BEAUREPAIRE PY (2006) - Saint-Jean d’Écosse de Marseille, p 61-95 in La Franc-Maçonnerie en Méditerranée (XVIIIe - XXe siècle), Cahiers de la Méditerranée N°72, p 83.

324 In BERETTI F. (1988) - Pascal Paoli et l’image de la Corse au dix-huitième siècle : Le témoignage des voyageurs britanniques, Oxford, Voltaire Foundation, p 40.

325 In CAZZANIGA G. M. Dir. 2006) - Storia d’Italia. Annali 21. La Massoneria, Roma, Einaudi, p 66.

326 In MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 343.

327 In COLOMBANI M.J (2019) - Naples et la Corse, deux étapes du Grand Tour d’un libertin e nquête de vertu, James Boswell (1740-1795), in VERGE-FRANCESCHI Michel Dir, La Corse et Naples, 2019 Ajaccio, Editions Alain Piazzola, p 86.

328 In PITTOCK M. (2007) - James Boswell, Aberdeen, AHRC Centre for Irish and Scottish studies, p 72.

It is important to note that at the same time, Phillipe-Goswin de Nény, son of the Count of Nény, a mason from the Austrian Netherlands and a member of an illustrious Jacobite family, was also in Rome.³²⁹ In June 1765, Lord Mount Stuart wrote to Lord Auchinleck, James's father, asking him to allow his son to stay longer in Italy.³³⁰ It was important, apparently.

Before leaving Rome, James Boswell commissioned the famous Scottish painter Gavin Hamilton to paint a very special picture, which arrived in Scotland 10 years later. The painting depicts the abdication of Queen Mary Stuart in 1567. This painting and the reasons why James Boswell commissioned it are still a subject of study today. There are many possible symbolic interpretations of this painting. After Mary Stuart abdicated, James I took over the throne, marking the end of her reign but not the end of the House of Stuart. This commission, which came against the backdrop of the death of James III Stuart and the succession claimed by Charles Edward Stuart, makes for an obvious comparison. Some have seen this work as clear evidence of James Boswell's romantic Jacobite streak. After all, one of his own ancestors had fought for Mary Stuart and he himself often wore a miniature of the Queen around his neck.³³¹

At the time, Charles Edward Stuart lived in the Duchy of Bouillon, a small sovereign state in the Austrian Netherlands. This was a wise choice, as the Duchy was a strategic crossroads and the President of the Privy Council of the Austrian Netherlands was none other than the Count of Nény.

On October 3rd, he wrote to his brother, the Cardinal of York, to ask him to have his royal dignity recognized by the Pope upon the death of his father the King.³³² He asked him to maintain the utmost secrecy about his forthcoming visit to Italy. The question of a sovereign in title but without a Kingdom remained unresolved.

Earl Marischal, as a wise statesman, must have started anticipating even before James Boswell came to Prussia. He had to start working on a fallback solution for the Royal House of Stuart, and this was perhaps an opportunity for James Boswell to try to reconcile his romantic ideals for the Corsicans and the Stuarts. For some historians and biographers specialising in Jacobitism, there is a strong possibility that James Boswell conducted a Jacobite espionage operation in Corsica.³³³

329 *In* BERNARD B. (1992) - *Amours et voyages: les pérégrinations méditerranéennes de Philippe-Goswin de Neny in Groupe d'études lignistes - Nouvelles annales Prince de Ligne*, Tome 7, Paris, Honoré Champion, p 193.

330 *In* MARTIN P. (2000) - *A life of James Boswell*, London, Yale University Press, p 200.

331 *In* LEWIS J.E (1997) - "Hamilton's "Abdication," Boswell's Jacobitism and the Myth of Mary Queen of Scots in *English Literary History* - Vol 64 / N°4, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, p 1081.

332 *In* Archivio di Stato di Torino, Mazzo 4 d'addizione / Fasc. 15 – Corti Straniere, Inghilterra, Letter, From Charles Edward Stuart, Bouillon, 3 octoer 1765.

333 *In* PITTOCK M. (2007) – *James Boswell*, Aberdeen, AHRC Centre for Irish and Scottish studies, p 73.

In the Boswell family, up until 1950, an old sword was displayed on multiple occasions, bearing the inscription: *“For God, My Country and King James the 8th and 3rd”*.

James Boswell went to Livorno to embark for Corsica and had no difficulty obtaining an English passport from the British Consulate. The Consul, John Dick, was the same man who had taken Theodore of Neuhoff to Corsica in 1736. His cousin, Alexander Dick, had been approached to be Charles Edward Stuart’s private secretary during the rebellion of 1745.³³⁴ In the end, another Dick cousin, Andrew Ludmisen, was chosen. It would appear that a former Jacobite network had been reawakened.

It should also be borne in mind that several British Tories, although not necessarily still active Jacobites, wanted to put an end to the opposition between the Jacobites and the Hanoverians. Some British politicians may have accepted and understood the idea of securing a Corsican future for the last Stuart Pretender as a means of countering the French Duc de Choiseul’s plans in the Mediterranean. But this win-win compromise had varying support in England, even among the Stuarts loyal to George III, such as the Duke of Grafton, a declared enemy of the Jacobites.

Before leaving for Corsica, James Boswell was warned by James Stuart-Keith (Earl Marischal’s second cousin), captain of the Royal Navy frigate Montréal, who feared the dangers awaiting him in Corsica. James Boswell heeded this warning. While Boswell was meeting Paoli, the Cardinal of York gave the Pope a 24-page memorandum in which he defended his brother’s right to royal dignity.³³⁵ He recalled that his grandfather James II had sacrificed three kingdoms for the Catholic faith. He insisted upon the fact that his brother had always been acknowledged by the Vatican as the Prince of Wales, which came with all the associated privileges, including those of his succession rights.

Cardinal Albani informed Sir Horace Mann that: *“The Pope answered that he would see Charles Edward again, with great pleasure, that he would receive treatment according to his distinguished rank, that after his Father’s death, he could count on the remuneration that was already fixed for the Cardinal his brother. But as regards the titles of Royalty, he cannot and will not take it upon himself to grant him this title”*.³³⁶ The Pope’s procrastination did not discourage Charles Edward Stuart, who wrote to his brother on the following November 28th to thank him warmly for all his efforts and to hasten his preparations to go to Italy.³³⁷

334 In PITTOCK M. (2013) - Material Culture and Sedition, 1688-1760: Treacherous Objects, Secret places, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, p 52.

335 In Archivio di Stato di Torino, Mazzo 4 d’addizione / Fasc. 15 – Corti Straniere, Inghilterra, Mémoire du cardinal d’York pour faire reconnaître comme unique successeur du Royaume d’Angleterre la Maison Royale Stuart, 28 October 1765.

336 In RORBURGHE CLUB (1843) - The Decline of the last Stuarts, London, Shakspeare Press, p 22.

337 In Archivio di Stato di Torino, Mazzo 4 d’addizione / Fasc. 15 – Corti Straniere, Inghilterra, Letter, from Charles Edward Stuart, Bouillon, 28 November 1765.

It was after Boswell's return from Corsica, on November 29th 1765, that a few insiders in Genoa learned about the true reason for his trip to.³³⁸ On December 16th he wrote a letter on the subject, which he posted to the London Chronicle as soon as he arrived in Marseille. On December 25th 1765, Boswell arrived in Avignon, where he was received by the Jacobite James Murray, Earl of Dunbar, former private secretary to James III Stuart, the same man who had been involved in Charles Edward Stuart's plan to settle Corsica in 1754.³³⁹ This meeting was no accident. James Boswell's intentions were revealed in Great Britain. It could be read on Thursday January 23rd in London,³⁴⁰ on Tuesday January 28th in Leeds³⁴¹ and on Friday January 31st in Belfast:³⁴²

"Touched by the misfortunes of Prince Charles Stuart (...), I went to Signior Paoli to test the waters, in order if possible, to procure some kind of establishment of sovereignty for their high born Prince in that Island ". "The young Chevalier himself had not the least knowledge of or participation in this notable scheme, but that is purely the effects of the warm but unauthorized zeal in a few of his banished partisans"

In other words, despite his expressed reservations, it was a half-hearted recognition of the project and the officialization of an initiative originating from Jacobites or Tory sympathizers. James Boswell would have found the idea of making Charles Edward Stuart King of Corsica pleasant.³⁴³ His brother, David Boswell, persuaded the Edinburgh press not to mention the article in the London Chronicle, referring to his brother's sudden *"warm and misguided zeal"* for Prince Stuart.³⁴⁴ His father, Lord Auchinleck, was informed of it by Sir David Dalrymple, which sent him into a rage.

Given the context, it seems unlikely that James Boswell would have made public all his discussions with Pasquale de Paoli. However, certain exchanges are enlightening, particularly when Pasquale de Paoli broached the question of Corsican sovereignty: *"We may well have foreign princes as friends, but they must be, amici fuori di casa. We can also enter into alliances, but we do not want to submit to the domination of the greatest nation in Europe. This people, which has done so much for freedom, would let itself be chopped to pieces, to the last man, rather than consent to fall back into the power of another State"*.³⁴⁵

338 In MARTIN P. (2000) - A life of James Boswell, London, Yale University Press, p 208.

339 In POTTLE F.A (1955) – Boswell on the Grand Tour, Italy, Corsica and France 1765-1766, New York, Mac Graw Hill Book Cie, P 250.

340 In The London Chronicle, Thursday 23 January 1766, Foreign Intelligence, p 1.

341 In The Leeds Intelligencer, N° 620, Tuesday, 28 January 1766, p 1.

342 In Belfast Newsletter, N° 2969, Friday, 31 January 1766, p 1.

343 In PITTOCK M.G.H (2006) - Poetry and Jacobite Politics in Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 82.

344 In POTTLE F.A (1955) – Boswell on the Grand Tour, Italy, Corsica and France 1765-1766, New York, Mac Graw Hill Book Cie, p 274.

345 In BOSWELL J. (2015) - Relation de l'Isle de Corse, journal d'un voyage dans cette île, Paris, BNF/Hachette, p 202.

Independence and Liberty therefore remained the main objectives, but Pasquale de Paoli did not close the door to any alliance, either with Great Britain or with some foreign Princes, which is just as true for Charles Edward Stuart. These two perspectives could only suit James Boswell, as he could serve his country, help the Corsicans and inform the Stuart supporters that it was possible to negotiate with Pasquale de Paoli. We can better understand James Boswell's motivations, as he sought to help the Corsican nation by every means possible, relying as much on British public opinion as on his allies in the state apparatus and on the Jacobite networks that were still active.

In December 1765, Choiseul had assured the Young Pretender that he would be successful in his dealings with the Pope, while having him issued with a French passport in the name of Baron de Douglas.³⁴⁶

³⁴⁶ *In Public Record Office - SP 78/268/82 f. 236, State Papers Foreign, France, Letter, Richmond to Conway, 19 December 1765.*

The death of James III Stuart and the decline of Charles Edward Stuart.

On January 2nd 1766, James III Stuart died in Rome, accompanied by only seven servants.³⁴⁷ Andrew Ludmisen urged Charles Edward Stuart to return to Rome immediately. His fate was soon sealed: on 14 January 1766, a conclave met to decide on the validity of his royal claims.³⁴⁸ A number of pro-Stuart Cardinals were dismissed, and it was during this meeting that Cardinal Albani, whom Sir Horace Mann had bribed, was discovered to be a Hanoverian spy. The Pope informed Charles Edward Stuart, through the Cardinal of York, that he did not have the status of royal dignity but could accept the status of Count of Albania.

On January 17th, Cardinal Albani received assurances from the French and Spanish ambassadors that they would not intervene in this matter without their court orders.³⁴⁹ The Pope was in a wait-and-see position, telling the French ambassador: *"If your King is the first to recognize this, I will be the second"*.³⁵⁰ Sir Horace Mann sent news to London Court: *"The Pope has refused to give effect to the pretensions of the Pretender's son to the displeasure of Cardinal Stuart and the Ministers who support him"*.³⁵¹

Charles Edward Stuart arrived in Rome on January 23rd under the identity of Baron Douglas. That same evening the Pope granted a secret audience to the Cardinal of York to tell him that his brother's requests would not be acted upon.³⁵² Charles Edward Stuart was shocked and immediately went to Frascati.

Cardinal Albani informed the King of Piedmont-Sardinia that he had learned that England had threatened to bombard the ports of Civitavecchia and Ancona if the Pope recognized Charles Edward Stuart as King of England.³⁵³ On January 27th, a secret consistory confirmed the Pope's position.

On January 30th, the Cardinal of York gave a Mass in memory of James III Stuart in the *Basilica of San Lorenzo in Damaso*. The crowd acclaimed his present brother: *"Long live our King, Where God is, We cannot fear the devil!"*³⁵⁴ The Cardinal of York did not give up, and on February 7, he met the Pope in the Basilica of San Lorenzo in Damaso.³⁵⁵

347 In CORP E. (2011) - The Stuarts in Italy, 1719-1766: A Royal Court In Permanent Exil, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 345.

348 In MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 344.

349 In Archivio di Stato di Torino, Mazzo 4 d'addizione / Fasc. 15 – Corti Straniere, Inghilterra, Letter, From Cardinal Albani, Rome, 17 January 1766.

350 In Horace Mann to Horace Walpole, Florence, Letter, 18 September 1784.

351 In Public Record Office - SP 78/269/50 f. 188, State Papers Foreign, France, Letter, Horace Mann to Richmond. 24 January 1766.

352 In Gazette de Leyde - supplément N° XV, 21 February 1766, p 3.

353 In Archivio di Stato di Torino, Mazzo 4 d'addizione / Fasc. 15 – Corti Straniere, Inghilterra, Letter, from Cardinal Albani, Rome, 25 January 1766.

354 Ibid, Letter, from Cardinal Albani, Rome, 1st February 1766.

355 In Diario ordinario di Roma, N° 7704, 15 February 1766, p 2.

Archbishop Vitaliano Borromeo, following orders from the Pope, spoke to Charles Edward Stuart on February 16th, saying: *“Sir, it is with the greatest regret that His Holiness has asked me to inform you that he will not be able to recognize you in his presence as an obedient and devoted son, or as a friend until you return to the religion of your ancestors and show filial submission to the Holy See. He will not be able, in accordance with his conscience, to support you in a manner befitting your birth, or to allow you to reside in any of his estates, unless you can convince him that your religion is orthodox and that the opinions about your defection are erroneous”*.³⁵⁶

The basis of the Cardinal of York’s argument was to defend the Catholic faith, and by giving the Pope information about Charles Edward Stuart’s conversion to Protestantism, Horace Mann and Albani delivered the final blow to the Young Pretender. At the same time, a courier from Versailles ordered his ambassador to observe the strictest neutrality in the matter.³⁵⁷ It was a logical order, in keeping with the arrangements between London and Paris.

In Florence, Sir Horace Mann was overjoyed. In France, Choiseul halved the pension granted by Versailles to Charles Edward Stuart, breaking Louis XV’s commitments to James III Stuart.³⁵⁸ In the first week of March 1766, all signs of Stuart royalty were removed from the buildings in Rome, including the gateway to the palace of the late Old Pretender.³⁵⁹

Humiliated, disgraced, and welcomed as a pariah, Charles Edward Stuart left Rome. He overrode the Vatican’s decision and asked his supporters to recognize him as Charles III Stuart. The Roman Curia reprimanded any priests who tried.

This decline of the Royal House of Stuart made the search for a potential alliance with the Corsicans even more important. James Boswell and the Earl Marischal had clearly understood that respect for Independence and the Constitution desired by the Corsicans was a prerequisite for any negotiations.

But Charles Edward Stuart was far removed from the absolutist theses of his ancestors, as his subsequent discussions with King Gustav III of Sweden would show. Equality under the law for the Corsicans did not therefore appear to be an insurmountable ideological obstacle. He had converted to Protestantism to be closer to his British subjects. These negotiations for the Prince’s future no longer concerned James Boswell.

356 *In The Scot Magazine*, 1st March 1766, p 157.

357 *In Archivio di Stato di Torino, Mazzo 4 d’addizione / Fasc. 15 – Corti Straniere, Inghilterra, Letter, from Cardinal Albani, Rome, 22 February 1766.*

358 *In Gazette de Berne*, 25 June 1766, supplément, p 5.

359 *In DORAN Dr (1876) – Mann and manners at the Court of Florence, Vol. II, London, Bentley & Son, p 165.*

Jacobite support of Pasquale de Paoli's government (1766-1769).

The fall of the Royal House of Stuart affected both the old Jacobites and the fourth generation of Irish, Scottish, and English exiles, whose birth on the European continent could only be explained by their ancestors' loyalty to the Stuart cause. The idea that so many sacrifices and deaths had been in vain was hardly acceptable. Some other princes who lost wars had more dignified retreats. The poor treatment meted out by the European courts to the last Stuart Pretender was seen as insulting. In addition to active Jacobitism, which had dwindled, many friends of the Stuarts could not bring themselves to accept the sudden demise of a five-century-old dynasty. Even if some European courts were satisfied with the end of all Jacobite political interference in their strategic choices, the prospect of seeing Corsica come under French control was very unpopular with certain states. For England, it was a direct threat to its trade in the Mediterranean, while for other neighboring powers, it was tantamount to a reversal of the balance of power in the *Mare Nostrum*.

From this point of view, the mediation with Genoa undertaken by the King of Piedmont-Sardinia, also a cousin of the Stuarts and an old ally of the Corsicans, is all the more understandable. Fearing that France would annex Corsica, George III suggested to the King of Piedmont-Sardinia that Genoa cede the island to Sardinia. Charles-Emmanuel III, King of Piedmont-Sardinia, was keen to maintain good relations with both the Hanoverians and the Stuarts. With the idea of freezing the latter's claims to the English throne by offering them a fallback solution, he replied to George III that: "*This island should be ceded to the eldest son of James III, Prince Charles Stuart*".³⁶⁰ Three years later, it was confirmed that Charles Edward Stuart was prepared to give up the English throne if he was offered a political solution worthy of his rank.

On March 10th 1766, the press of Frederick II of Prussia wrote: "*This power is using its good offices with the Republic of Genoa to ensure that Prince Charles Edward Stuart is granted a retreat on the island of Corsica that is appropriate to the Prince's rank, and that it could succeed in doing so if it did not first have some problems to resolve with the Genoese themselves*".³⁶¹

Since 1764, the Earl Marischal had corresponded with the King of Piedmont-Sardinia. It seems almost certain that he was once again planning to bring Charles Edward Stuart to Corsica, and trying to obtain more guarantees from the Corsicans and from the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. Politically, he was not that far removed from Paoli's republican ideal, as he himself was considered to be "*a republican Jacobite*".³⁶²

360 In BIANCHI.P, WOLFE.K (2017) - Turin and the British in the Age of the Grand Tour, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 69.

361 In Gazette de Cologne, Mardi 1er avril 1766, Supplément, p 1.

362 In CUTHELL E. E. (1915) - The scottish friend of Frederic the great, The last Earl Marischall – Vol. II, London, Stanley Paul, p 313.

He had learned from the failures of the 1730s, but his project came up against the Duke of Choiseul's views on Corsica. Choiseul played for time with the Corsicans, as the Comte de Boissieux had done in his time, but he had become fully aware of the critical situation of the Republic of Genoa on the island and it was a calculated biding of time.

Pasquale de Paoli increasingly feared French intervention. The priority at the time was to build up an artillery system to equip his navy and lay siege to Calvi and Bonifacio. Paoli's emissaries set off in search of cannons, engineers and armorers. The French diplomatic corps was on the alert, especially Mr Michel, the French Consul in Genoa. In February 1766, he informed his court that "*using a false Sardinian flag, the Corsican rebels have attempted to bring 16 cannons and three boats full of ammunition to Corsica*".³⁶³ At the same time, he announced that "*the Corsican officer present in Livorno had bought 7.8 small-caliber cannons, and the contract had been signed*".³⁶⁴

The Republic of Genoa protested to the two Courts, asking the Grand Duke of Tuscany "*that he no longer grant facilities to Corsicans who supply themselves with cannons and ammunition and bring builders to Corsica*".³⁶⁵ Genoa was also concerned about "*the assistance provided by the Kingdom of Sardinia to the Corsican rebels to build their navy, as well as their freedom of movement in the ports of this Kingdom*".³⁶⁶ It will be remembered that Paoli had an old acquaintance, working at the Pucci forges in Portoferraio, his old comrade-in-arms Emmanuel Stuart. This forge had the capacity to honor a contract for 7 or 8 small cannons.

For his part, Charles Edward Stuart had tried unsuccessfully to mediate with the Hungarian Court,³⁶⁷ where Philip Goswyn, the future 2nd Earl of Nény, had powerful friends. This powerful networker also held a high rank in Masonry and was connected with the St John of Scotland Lodge in Genoa. Count Mahony, the Austrian ambassador to Spain, invited Philip Goswyn to Vienna on March 17th, 1766.³⁶⁸ A grand ball was organised to celebrate St Patrick's Day, and several dozen prominent figures of Irish origin came along. On this occasion, Philip Goswyn de Nény had ample opportunity to discuss the fate of Charles Edward Stuart with George Kelly's nephew, Ulysses' son Maximillian Browne, James Lockhart and other high-ranking Jacobites. Philip Goswyn de Nény, a supporter of enlightened despotism, had corresponded with James Boswell since 1764 about the writings of Voltaire and Rousseau, two admired philosophers. On April 2nd 1766, Pasquale de Paoli received him at the Palazzu Naziunale (home of the Corsican government).³⁶⁹

363 *In Archives Diplomatiques - 41CP/150 f.40, Gênes / Correspondances Politiques, Letter, M. Michel to Duc de Praslin, 20 February 1766.*

364 *Ibid. f.43, Gênes / Letter, M. Michel to Duc de Praslin, 24 February 1766.*

365 *Ibid. f.46, Gênes / Letter, M. Michel to Duc de Praslin, 3 March 1766.*

366 *Ibid. f.73, Gênes / Letter, M. Michel au Duc de Praslin, 31 March 1766.*

367 *In Freeman's journal, 25 March 1766, p 2.*

368 *In Freeman's journal, 26 April 1766, p 2.*

369 *In VERGE-FRANCESCHI M. (2005) - Paoli : un Corse des lumières, Paris, Fayard, p 22.*

Unsurprisingly, he was in the company of the Piedmontese *Chevalier De Vigne*.³⁷⁰ Nény informed a young Scottish lady of his meeting with Paoli, Marie-Caroline Murray, a resident of Brussels, who replied: “*You may remember that I always liked the Corsicans (sic) when we read the public news and thought the same of them*”.³⁷¹

Charles Edward Stuart’s young friend asked Pasquale de Paoli about his political, philosophical, and religious opinions. Here is the account he gave: “*the General is convinced, as are the Principals of the Nation, that of all the Christian sects, the Roman is the one least suited to a free State, and it is probable that, circumstances permitting, he will one day give to the south of Europe the example that the Great Gustavus gave in the north*”.³⁷² This was a comparison with the future King Gustav III of Sweden, who was known at the time to have embraced the ideals of the Enlightenment.

As Phillipe-Goswyn de Nény used to boast, he had received numerous letters of recommendation from “Freemasonry” before coming to Corsica. It should be noted that at this time, Emmanuele Costa from Balagne was one of Paoli’s personal guards, and he was to become the Corsican referent of the *Saint Jean d’Écosse* Lodge in Marseille in the 1780s.³⁷³

On April 26th 1766, Earl Marischal wrote a letter to Rousseau, who was in England then. He told him that the Corsicans wouldn’t adopt his Corsica constitution draft and that he hoped to be able to give him some explanations on the subject.³⁷⁴ His explanations were necessarily the result of agreements between Paoli, Neny and De Vigne, of which he seemed to be perfectly aware.

A few days later, a shipment was delivered to Pasquale de Paoli, raising many questions. On May 4th 1766, the Genoese Lieutenant Camillo Francesco Bizarelli informed the Genoese Consul in Livorno that: “*The rebel De Paoli has brought a very precious throne from Rome, and has placed it in the Public House in Corti*”.³⁷⁵ The Irish Jacobites conveyed more accurate information to Dublin. The shipment contained “*a magnificent crown and throne, with various emblems of royalty, made in Holland*”.³⁷⁶ The following month, Charles Edward Stuart had all his father’s possessions in France put up for sale, for a sum estimated at 180,000 pounds at the time.³⁷⁷ The Corsican project seemed to be well underway this time.

370 In Raguagli dell’Isola di Corsica - N°2 - juin, juillet, août 1766.

371 In BERNARD B. (1992) - Amours et voyages: les pérégrinations méditerranéennes de Philippe-Goswin de Neny in Groupe d’études lignistes - Nouvelles annales Prince de Ligne, Tome 7, Paris, Honoré Champion, p 201.

372 Ibid, p 203.

373 In CAZZANIGA G. M. Dir. 2006) - Storia d’Italia. Annali 21. La Massoneria, Roma, Einaudi, p 432.

374 In CUTHELL E. E. (1915) - The scottish friend of frederic the great, The last Earl Marischall – Vol. II, London, Stanley Paul, p 262.

375 In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno Letter, Lieutenant Bizarelli to Consul Giovanni Antonio Gavison, 7 May 1766.

376 In Freeman’s journal, 10 mai 1766, p 1.

377 In Freeman’s journal, 19 juillet 1766, p 1.

The presence of this throne at *Palazzu* gave rise to many questions among both the Paolist notables and the villagers. A rumor spread across the island that Pasquale de Paoli was to become King of Corsica, a rumour that was unfounded according to one observer at the time.³⁷⁸ However, this rumor did go a long way towards explaining the unusually large turnout at the Consulta on May 20th 1766. Pressed for an explanation, here is the answer that Pasquale de Paoli gave to the deputies of the *Pieve* (Counties) of Corsica who asked him about the presence of this Throne at the *Palazzu Naziunale*:

*“This, my dear compatriots, is the first sign of your freedom, and none of us is unaware that it was through the most arduous work and at the cost of our blood that we purchased it. You can see that we are almost free, but do not flatter yourselves and fear that our operations will remain unsuccessful if we do not redouble our efforts and activity to put the finishing touches to a work that is of the greatest importance to us. Don’t be surprised by the apparatus of this throne, I swear to you that no one will have the boldness and temerity to climb it until we have completely shaken off the tyrannical yoke of the Genoese and driven them completely out of the places they still occupy on the island. To achieve such a desirable goal, we still have a short way to go, so join with me if you can, continue to help me with your arms and your advice, and rest assured that you will find me ready at all times to sacrifice what is most dear to me and even my life if it is necessary in order to hasten the happy moment when the Kingdom will be able to enjoy the complete freedom for which the good and faithful patriots never cease to make the most sincere and ardent wishes.”*³⁷⁹

In addition to the comments that are open to interpretation, we note that at no time does Paoli claim that the Throne is destined for him. Whoever declares it will do so when Corsica is pacified. How can we not think of the identical context in 1736?

London was quick to react; on August 5th 1766, Frederick Augustus Hervey, 4th Earl of Bristol, arrived in Corsica. He went to see Pasquale de Paoli, with whom he held discussions from August 9th to 16th.³⁸⁰ The elder brother of the 4th Earl of Bristol had been England’s ambassador to the King of Piedmont-Sardinia and had played a very active role in supporting Rivarola in Corsica in 1745. Lord Hervey was necessarily aware of the Sardinian proposal concerning the Young Pretender and Corsica. The Earls of Bristol in the Hervey family had been Hanoverians since 1714 and hostile to Jacobite activities. He had probably come on a mission to Paoli on behalf of George III, whose Chaplain Royal he had been since 1763.

378 In Archives Départementales de Corse du Sud – 117/6, Entrées par voie extraordinaire, Note historique sur la Consulta Generale di Corsica.

379 In Archives Diplomatiques - 41CP/150 f.162, Gênes / Correspondances Politiques Letter, M. Michel to Duc de Praslin, 16 May 1766.

380 In BERETTI F. (1988) – Pascal Paoli et l’image de la Corse au dix-huitième siècle : Le témoignage des voyageurs britanniques, Oxford, Voltaire Foundation, p 68.

Earl Marischal, described by Rousseau as Paoli's most zealous supporter, continued his pro-Corsican efforts with his friend, the King of Prussia. Not surprisingly, the first concrete military support came from Prussia. As early as June 1766, a Paoli agent was reported in Prussia, in Hamburg.³⁸¹ In the last week of October, he was escorted to Berlin and met the Earl Marischal and his Scottish friend, the British ambassador Andrew Mitchell.³⁸² At the end of November 1766, a Prussian ship arrived in the Gulf of Ajaccio, bringing Paoli's government several hundred barrels of gunpowder, small artillery pieces, and firearms.³⁸³ In June 1766, a large armed Corsican felucca was reported in the port of Portoferraio.³⁸⁴ It is likely that this ship transported Emmanuel Stuart and his cargo to Corsica.

James Boswell entirely devoted himself to defending the cause of the Corsicans in Great Britain, whose government was interested in his trip to the island. James Boswell was received by the Prime Minister, William Pitt, 1st Earl of Chatman.³⁸⁵ William Pitt the Elder was a member of the Patriot Whigs faction. An historic opponent of George II of Hanover, he was the most hostile of the Whigs to the Stuarts, but was especially opposed to French colonial expansion and had few sympathy for the Duc de Choiseul. Although cautious at first, the Prime Minister was convinced by Boswell that Great Britain had an obvious interest in supporting Paoli.

There was a protocol, political, and diplomatic difficulty: negotiating directly with Paoli would be tantamount to official recognition of the government of Corsica,³⁸⁶ which was not London's position because it contradicted various treaties. James Boswell could mobilize both patriotic factions of the Tories and the Whigs on the Corsican Question, but all the old Jacobite networks were still close to Earl Marischal. He produced a major propaganda work, *An Account of Corsica*, to popularise the Corsican fight for freedom. In October 1766, John Dick, Consul of Livorno, sent him a collection of documents on Corsica to help him complete the book.³⁸⁷ All means were used to raise public awareness in England, and James Boswell published numerous articles in the London press. At the end of the year, the Genoese Consul in Livorno informed the Serenissima of the facilities offered by the port of Nice to the Corsican rebels.³⁸⁸ Freeman's journal confirmed this new implicit support from the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. In the face of fresh protests from Genoa, the Court of Turin invariably replied that it was difficult to enforce its orders because of the proximity of Corsica and Sardinia and because of the custom of these island peoples to trade with each other.

381 *In* Gazette de Cologne, Tuesday, 1st July 1766, p 4.

382 *In* Gentleman's Magazine, Volume 37, p 45.

383 *In* Freeman's Journal, 2 December 1766, p 1.

384 *In* Archives Diplomatiques - 41CP/150 f.162, Gênes / Correspondances Politiques Letter, M. Michel to Duc de Praslin, 16 June 1766.

385 *In* MARTIN P. (2000) - *A life of James Boswell*, London, Yale University Press, p 216.

386 *Ibid*, p 216.

387 *Ibid*, p 217.

388 *In* Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno, Letter, Giovanni Antonio Gavison to Sénat, 19 November 1766.

At the beginning of 1767, Phillip-Goswin de Neny corresponded with Pasquale de Paoli, mentioning “*negotiations to send to his isle a small colony headed by a philosopher, Corsican tragedies and songs in the style of some of Ossian’s hymns*”.³⁸⁹ This allusion to the famous Scottish poet James Macpherson, who held James II Stuart’s personal archives, indicates, at the very least, the origin of the people who might have populated this colony. In this coded message, we can only speculate on the identity of the philosopher. At the same time, on January 27th 1767, Charles Edward Stuart asked France for three passports to repatriate all his possessions from the Duchy of Bouillon, Paris, and Avignon to the port of Marseille for shipment to Rome.³⁹⁰ This radical decision showed that his future lay in the Mediterranean.

The Corsican offensive on Capraia, which began in February 1767, gave credibility to the young Corsican state and aroused public opinion in certain Italian states and also in Great Britain. The Genoese Consul in Livorno mentioned the presence of Neapolitan feluccas helping Corsican troops to land on the island of Capraia.³⁹¹ This affair had repercussions in Naples, and even at the Court of Madrid. In the end, however, the response given to the Genoese was that no felucca flying the flag of the Two Sicilies had been placed at Paoli’s service. The Genoese maintained their version, claiming that they had not invented anything. On March 10th 1767, a letter left Capraia Island from Sam Jones, a volunteer in the Paolist army, in which he stated: “(...) *There are 5 other Englishmen and 2 Scots with me on Capraia Island (...)*”.³⁹² In April it was learned that the Irish engineer O’Dun and some British officers had entered Paoli’s service.³⁹³ The Genoa Consul in Livorno wrote: “*On Sunday the 19th of April, a Neapolitan felucca returned from Corsica, this one having gone there with two others. And the nationals of the Two Sicilies transported to Macinaggio put themselves at Paoli’s service, for a wage of two sequins a day*”.³⁹⁴ We know that the Irish Jacobites of the O’Dun family had been in the service of the Two Sicilies since 1736.

An envoy mandated by the Supreme Council of Corsica managed to approach the British Secretary of State, Lord Shelburne, and obtained the following reply: “*If a power took sides with the Genoese against the island of Corsica, all reasonable assistance and protection would be assured, within the limits of the treaties subsisting between the different courts*”.³⁹⁵ The British government did not close the door on the Corsicans but offered the possibility of limited intervention in the event of a French military offensive in Corsica.

389 In BERNARD B. (1992) - Amours et voyages: les pérégrinations méditerranéennes de Philippe-Goswin de Neny in Groupe d’études lignistes - Nouvelles annales Prince de Ligne, Tome 7, Paris, Honoré Champion, p 203 and 204.

390 In Archives Diplomatiques – Mémoires et Document N°2023, Passeports accordés du 17 janvier 1758 au 13 décembre 1767, f 182.

391 In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno, Letter, Giovanni Antonio Gavison to Sénat, 25 February 1767.

392 In The Scots Magazine, April 1767, p 221.

393 In The Scots magazine, Volume 29, April 1767, p 217.

394 In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno Letter, Giovanni Antonio Gavison to Sénat, 22 April 1767.

395 In Freeman’s Journal, 6 June 1767, p 2.

On May 28th 1767, a Consulta began in Corsica, at which two emissaries represented the King of Piedmont-Sardinia.³⁹⁶ It was then that news arrived of the Capitulation of Capraia. This Corsican military victory had an international impact, further increasing the number of supporters abroad.

At the same time, support was growing in the Scottish Highlands: *“We learn that in Inverness, a certain number of Scottish Highlanders, who were abroad during the last war, have recently pledged to leave for Corsica, to serve as soldiers in the service of General Paoli”*.³⁹⁷ Inverness is the birthplace of James Macpherson, to whom Phillippe-Goswin de Neny here alludes, and here is at least part of his letter decoded. De Nény followed all these events closely since he was present in Genoa during May and June 1767.³⁹⁸ This was not by chance. During the summer of 1767, the Genoese Consul in Livorno was concerned about the presence of Englishmen (to be taken in the sense of Britons) from various backgrounds in Paoli’s presence, supposedly out of simple curiosity.³⁹⁹ He asked the Genoese senate to be extremely vigilant in this matter. In Bastia, he monitored the movements of Infantry Captain Thomas Bell, who was staying with a certain Brown, a town resident. It should be pointed out that Captain Bell had served in Germany and was close with the Earl Marischal.

In September 1767, the Duke of Choiseul wrote to Paoli to inform him that he had *“countless difficulties in destroying foreign negotiations”* in Genoa.⁴⁰⁰ He asked Paoli to cede two presidia to France. At the same time, the King of Piedmont-Sardinia sent a secret memorandum to the Minister Plenipotentiary of his Court (the Court of Turin) in London, Count de Viry.⁴⁰¹ He confirmed the existence of negotiations between Genoa, Vienna and Madrid for the cession of Corsica. They did not progress because the Emperor was intransigent on certain territorial issues. This memorandum explains the position of the King of Piedmont-Sardinia. He wanted Corsica not to fall under the domination of a foreign power, which would have been detrimental to his country in the more or less long-term in any event. His Court was seriously concerned about London’s lack of interest in Corsican affairs, as its trade in the Mediterranean could suffer as a result.

In London, under the pseudonym “Brown of Shoes Lane”, James Boswell tried to convince the business community of the economic advantages for Great Britain of preserving Corsica from French annexation.⁴⁰²

396 *In* The Scots magazine, Volume 29, April 1767, p 217.

397 *In* Freeman’s Journal, 6 June 1767, p 3.

398 *In* BERNARD B. (1992) - *Amours et voyages: les pérégrinations méditerranéennes de Philippe-Goswin de Neny in Groupe d’études lignistes - Nouvelles annales Prince de Ligne, Tome 7, Paris, Honoré Champion, p 205.*

399 *In* Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno, Letter, Giovanni Antonio Gavison to Sénat, 22 July 1767.

400 *In* Archivio di Stato di Torino – Mazzo 1 d’addizione, Negoziazioni cola Corsica, Fasc. 14 f. 37, Letter, Duc de Choiseul to Paoli, 11 September 1767.

401 *In* Archivio di Stato di Torino – Mazzo 1 d’addizione, Negoziazioni cola Corsica, Fasc. 17. Mémoire secret de la Cour de Turin sur les Affaires Corses, September 1767.

402 *In* The Monthly Review , Volume 39, October 1768, p 326.

In December 1767, two Scots on the island of Capraia reported the discovery of coins dating back to the Roman emperor Tiberius.⁴⁰³ After the capture of Capraia and the failure of its counter-offensive, the Republic of Genoa found itself in a desperate situation. Some of the gazettes of the period stated that Corsica's independence would eventually have to be declared. Genoa resigned itself to the idea of ceding Corsica to France and sent its representative to Versailles to negotiate the terms. On December 15th 1767, Paoli sent thanks to Earl Marischal, through James Boswell, for his help and gifts from Prussia. He was unaware that they had come from Frederick II himself.

On January 6th 1768, the Duke of Choiseul wrote to Paoli, assuring him that the King of France regarded Corsica as a free and independent nation. In the same letter, he set out France's conditions: *"If the Republic of Genoa cedes its rights, then the King will deal directly with the Nation, guarantee its freedom, and contribute to its independence. But the King will irrevocably retain sovereignty over the town of Bastia, the town of Saint Florent, and Cape Corsica"*.⁴⁰⁴

This was a real cold shower for Paoli, who immediately explained to his envoy to Versailles, Matteo Buttafuoco, what he thought of the French demands: *"It would have been less painful for our peoples if we were asked for complete sovereignty of the whole Kingdom (of Corsica), than the dismemberment of such a considerable part of it, as well as the inevitable consequences that would be drawn from this, the total ruin of the rest of the country"*.⁴⁰⁵ As a shrewd head of state, Paoli knew that if he had given in to Choiseul's demands, the French ports in Corsica would have applied a tax system that favored French goods and was unfavorable to Corsican goods, which would have led to the ruin of entire sectors of the island's economy. The future will prove him right on this point.

Despite these difficulties, the Jacobites, who were active and involved in Corsican affairs, believed France might be prepared to recognize Corsican independence. It was, therefore, a leading emissary, James Lockhart,⁴⁰⁶ who left Antibes on January 9th to travel to Corsica. The Chamberlain to the King of Prussia, Count Maximilian Joseph von Lamberg, who was in Bastia at the time, saw him and was informed by him of his intention to go and see Paoli.⁴⁰⁷ It is important to understand the importance of this visit, as it was a direct communication channel between Paoli and Charles Edward Stuart.

403 *In Freeman's Journal*, 12 January 1768, p 2.

404 *In Archivio di Stato di Torino – Mazzo 1 d'addizione, Negoziaroni cola Corsica, Fasc. 14 f. 44*, Letter, Duc de Choiseul to Paoli, 6 January 1768.

405 *In Archives Départementales de Corse du Sud – Entrée par voie extraordinaire 1J23/5*, Letter, Paoli to Buttafuoco, 5 February 1768.

406 James Lockhart is the younger brother of George Lochart, with whom he shared Charles Edward Stuart's exile in Scotland, Paris and Avignon. He is very close to Phillipe-Goswyn de Nény and, like him, belongs to the Order of the Knights of Maria Theresa.

407 *In LAMBERG M. (1774), Le Memorial d'un Mondain au Cap Corse*, p 55.

We learn that Lochkart spent 8 days in conference with Paoli and received great honors.⁴⁰⁸ This was a significant event in the negotiations that started two years ago between the Corsicans and the Jacobites.

Unfortunately, the time for negotiations ended on February 23rd 1768. The French Consul in Genoa had just communicated a draft treaty for the cession of Corsica to France by the Republic of Genoa, which laid down the non-negotiable principle that “no part of Corsica should be independent or sovereign”.⁴⁰⁹ Versailles immediately broke off negotiations with the Corsican government. The year 1768, therefore, clearly heralded an inevitable military confrontation between Paoli’s Corsica and Choiseul’s France. Meanwhile, British and Sardinian aid continued to arrive in Corsica. The Cologne Gazette reported the presence of several Scottish officers in Paoli’s service.⁴¹⁰ The Genoese Consul in Livorno reported: “*The Sardinian Captain Bernardo Tomasi d’Oneglia had left Nice with the Paolist officer Antonio Antonetti and an all-Corsican crew to deliver arms to Corsica*”.⁴¹¹ On the diplomatic front, considerable aid almost came to strengthen this British-Sardinian movement for the Corsicans. Indeed, Lord Mount-Stuart, the friend to whom James Boswell had just dedicated his bar exam dissertation, was being considered, with the support of the Prime Minister, for the position of British ambassador to Turin (the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia).⁴¹² His first uncle, James Stuart-Mackenzie, had already held this post and was an intimate of the King of Piedmont-Sardinia and a great admirer of Paoli. The deed of appointment was signed, but Prime Minister Chatman’s opponents, who were well aware of the secret negotiations with Turin concerning Corsica, thwarted the appointment. Among these opponents, who were close to King George III, was the Duke of Grafton, a descendant of Charles II Stuart, a notorious anti-Jacobite and an opponent of Chatman and the Stuarts of Bute. The Duke of Grafton secured the appointment of Lord Spencer to the post, a blow to the Jacobite networks.

On March 7th 1768, the Count of Nény, who had come expressly from Vienna, visited the Grand Duke of Tuscany in Florence.⁴¹³ It seems clear that this visit had something to do with the political situation in Corsica. On March 22nd, Consul John Dick was in London. He gathered together a few friends at the Roman’s Club and launched a public subscription in favour of the Corsicans. On April 8th, Paoli’s emissaries approached the Office of Trade and Plantations to establish trade contracts between Great Britain and Corsica, and the appointment of a British consul in Corsica was also discussed.⁴¹⁴

408 *In Gazzetta Toscana*, N° 5, 1768, p 20.

409 *In Archives Diplomatiques* - 41CP/152 f.36, Gênes / Correspondances Politiques, Letter, Boyer to Duc de Praslin, 23 February 1768.

410 *In Gazette de Cologne*, Friday, 12 February 1768, p 1.

411 *In Archivio di Stato di Genova* – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno, Letter, Giovanni Antonio Gavison to Sénat, 24 February 1768.

412 *In Gazette de Leyde*, Friday, 19 February 1768, Supplément, p 8.

413 *In Archivio di Stato di Genova* – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno, Letter, Giovanni Antonio Gavison to Sénat, 16 March 1768.

414 *In Gazette de Berne*, Saturday, 23 April 1768, p 1.

In April 1768, Pasquale de Paoli placed an order with Portoferraio: “an eminent founder in this town has received an order for fifty church bells of good size, which the best metal in England cannot offer”.⁴¹⁵ This eminent founder, Guiseppe Maria Pucci, was to become Emmanuel Stuart’s best man at his wedding. It is not certain that the order was for bells.

The way in which England reacted to the plan to cede Corsica to France is a crucial point that deserves to be examined in detail. As early as February 1768, the English Ambassador to Versailles, the Earl of Rochford, had perfectly understood Choiseul’s plans and did everything he could to alert his government, sometimes exceeding his prerogatives. In March 1768, the French Ambassador in London, Du Châtelet, received him in his cabinet and severely reprimanded him, asking him “how astonished he was that he had dared to suggest in Paris that his Court would view with concern the arrangement that the King might make concerning Corsica, and on what grounds he dared to make such a comment”.⁴¹⁶ Du Châtelet was to discover that Rochford had some support.

On April 18th 1768, the French consul was summoned by Lord Shelburne and he pointed out that when he arrived at Lord Shelburne’s house: “The Minister of Sardinia had been locked up there for more than an hour, and he made me wait at least another hour before he came out (...) I don’t know if you are aware, Sir, that he is the only one of the foreign Ministers who sees Lord Bute, who is the greatest intriguer in this country”.⁴¹⁷ These links established between the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia and the Stuarts can no longer surprise insiders.

Under the Treaty of Versailles of May 15th 1768, the Republic of Genoa ceded its rights of suzerainty, apparently provisionally, to the Crown of France. This moved several European sovereigns. On May 12th, the Earl of Rochford obtained a copy of this secret treaty and tried to alert his government. Lord Shelburne understood the danger and sent his court a Memorandum, the main arguments of which were that in 1743 England had declared that it would never tolerate Corsica being sold to another power, and that the very spirit of the Treaty of Versailles called into question the agreements stipulated in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1748.⁴¹⁸ By an unfortunate combination of circumstances, on the very day this memoir was submitted, the Thames Boatmen’s Revolt began against rising food prices. Social riots ensued throughout London and beyond. The Duke of Grafton ignored all foreign policy considerations, being too busy suppressing the riots in London.⁴¹⁹

415 In The Scots Magazine, Volume 30, April 1768, p. 215.

416 In Archives Diplomatiques - 8CP/477 f.8, Angleterre / Correspondances Politiques, Letter, Du Châtelet to Duc de Praslin, 25 March 1768.

417 In Archives Diplomatiques - 8CP/477 f.18, Angleterre / Correspondances Politiques, Letter, Du Châtelet to Duc de Praslin, 18 April 1768.

418 In Public Record Office - SP 78/275 f.11, State Papers Foreign, France, Shelburne’s Report on Corsica, 16 May 1768.

419 In Public Record Office - SP 78/275 f.43, State Papers Foreign, France, Letter, Rochford to Shelburne, 26 May 1768.

On May 20th 1768, Lord Shelburne again summoned the French Ambassador du Châtelet, telling him that *“it will be impossible for England not to regard the attitude of France as very suspicious so long as she sees her following with such great means of force, and at such great expense, an object (Corsica) which may be of little importance for the present, but of great interest for the future”*.⁴²⁰

There was much dissension in the King of Great Britain’s Privy Council over Corsica. The friends of the Earl of Bute and Lord Chatham were in favour of keeping a very close eye on the actions of the French in Corsica. Lord Shelburne gave very precise instructions to this effect to the Earl of Rochford.

The Duke of Choiseul complained openly to the Duke of Grafton, who officially disowned the Earl of Rochford. Choiseul took particular pleasure in summoning the Earl of Rochford and showing him the letter from the Duke of Grafton sent to the French Ambassador in London. He taught the Earl of Rochford a real lesson by warning him against his behavior and explaining that he had exceeded the instructions of his own Court, a real humiliation for the Earl of Rochford.⁴²¹ At the same meeting, he refuted Lord Shelburne’s arguments by telling Rochford, with a certain amount of applause, *“that England had misinterpreted Article XV of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and that France had since sent troops to Corsica without any protest”*.⁴²²

Genoa was also subject to British pressure, with the dispatch of Squadron Leader Spry, who was Minister Plenipotentiary. Mr Boyer, the French Consul in Genoa, reported, *“Mr Spry is not satisfied with the explanations given by the Doge and his Secretary of State Gherardi. He is very upset with the British Consul in Genoa, Mr Oxford. They are worried about the consequences for England of the arrangements between France and the Genoese”*.⁴²³

The Republic of Genoa replied to Minister Plenipotentiary and Squadron Leader Spry: *“A power that is a friend of the Republic cannot fail to approve the treaty signed with France to curb the revolt in Corsica”*.⁴²⁴ The French Consul remarked that *“the discontent of the Court in London is making a strong impression on the mind of the Genoese government”*.⁴²⁵ The Earl of Rochford had predicted that more political pressure from England could have undermined Choiseul’s plan for Corsica, but his Court thought otherwise.⁴²⁶

420 *In Archives Diplomatiques - 8CP/477 f.274, Angleterre / Correspondances Politiques, Letter, Du Châtelet to Duc de Praslin, 20 May 1768.*

421 *In The Literary Register or Weekly Miscellany, 1799, Volume 1, Newcastle, p 157.*

422 *In Public Record Office - SP 78/275 f.43, State Papers Foreign, France, Letter, Rochford to Shelburne, 26 May 1768.*

423 *In Archives Diplomatiques - 41CP/152 f.153, Gênes / Correspondances Politiques, Letter, Boyer to Duc de Praslin, 20 June 1768.*

424 *In Archivio di Stato di Torino – Mazzo 1 d’addizione, Negoziazioni cola Corsica, Fasc. 19, Letter, Genose Senate to Spry, 20 June 1768.*

425 *In Archives Diplomatiques - 41CP/152 f.153, Gênes / Correspondances Politiques, Letter, Boyer to Duc de Praslin, 20 May 1768.*

426 *In Public Record Office - SP 78/275 f.169, State Papers Foreign, France, Letter, Rochford to Shelburne, 4 July 1768.*

Faced with growing internal opposition, on July 1st 1768 Prime Minister Chatman reluctantly expressed London's official position: "*The English Court will not in any way oppose the arrangements concluded between France and the Republic of Genoa (...) unless, however, the operations of the French troops give rise to incidents that would oblige it to interfere in one way or another*".⁴²⁷

Worried about London's position, the King of Piedmont-Sardinia sent an encrypted memorandum to the Count de Viry, his Minister Plenipotentiary in Great Britain. In this long memorandum, he urged his diplomat to convince the British to oppose the French military conquest of Corsica.⁴²⁸ The diplomat received some assurances from London but in the uncertain context of strong internal divisions. This competition, including parallel intelligence missions, pitted the Shelburne and Grafton networks against each other in Britain's unofficial intervention in Corsica.

In Corsica, the Consulta of May 22nd called on the people to take up arms. We will not go into detail here of all the military operations of the Franco-Corsican war, but will confine our account to the actions of the networks of Earl Marischal and James Boswell, and will also describe the consequences of the dissensions within the British state apparatus about what to do about Corsica. Equally, the role of Piedmont-Sardinia remained a central issue.

On July 23rd, the Genoese Consul in Livorno deplored the fact that an English frigate had docked at Île Rousse and disembarked men and equipment without permission.⁴²⁹ This port was to become the nerve center for all relations between Corsica and the various British networks. On July 30th 1768, Lord Mount-Stuart was commissioned by Lord Shelburne to carry out an intelligence mission in Corsica under the pseudonym of Murray. That same week Earl Pembroke and Captain Meadows left London for Corsica, carrying letters of recommendation from James Boswell to Paoli.⁴³⁰

Arriving in The Hague, Earl Pembroke stopped off at his private hotel to receive Prince Henry of Prussia and his wife on August 20th.⁴³¹ This Prince regularly informed his brother, the King of Prussia, on Corsican developments. The involvement of Henry Herbert, 10th Earl of Pembroke,⁴³² in the Shelburne/Earl Marischal axis concerning Corsica will be looked at later in the light of the individual's family networks.

427 *In Gazette de Berne, Saturday, 16 July 1768, Supplément, p 3.*

428 *In Archivio di Stato di Torino – Mazzo 1 d'addizione, Negoiazioni cola Corsica, Fasc. 20, Mémoire de la Cour de Turin pour que les puissances d'Europe s'opposent à la soumission de la Corse par la France – 16 July 1768.*

429 *In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno, Letter, Giovanni Antonio Gavisono to Sénat, 27 July 1768.*

430 *In The Gentleman's Magazine, July 1768, p 348.*

431 *In Courrier du Bas-Rhin, 1768, p 567.*

432 His maternal grandfather and great-grandfather, both Roman Catholics, had long been troubled by the London government for their loyalty to James II Stuart. Through his wife, Lady Elizabeth Spencer, he also had direct family access to the new British ambassador in Turin. He is a key man whose profile is not necessarily worrying for London. His personal motives are questionable, however, as he was the most loyal supporter of the last Stuart pretenders until the last one's death in 1807. More on this later.

An agent of the Duke of Grafton, with the backing of George III, was first to arrive in Corsica, delivering many guns to Paoli. Shelburne's agent, Lord Mount-Stuart, arrived a few days later. Lord Mount-Stuart visited Paoli with 12 other Britons from the 3rd to the 5th of August 1768.⁴³³ On this occasion, gunpowder and weapons were once again handed over to the Corsicans. Mere days later, on August 9th, the delegation returned to Livorno on board the frigate Aquilon, taking a Corsican delegation to London.⁴³⁴ The Piedmont-Sardinia Consul in Livorno confirmed this fact: "*Murray returned to London with a Corsican from the Nation*".⁴³⁵

During the same period, Major-General Henri Lloyd, who was known to be close to Earl Marischal and Philippe-Goswin de Nény, attempted to cross into Corsica to join Paoli's service.⁴³⁶ Various sources agree on Lloyd's involvement in transporting military supplies to Corsica and his important role in providing financial support. He was, therefore, both one of the best agents of the Jacobite movement and directly involved in Corsican affairs. Informed of this unofficial support, the Court of Versailles announced: "*It forbids the English to enter any of its ports in Corsica on pain of seizure and confiscation*",⁴³⁷ which caused an outcry in London. After reading the 92-page report submitted by Lord Mount-Stuart and listening to Paoli's representative, Lord Shelburne declared that "*immediate military assistance must be given to the Corsicans*".⁴³⁸ Yet all that Lord Shelburne obtained from the King's Privy Council was permission to send a squadron to the Mediterranean under the command of Commander Spry.

The exiled Scottish community in Rome, including the Jacobite Court, followed the situation closely. It should not be forgotten that some supporters of the Stuarts still adhered to the original Jacobite cause. The Cardinal of York, Henry Benedict Stuart, remained very active, while Charles Edward Stuart lived incognito. Henry Benedict Stuart had considerable financial resources at his disposal, including 100,000 Roman crowns in his account at the *Monte dei Paschi di Siena* bank,⁴³⁹ in addition to annuities from the Stuarts' vast Polish landholdings, a little-known fact. Although the Stuart pretenders no longer had the resources of their ancestors, they still had an effective intelligence service and armed protectors. Earl Marischal was in constant contact with his relays in Italy.

433 In VERGE-FRANCESCHI M. (2005) - La Corse et l'Angleterre XVIIe – XIXe siècle, Ajaccio, Alain Piazzola, p 181.

434 In Freeman's Journal, 13 September 1768, p 3.

435 In Archivio di Stato di Torino – Corti Estere, Toscana, mazzo 2, Letter, Bruno di Liamone to Sénat, 15 August 1768.

436 In PITTOCK M. (2013) - Material Culture and Sedition, 1688-1760: Treacherous Objects, Secret places, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, p 121.

437 In Gazette de Leyde, Tuesday, 6 September 1768, p 3.

438 In The Monthly Review, 1768, Volume 39, page 155.

439 In MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 349.

When Charles Edward Stuart, whose drinking problems were mocked by the Duke of Choiseul, fell out with Andrew Ludmisen, Earl Marischal intervened. He wrote a letter to Charles Edward Stuart asking him to temper his ardour and to consider the example of Andrew Ludmisen, a “*truly magnanimous*” man.⁴⁴⁰

It was in fact the Cardinal of York, Henry Benedict Stuart, who was to be the real political leader of the Roman Jacobites, until his brother was in a better frame of mind. It is likely that he followed the progress of Earl Marischal’s project concerning Corsica, supported by the King of Prussia and the King of Piedmont-Sardinia. These allies also received an important reinforcement. Lord Mount-Stuart had not left London alone: his father John Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute and former Prime Minister of Great Britain, had followed him to Italy. The English public hated him and nicknamed him “*Whiterose*” due to his supposed Jacobite sympathies.

During 1768, the various subscriptions launched by James Boswell in favour of the Corsicans raised £20,000, an initiative independent of Chatman’s government.⁴⁴¹ On the contrary, James Boswell had leant on the Drummond family of Perth, first cousins of Earl Marischal, whose mother was a Drummond. Subscriptions for the Corsicans in London were therefore to be deposited with the Bank of Andrew Drummond & Co.^{442,443} James Boswell ordered an artillery train from the Carron Forge in Falkirk. To convoy this train to Corsica, he received the help of Captain Archibald Menzies of Culdres, a ranking member of St Michael’s Lodge No 38 in Perth, whose Master from 1766 to 1768 was Captain Robert Drummond,⁴⁴⁴ cousin of Earl Marischal. It is hardly surprising that this Captain was responsible for the delivery to Corsica, given the closeness of the Clan Menzies of Culdres to the Jacobite movement.⁴⁴⁵

Paoli’s resounding victory over the French army at Borgo on October 10th 1768 gave hope of more concrete support from London, but something predictable happened: on October 15th, the Duke of Grafton replaced William Pitt the Elder, who was gravely ill, as Prime Minister. Lord Shelburne promptly resigned. This was a disaster for the plans of Earl Marischal and Henry Benedict Stuart. It wasn’t necessarily good news for Paoli either. The Lower House of the British Parliament was in favour of military intervention in Corsica, but the Upper House, dominated by the Duke of Grafton, was firmly opposed.⁴⁴⁶

440 In MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 349.

441 In MARTIN P. (2000) - A life of James Boswell, London, Yale University Press, p 220.

442 In The Scots magazine, Volume 30, December 1768, p 626.

443 Andrew Drummond was the nephew of William Drummond, 4th Viscount Strathallan, a Jacobite officer who took part in the Scottish revolts of 1715 and 1745. Rather than surrender to the Hanoverian troops at Culloden, William Drummond charged them and was killed. This gives us a better understanding of the family’s state of mind.

444 In <http://www.lodge38.bravehost.com/pm.html> (Access on 4 December 2016)

445 The Menzies of Culdres clan fought alongside James III Stuart in 1715. Archibald’s uncle Robert harbored Charles Edward Stuart in 1745 and provided him with a horse to escape in 1746. Archibald’s father James was allied to the Steuarts of Grandtully (Funghort branch), of whom we have already spoken. His aunt Marjory married William Steuart of Fungorth and Archibald married Susannah Steuart.

446 In Gazette de Berne, Saturday, 3 December 1768, supplément, p 3.

The Jacobite intrigues in Piedmont-Sardinia were now known to London. When the Piedmont-Sardinia complained about Britain's failure to intervene in Corsica via an emissary sent to Ambassador Spencer, he replied curtly: *"You would be better off taking care of your own business in Rome and informing them that your plans have failed when you grace the honour of the Pope's residence and enlighten them with your presence"*.⁴⁴⁷

Shortly after the victory at Borgo in October 1768, the Earl of Pembroke arrived in the port of Ile Rousse. He offered his services to Pasquale de Paoli and stayed on the island for several weeks.⁴⁴⁸ He also presented him with the sum of 3,000 pounds, the proceeds of a subscription from several British citizens of Florence, organised in the presence of Captain Franceschi of the Corsican navy.⁴⁴⁹ A letter from Corsica dated November 28th stated: *"The richest Englishmen are opening their purses. Earl Pembroke, who is one of the most devoted, is currently on the island"*.⁴⁵⁰ Another letter from Balagne, Corsica to Switzerland on November 30th stated, *"Two Englishmen arrived here some time ago aboard frigates loaded with instruments of war"*.⁴⁵¹ Still from Balagne, another letter dated December 4th reported, *"Two English lords traveling on our island (...) have assured us that two frigates loaded with munitions of war will soon be arriving from England"*.⁴⁵²

This must have been Archibald Menzies of Culdres and Captain William Augustus Fawkener, informing Paoli of the arrival of the Scottish guns in Italy, but the winter season made it risky to bring them to Corsica. They had passed through Portoferraio on November 16th, where it was assumed that they *"were in charge of an important and secret commission for General Paoli"*.⁴⁵³

The Genoese Consul in Livorno confirmed that: *"Two Englishmen returned from Corsica to Livorno on December 1st; they had gone specifically to see General Paoli. They gave no information before going to Pisa"*.⁴⁵⁴ On December 20th 1768, the engineer Peter Caper Junior from the Carron forge was also reported in Livorno. On December 26th 1768, the Carron forge sent a letter to James Boswell stating that the cannons had been temporarily stored in the arsenals of the Grand Duke of Tuscany pending a better opportunity to convoy them to Corsica. The letter included the invoice for £743.14.⁴⁵⁵

During the same period in London, the question of military intervention in Corsica was raised at the plenary session of Parliament on November 15th 1768. The motion was rejected by 280 votes to 84.

447 In Freeman's Journal, 27 December 1768, p 2.

448 In Gazette de Berne, Saturday, 19 November 1768, supplément, p 4.

449 In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno, Letter, Giovanni Antonio Gavison to Sénat, 2 November 1768.

450 In Gazette de Cologne, Friday, 16 December 1768, p 3.

451 In Gazette de Berne, Saturday, 31 December 1768, supplément, p 3.

452 In Courrier du Bas-Rhin, 1768, p 836.

453 In Freeman's Journal, 27 December 1768, p 3.

454 In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno, Letter, Giovanni Antonio Gavison to Sénat, 5 December 1768.

455 In National Archives of Scotland, GD 58/1/1 - Caron Company MSS, Caron Company Letters Book, Letter, 26 December 1768.

On January 7th 1769, John Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute, his son Lord Mount-Stuart, and two others (most likely Pembroke and Meadows) arrived in Rome.⁴⁵⁶ Upon their arrival, four Scots members of the Court of the Stuart Pretender greeted them eagerly.⁴⁵⁷ The situation in Corsica was inevitably discussed, including the organization of military and financial aid to Paoli. In Corsica, a Corsican officer confirmed the inclusion of British soldiers in the army with an estimate in January 1769: “15 English gentlemen and 27 Scots, very rich, are currently serving in our army as volunteers”.⁴⁵⁸

In February 1769, the promise made by Archibald Menzies of Cudares and Captain Augustus William Fawkenor was honored. The Tuscan press reported that on the evening of February 12th 1769, two merchant ships flying the English flag had left the port of Livorno, escorted by the *Aeolus*, a warship: “They claim to be carrying supplies to Maone. Many people here claim they will go directly to Corsica. This is unfounded since they don’t need these supplies there”.⁴⁵⁹

On February 13th 1769, the Genoese Consul in Livorno alerted the Senate: “That a delivery of arms was going to take place to Ile Rousse (Corsica) and that it was being escorted by the English frigate *Aeolus*”.⁴⁶⁰ The logbook of the frigate *Aeolus* proves the Genoese Consul right, as not only did the ship leave the port of Livorno on Sunday February 12th 1769 at 17:00, but more importantly, it was cruising off the coast of Ile Rousse on February 14th, which does not quite correspond to the maritime route usually followed to reach the first destination announced. One of the two merchant ships was intercepted by a French *shébeck*. The French sailors found many rifles and barrels of powder hidden in the hold, but not Boswell’s cannons.⁴⁶¹ On the other hand, the second ship carrying the cannons did arrive in the port of Ile Rousse. The Piedmont-Sardinia Consul in Livorno even said: “The supplies sent to them by English private individuals are not just small”.⁴⁶² A Genoese source in Calvi confirmed this fact,⁴⁶³ and the Leeds Intelligencer gave a delightful version: “The Captain was obliged to unload his cargo of military supplies and provisions at Isola Rossa, as it was too heavy to continue on to Port Mahon”.⁴⁶⁴

The affair of this delivery of cannons to the Corsicans caused quite a stir, and the British Consul in Livorno, Sir John Dick, had to justify himself to Horace Mann.

456 In Gazette de Leyde, Tuesday, 31 January 1769, Supplément, p 6.

457 In Freeman’s Journal, 11 February 1769, p 2.

458 In Gazette de Berne, Wenesday, 15 March 1769, Supplément, p 5.

459 In Gazzetta Toscana, N°7, 1769, p 28.

460 In Archivio di Stato di Genova – Filza 2693, Lettere Consoli, Livorno, Letter, Giovanni Antonio Gavison to Sénat, 13 February 1769.

461 In Courrier d’Avignon, 21 March 1769, N°14, p 3.

462 In Archivio di Stato di Torino – Corti Estere, Toscana, mazzo 2, Letter, Bruno di Liamone to Sénat, 1st May 1769.

463 In Courrier d’Avignon, 10 March 1769, N°11, p 4.

464 In Leeds Intelligencer, Tuesday, 28 March 1769, p 2.

He declared that although the war frigate *Aeolus* had indeed escorted a merchant ship, "*L'aigle Romain*", chartered by a German, the Captain of the *Aeolus* had never had any dealings with the captain of this ship, which was said to be carrying anything other than wheat cakes. And he adds that he himself is not involved in this affair.⁴⁶⁵ This statement is almost laughable when you consider the diplomat's interpersonal skills. Contrary to what some have claimed, Boswell's cannons were not lost at sea off the coast of Scotland or seized by the French Royal Navy off Cap Corse but were, in fact, delivered to the Corsicans. After the conquest, France ceded them to the Republic of Genoa, which ironically disposed of them at Fort San Giorgio on the island of Capraia.

The following April, Earl Pembroke left Rome with the painter Vincenzo Rotigliardi, and organised a veritable expedition to Corsica, including the delivery of a large sum of money. The group he formed embarked on two small Neapolitan feluccas from Civitavecchia, taking different routes. Captain Meadows, accompanied by Lord Mount Stuart and a Prussian officer, was to carry 12 wooden boxes with iron hoops containing 50,000 Roman sequins and was to dock at Prunete, Corsica.⁴⁶⁶ The other felucca was to carry Pembroke, the Milanese Marquis Fagnani, Frederick of Neuhoff, and the Roman painter Rotigliardi, and they dock in the cove of *Malfacu*, in the Corsican Agriates desert. The delegation were to meet again in Murato on April 12th and attend the *Consulta of Sant'Antonio di a Casabianca* on the 15th, which would decree a general mobilization of the people for war. The delegation then traveled to Corti, where the painter Vincenzo Rotigliardi painted a very realistic portrait of Paoli, which is still owned by the Pembrokes today. Afterwards, Pembroke inspected the fortifications at Isula Rossa, where he met up with the English Admiral Smittoy, whose frigate was anchored in the port.⁴⁶⁷ On April 23rd, the entire British delegation returned to Casinca to attend a review of the Corsican troops before they were dispersed in different corps towards the front line.

Both Paoli and the British reported the presence of many foreign fighters. Captain Meadows took the entire delegation back to Portoferraio on April 28th. The balance of power was too unequal, and the Corsican army lost the battles of Ponte Novu and Tenda in the central confrontation with Louis XV's troops between the 4th and 10th of May 1769. A further pitched battle took place at the *Ponte Vecchio* a month later, allowing the last Paolist forces to cover their retreats towards Tuscany and Sardinia, the nations that were culturally and politically closest to them.⁴⁶⁸

465 In Public Record Office - SP98/74 f. 28, State Papers Foreign, Tuscany, Letter, John Dick to Horace Mann, 20 February 1769.

466 In Gazzetta Toscana N° 17, 1769, p 65.

467 In Gazette de Berne, Wenesday, 17 May 1769, Supplément, p 3.

468 In REY D. (1995) - Les Fuorusciti corses en Sardaigne et en Toscane de 1769 à 1789, p.65-82, in Études corses, Numéro 45, Ajaccio, La Marge, p 65.

On May 26th 1769, Frederick II of Prussia wrote to Boswell: “*Your letter, with which you have given me the life of the protector and defender of Corsica, General Paoli, has pleased me. I admire talent and virtue on any horizon; I also take a keen interest in knowing the man who promotes of the former and appreciates the later*”.⁴⁶⁹ Neither of them knew that the French army would crush the Corsican nation a month later.

At two o'clock in the morning on June 13th, the English merchant ship *Bermuda Packett* evacuated Pasquale de Paoli from Porto Vecchio. Upon arrival in Livorno, he was housed in the villa of the British Consul John Dick, where he was reunited with Earl Pembroke and the Sardinian Consul Domenico Rivarola, who had been one of his main supporters. It was decided to send him to Great Britain. After visiting various courts, from The Hague on September 19th 1769, Pasquale de Paoli embarked for England accompanied by Earl Pembroke.⁴⁷⁰

469 *In Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand, édition numérisée de la bibliothèque de Trèves, Volume 18, p 305.*

470 *In Nouveau Journal helvétique, October 1769, p 497.*

Charles Edward Stuart and Corsica after the Ponte Novu disaster.

The hopes of the Paolists and the last Jacobites seemed to be sealed, but their respective diasporas still had some human and financial resources to give them hope for a better future.

In Rome, a new Pope, Benedict XIV, had been in office since May 19th 1769. The ambassador of France to Rome, d'Aubeterre, was recalled, and Cardinal de Bernis took his place. The Consul of Piedmont-Sardinia was informed of Charles Edward Stuart's presence in Rome. He was worried about the French maneuvers and believed that the capture of Corsica was the result of the weakness of the English, "*In Rome, the Bourbons are taking advantage of the opportunity, maneuvering to have Prince Stuart recognized by the new Pontiff as King of England*".⁴⁷¹ But this topic was no longer on the agenda and Versailles had other priorities, in particular the amicable resolution of the question of the Vatican's temporal rights over Corsica and the question of the Jesuits.

On Thursday the 22nd of June 1769, the Cardinal of York introduced his brother to the Pope, who received him very cordially.⁴⁷² This fact is confirmed by the Vatican press, which refers to a meal and a meeting that lasted three-quarters of an hour and states that Charles Edward Stuart was admitted to the Roman Curia under the identity of Baron d'Erfort.⁴⁷³ Since February 1766, Charles Edward Stuart had been coming to Rome incognito because he refused to appear in public under anything other than his Jacobite title, Charles III Stuart. As the Vatican definitively prevented him from doing so, he cut himself off from high society, aside from his often troublesome appearances at different shows.

Benedict XIV took him in his arms, embraced him, and reminded him of the time when he had been his father's chaplain. "*He would like nothing more than to see him restored to his titles and dignity, but collegiate decisions are the norm in matters of high politics*".⁴⁷⁴ We know of other comments made by the Pope to the Stuart Pretender through British agents.

On July 29th 1769, Horace Mann informed London that: "*The Pope has urged him to abandon the retired life he has been leading for some time, and to stop excluding himself from all society on the grounds of titles that could not be given to him*".⁴⁷⁵ In the same letter, we learn that the Vatican authorized him to appear publicly under the title of Baron of Renfrew. The Pope's reception of the Stuart Pretender was announced in practically all the gazettes in European capitals, but Charles Edward Stuart's long interview with the Pope received very different media coverage in different countries.

471 In Archivio di Stato di Torino – Mazzo 2, Corti Estere, Toscana, Letter, Bruno di Liamone to Sénat, 12 June 1769.

472 In Public Record Office - SP98/74 f.140, State Papers Foreign, Tuscany, Letter, Horace Man to Lord Weymouth, 30 June 1769.

473 In Notizie Del Mondo, N° 52, 1st July 1769, p 421.

474 In MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 354.

475 In Public Record Office - SP98/74 f.140, State Papers Foreign, Tuscany, Letter, Horace Man to Lord Weymouth, 29 July 1769.

The Jacobite networks in the Austrian Netherlands obviously knew a little more, since it was in the press authorized by Patrice-François de Nény that Corsica seemed to be the subject of all the speculation.⁴⁷⁶ Only five British newspapers mentioned this Brussels source: The Freeman's Journal, The Leeds Intelligencer, The Newcastle Courant, The Salisbury and Winchester Journal, and The Stamford Mercury. According to several Roman Cardinals, here is the content of Charles Edward Stuart's reply to the Pope: *"This prince is tired of having lived so long in obscurity and is now determined to play a role in the great world once again (...) In the event that the French do not wish to keep Corsica for themselves, they would be well advised to make a gift of this Kingdom to his Highness"*.⁴⁷⁷

If they had been well advised to let him reign in Corsica, it was because Charles Edward Stuart had some guarantees. His brother and the Jacobite Court in Rome would never have allowed such comments to be made if this was not always an option on the agenda. It is inconceivable that the meeting with the Pope was not prepared. Charles Edward Stuart was very sensitive to the Pope's affection and sincerity, and the Pope convinced him that maintaining his claim to the English throne was a *"fight he could never win."*⁴⁷⁸

This renewed proposal concerning Corsica was bound to be refused by the Duke of Choiseul, who, quite apart from his contempt for the Pretender Stuart, had had to borrow 20 million pounds at 10% interest to pacify Corsica and who intended to prove the value of this new domain to Louis XV. Furthermore, Cardinal de Bernis deemed the Pretender as both unhelpful and burdensome.

But the Pretender Stuart still seemed to have some hopes for the King of Piedmont-Sardinia and even more so for his son Victor Amédée, Prince of Piedmont-Sardinia. The latter was both a supporter of the Stuarts and an ardent defender of the Corsican cause. In August 1769, he proposed nothing less than that the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia should declare war on Louis XV and lead an expedition to Corsica against the French occupation.⁴⁷⁹ Flamin Raiberti, first officer of the State Office of Foreign Affairs of Piedmont-Sardinia, used all his energy to moderate the excesses of this Prince's language and to protect Versailles from false news about Corsica. But in any case, there was once again an operational junction between the paolists and the Jacobites, which passed through the Sardinian-Piedmont Court of Turin.

476 In gazette des Pays-Bas, N°30, 13 July 1769, p 1.

477 In Freeman's Journal, 22 July 1769, Foreign Intelligence, p 2.

478 In MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 487.

479 In Public Record Office - SP98/74 f.140, State Papers Foreign, Tuscany, Letter, Horace Man to Lord Weymouth, 30 August 1769.

At the end of 1769, the Court of Turin was negotiating with the Republic of Genoa over border issues, particularly the thorny problem of the Marquisate of *Final*. The negotiations did not go well. Some people spread the news in Venice that in the event of a diplomatic breakdown between the two states: *“Prince Edward, son of the late Knight St George, will serve as a volunteer in the Piedmontese army”*.⁴⁸⁰

It is understandable that Charles Edward Stuart should have had some personal grievances against the Republic of Genoa, particularly since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles had scuppered his plans. However, the political and military situation in Corsica was far from stable, and as such, there was still hope.

⁴⁸⁰ *In Gazette de Cologne*, 29 December 1769, p 3.

Paolists and Jacobites in the 1770s.

This was a bad time for Paolists and Jacobites alike. Both movements were looking for allies and political opportunities. We will see that their destinies collided several times, on various projects.

In June 1770, the Falklands crisis between Great Britain and Spain led to a difference of opinion between Louis XV and the Duc de Choiseul. At the time, Charles Edward Stuart was living in Senigallia on the Adriatic coast. On August 16th 1770, he arrived in Florence, where he said he was going to Pisa to enjoy the baths and the surrounding area.⁴⁸¹ He was, therefore, precisely where all the Corsican refugees were.

Choiseul, who favored peace over another conflict, was forced to resign by Louis XV on December 24th 1770. While the Paolist exiles in Tuscany welcomed this resignation, it was also good news for the Jacobites, as his replacement, the Duc d'Aiguillon, favored the Stuarts. The Duke of Aiguillon had overseen an unsuccessful project to land in England during the Seven Years' War and had been the embodiment of hope for the Jacobites during that period.⁴⁸² Concerning Corsica, he was categorical: "*The conquest of Corsica was madness.*"⁴⁸³

Against a backdrop of tension with England, from January 1771, support for the Stuarts was once again on the agenda at Versailles, with a possible marriage of the Stuart Pretender to restore his image on the international stage and to force recognition of his royal title by the Vatican. The Duc d'Aiguillon suggested that negotiations be held directly with the Prince in Paris, on condition that he remained incognito.⁴⁸⁴ He instructed the Duke of FitzJames, a senior French army officer and second cousin of Charles Edward Stuart, to arrange for the Prince's travel from Italy. Meanwhile, Colonel Ryan of the Irish Brigade was charged with finding a suitable wife for the Young Pretender.

In London, the government was very alarmed by this situation and the British Ambassador in Paris asked the Duke of Aiguillon for an explanation.⁴⁸⁵ In Tuscany, Sir Horace Mann put all his energy into convincing the Grand Duke of Tuscany not to allow Charles Edward Stuart to settle in Florence. But for Vienna and its Italian satellite states, the Stuart card could also be a card to play in Central Europe, especially as the Jacobites were not closed to any option that might preserve the Stuart dynasty.

481 In DORAN Dr (1876) – Mann and manners at the Court of Florence, Vol. II, London, Bentley & Son, p 211.

482 In PININSKI P. (2010) - Bonnie Prince Charlie, a Life, Stroud, Amberley Publishing, p 71.

483 In Public Record Office - SP 78/283 f.107, State Papers Foreign, France, Letter, Blaquièrre to Rochford, 11 December 1771.

484 In MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 358.

485 In PININSKI P. (2010) - Bonnie Prince Charlie, a Life, Stroud, Amberley Publishing, p 81.

On January 8th 1771, the Young Pretender received the Venetian Ambassador and the Princesses Sapieha and Revandoski to dinner in Rome.⁴⁸⁶ Princess Anna Paulina Sapieha was very active in the Polish Confederation of Bar, an assembly of reform-minded notables who opposed their King Stanislas II, himself supported by Russia. Once again, Charles Edward comes into contact progressive reformist circles. Corsica was not at the forefront of his mind at the time.

At the same time, the Pope and the Sacred College proposed to the King of France: *“to exchange the County of Avignon for Corsica, which arouses the jealousy of the Princes of Italy, which provides pretexts for the enemies of France, which will cost a great deal to subdue, populate and defend.”*⁴⁸⁷

When the Duke of Fitz-James arrived in Italy, numerous English spies tracked down the slightest movements of this escort of the Stuart Pretender, whose trail had been lost at the foot of the Alps at the end of August 1771.⁴⁸⁸ This news dismayed London and gave hope to the Jacobites. He was last reported in Siena on August 17th,⁴⁸⁹ where it was learned that his mother’s friends had asked him to take the road to Poland.⁴⁹⁰ In the end, however, Charles Edward Stuart traveled to Paris, with the permission of the Duke of Fitz-James.⁴⁹¹

Just as Charles Edward Stuart arrived in Paris, James Boswell received Pasquale de Paoli in Scotland, on August 26th 1771 to be precise.⁴⁹² Over the first fortnight of September, Pasquale de Paoli met several Scots who were active members of Stuardist Freemasonry: Peter Ramsay (whose father had been Charles Edward Stuart’s tutor in 1724), Alexander Dick, Professor John Moore, etc. He dined at James Boswell’s house in the company of the Polish Ambassador to Great Britain, with whom he returned to London on September 20th after a two-day journey.⁴⁹³ Most of the economic interests of the last Stuart Pretenders lay in Poland, the country of their mother’s birth. And it is also in this country that the only recognized descendants of Charles Edward Stuart remain. In other words, for three weeks, Pasquale de Paoli was at the heart of multiple networks favorable to the Stuarts.

In Tuscany, Clemente de Paoli, Pasquale’s brother, did not remain inactive. On September 17th, the existence of a project concerning Corsica was revealed in Berlin: seven Paoli emissaries had negotiated an agreement with the Prince of Sardinia-Piedmont, Victor Amédée, transferring suzerainty of Corsica to him in exchange for a large transfer of Sardinian troops to the island.⁴⁹⁴

486 *In* *Courrier du Bas-Rhin*, N°10, 2 February 1771, p 77.

487 *In* *Archives Diplomatiques* - 109CP/854, Rome / *Correspondances Politiques*, Letter, Bernis to Duc d’Aiguillon, 16 January 1771.

488 *In* MAC LYNN F. (1988) - *Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts*, London, Taylor & Francis, p 358.

489 *In* *Public Record Office* – SP 98/76 f. 147, *State Papers Foreign*, Tuscany, Letter, Horace Mann to Rocheford, 20 August 1771.

490 *In* *Gazette van Gend*, N° LXXV, 19 September 1771, p 1.

491 *In* *Archives Diplomatiques* - 109CP/858, Rome / *Correspondances Politiques*, Letter, Bernis to Duc d’Aiguillon, 28 August 1771.

492 *In* *The Scots Magazine*, Volume 33, September 1771, p 481.

493 *Ibid*, p 481.

494 *In* *The London Magazine* - Volume 40, October 1771, p 525.

It cannot be ruled out that this was once again a concerted plan with the Jacobites, for obvious reasons of proximity and political continuity.

Charles Edward Stuart, the Duke of FitzJames and their Jacobite escort remained in Pisa from May 15th to August 17th 1771,⁴⁹⁵ in the city where Clemente de Paoli and several hundred exiled Paolists resided, known under the term *Fuorusciti*. It should be noted that it was on May 27th that Clemente de Paoli received a considerable sum of money from the Tuscan banker Ottofranco to meet the needs of these *Fuorusciti*.⁴⁹⁶ It is not known who made the deposit on behalf of the Corsicans. Clemente de Paoli had a small army of 500 men in Tuscany alone, who regularly raided Corsica.⁴⁹⁷ For the Paolists, it was important to keep the situation in Corsica unstable, as the Duc d'Aiguillon was the man who had opposed the Duc de Choiseul on military intervention in Corsica and whose desire to keep the island was more a question of financial return than real political will.⁴⁹⁸

During the first week of October, Charles Edward Stuart was in Turin and had several private conferences with his cousin, the King of Piedmont-Sardinia, after which he traveled to Genoa.⁴⁹⁹ London was informed that the Polish throne had been discussed. The Stuart Pretender was again in Pisa in mid-October 1771. It is said in Florence that he also had conferences with the Genoese government.⁵⁰⁰ The Duc d'Aiguillon confirmed this fact.⁵⁰¹ On October 16th 1771, in Warsaw, a Prussian correspondent informed his Court that the Confederation of Bar was preparing to elect a new King. Various Catholic Courts were said to be working to have Prince Charles Edward Stuart or General Oginski recognized.⁵⁰²

On 3rd November, concern was expressed in London about this possibility, as Prince Stuart, a direct descendant of King John Sobieski, was likely to be elected.⁵⁰³ On the same day, Warsaw was assured that the Confederation meeting in Biała Podlaska expected Prince Stuart.⁵⁰⁴ That same evening, King Stanislas II was kidnapped from Warsaw and wounded. Catherine II of Russia ended this political enterprise and negotiated with Austria and Prussia to partition Poland. This abortive attempt to make Charles Edward Stuart King of Poland had been prepared for a year by Princess Jablonoswski, a relative of the Sobieskis.⁵⁰⁵

495 *In* MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 358.

496 *In* Gazzetta Toscana, N°23, 1771, p 2.

497 *In* REY D. (1995) - Les Fuorusciti corses en Sardaigne et en Toscane de 1769 à 1789, p.65-82, in *Études corses*, Numéro 45, Ajaccio, La Marge, p 81.

498 *In* EMMANUELLI R. (1989) - L'Équivoque de Corse 1769-1805, Ajaccio, La Marge, p 55.

499 *In* The Scots magazine, Volume XXXIII, November 1771, p 596.

500 *In* Public Record Office – SP 98/76 f. 208, State Papers Foreign, Tuscany, Letter, Horace Mann to Rocheford, 29 October 1771.

501 *In* Archives Diplomatiques - 109CP/856, Rome / Correspondances Politiques, Letter, Duc d'Aiguillon to Bernis, 17 November 1771.

502 *In* Courier du bas-Rhin, N°88, 2 November 1771, p 705.

503 *In* Gazette van Gend, N° XCI, 11 November 1771, p 1.

504 *In* Gazette van Gend, N° LXXX, 11 November 1771, p 1.

505 *In* Public Record Office – SP 98/76 f. 153, State Papers Foreign, Tuscany, Letter, Horace Mann to Rocheford, 3 September 1771.

The uncertainties surrounding the future of Corsica encouraged all kinds of projects for the exiled natives of the island. Even the Corsican notables loyal to Louis XV noted France's gradual military disengagement and feared the return of the Genoese.⁵⁰⁶ In this context of rumours and secret discussions, the Sardinian solution, indirectly linked to the interests of the Stuarts, remained one option among others. While this option might have suited the Paolists and the Jacobites, it came up against the interests of France, which was the widely accepted position in the French diplomatic corps and in the Ministries at the time.⁵⁰⁷

As 1771 drew to a close, Charles Edward Stuart made his intentions clear to Cardinal de Bernis.⁵⁰⁸ He no longer wanted the Pope to recognize him as King of England, but to treat him face to face as King. He wished only for the continuation of his name. Referring to his forthcoming marriage, he clarified that he wanted to ensure a state worthy of his rank for his wife and any children he might have with her, asking the Courts of France and Spain for a pension.

Charles Edward Stuart, who had demanded that he marry a German woman, agreed to take Princess Louise Zu Stolberg Gerden as his wife. This young woman was the granddaughter of Thomas Bruce, one of the most loyal English supporters of James II Stuart, who, after being imprisoned in the Tower of London, was exiled to Brussels. The Vatican had often reproached him for not being married, and this was an opportunity for the young Pretender to try again to obtain recognition of his royal dignity from the Pope. But Rome prioritized the religious tolerance negotiated with George III for Canadian Catholics, whom it did not want to see sacrificed because of the Stuart Pretender's plans. Charles Edward Stuart tried to be introduced to the Pope by the French ambassador, Cardinal de Bernis. Cardinal de Bernis reported to Versailles: "*Prince Edward would have liked me to have made representations to the Pope to obtain for him the same treatment as for his father, the Chevalier de Saint-Georges. I know positively that the Pope will not agree to this, so I refused to make this insinuation, as I was in no way authorised to do so by the King's orders. (...) Besides, why upset the Pope, and put him in a bind, by a useless acknowledgment that changes nothing in the state of things? Marriage does not give Prince Edward any new rights*".⁵⁰⁹

506 In EMMANUELLI R. (1989) - L'Équivoque de Corse 1769-1805, Ajaccio, La Marge, p 56.

507 Ibid, p 58.

508 In Archives Diplomatiques - 109CP/857, Rome / Correspondances Politiques, Letters, de Bernis to Duc d'Aiguillon.

509 In Archives Diplomatiques - 109CP/857, Rome / Correspondances Politiques, Letter, Bernis to Duc d'Aiguillon, 31 March 1772.

On April 13th 1772, the Pretender informed Louis XV directly of his forthcoming marriage, saying: *“Your Majesty must feel at the same time that the loss of my Kingdoms puts me in no state to support the rank that my birth gives me”*. On April 14th 1772, Charles Edward Stuart managed to get Cardinal Marefoschi to introduce him to the Vatican Secretary of State, but to no avail.

He left Rome that evening for Marecata, near Ancona, where on April 17th 1772 he married Princess Louise Zu Stolberg Gerden. This union caused a sensation in European capitals and positively impacted the remaining Jacobite faithful. Frederick II of Prussia saw in this union a significant development in the growing hostility between France and England.⁵¹⁰ The English press reported that the King of Prussia had intervened directly with the Stolbergs to arrange the marriage.⁵¹¹

Louis XV did not reply directly to Charles Edward Stuart, but he did instruct the Duc d’Aiguillon to reply to his letter in the following terms: *“His Majesty does not reply, no matter what part he may have in anything that may interest the happiness and satisfaction of this Prince, who also knows the reasons that deprive me of the honour of showing him on this occasion the feelings of my respect and my unbounded devotion”*.⁵¹² It must be understood that His Most Christian Majesty and his Minister of Foreign Affairs could not compromise themselves directly with a Prince who was said to be Protestant and that, more than anything else, this would risk causing a major stir at the Court in London.

During the same period, Clemente de Paoli, residing in his villa at Fucecchio, near Pisa, received regular visits from Corsican and foreign officers.⁵¹³ Incidentally, Clemente de Paoli’s foreign visitors included members of Florence’s Irish Jacobite community, such as Jacques O’Donoghue, whose Florentine palace featured a gallery dedicated to the glory of the Stuarts.⁵¹⁴ Having moved closer to Florence, Clemente de Paoli remained the operational leader of the Paolist resistance, with the goodwill of the Grand Duke of Tuscany.⁵¹⁵

On March 11th 1772, the latter had been informed of a Paolist raid from Livorno bound for Corsica, but this information was not passed on to the French consul.⁵¹⁶ The following May, the French Consul in Livorno complained that five murderers who had returned from Corsica had found refuge in Portoferraio,⁵¹⁷ the town where Emmanuel Stuart was living at the time.

510 *In* MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 362.

511 *In* The Jackson’s Oxford Journal, N°996, 30 May 1772, p 1.

512 *In* Archives Diplomatiques - 109CP/859, Rome / Correspondances Politiques, Letter, Duc d’Aiguillon to Bernis, 3 May 1772.

513 *In* Gazzetta Toscana, N° 32, anno 1772, p 128.

514 *In* CLARKE DE DROMANTIN P. (2005) - Les réfugiés jacobites dans la France du XVIIIe siècle: l’exode de toute une noblesse “pour cause de religion”, Bordeaux, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2005, p 151.

515 *In* REY D. (1995) - Les Fuorusciti corses en Sardaigne et en Toscane de 1769 à 1789, p.65-82, in Études corses, Numéro 45, Ajaccio, La Marge, p 81.

516 *Ibid*, p 73.

517 *Ibid*, p 73.

In May 1772, an English official hiding behind the pseudonym *'The British Spy'* wrote to the Ministers to warn them that the King of France would make Charles Edward Stuart King of Corsica. He was said to have been on one of the French and Spanish frigates that cruised off Corsica for two days.⁵¹⁸ On May 30th, it was confirmed in Prussia that letters from London stated that *"The Court of France had resolved to make an apanage to Prince Stuart and declare him King of Corsica."*⁵¹⁹

This information, which is difficult to verify, has the merit of highlighting this project once again, in a context in which various European newspapers mentioned the possibility of an agreement between the Spanish and French Courts to grant Charles Edward Stuart an apanage following his marriage. Sir Horace Mann confirmed that the Young Pretender and his wife had indeed set sail from Livorno for Naples around mid-April, and then on to Rome.⁵²⁰ This de facto confirms his presence on a Spanish frigate and his probable passage off the coast of Corsica.

It cannot be ruled out that the Duc d'Aiguillon did not think of such a plan, just as it was not difficult for Charles Edward Stuart to benefit once again from the services of his cousin Don Pedro Fitz-James Stuart, commander of the Spanish fleet in the Mediterranean.

However, if this project really existed at Versailles, it must not have met with unanimous approval within the ministerial cabinets and must have come up against the admonitions of certain courts, first and foremost that of London. Another factor to consider is that since 1743 Louis XV had his own secret political cabinet, which often clandestinely opposed his Minister of Foreign Affairs, which could have complicated the Duc d'Aiguillon's task.

The death of Charles Emmanuel III, King of Piedmont-Sardinia, on February 23rd 1773 led to a period of instability. Versailles sought the support of various Italian states for its territorial claims to the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. The King of Naples and the Grand Duke of Tuscany refused to follow the French, and assured the new King, Victor-Amédée III, that the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia could count on their respective friendships and protection.⁵²¹ The new King had been in direct contact with the Paolists and Charles Edward Stuart before his accession to the throne, which was rather positive regarding their shared hopes for Corsica. But for the time being, his main concern was his relations with France. Victor Amédée III worked very quickly to establish his neutrality and secure his kingdom by marrying his sister Marie Thérèse to Charles-Philippe of France on 16 November 1773.

518 *In* The Leeds Intelligencer, N° 976, Tuesday, 26 May 1772, p 4.

519 *In* Courier du Bas-Rhin, N°44, 30 May 1772, p 352.

520 *In* Horace Mann to Horace Walpole, 9 May 1772.

521 *In* Freeman's Journal, 25 September 1773, p 2.

In Corsica in 1773, Paoli's guerrilla operations continued, and Clemente de Paoli's emissaries were actively preparing an uprising. Paolist propaganda gained popularity due to the food shortages in Corsica and the heavy tax burden newly imposed by Versailles.⁵²²

But two major problems threatened to jeopardise this advantageous situation for the paolists: firstly, the various Fuorusciti groups continued to act as they pleased in an undisciplined manner,⁵²³ but above all, the French governor Marbeuf was fully informed and aware of the preparations for a paolist uprising.⁵²⁴

Several Corsican and French observers at the time suspected that the Duke of Aiguillon was deliberately allowing the situation to deteriorate in the interior of the island, to convince Versailles to focus solely on preserving the old Genoese presidia, which alone had real strategic value in both military and commercial terms. Others thought that Marbeuf wanted to let things degenerate to justify requests for additional aid and tax rebates.

The year 1774 was to prove decisive in this context.

522 *In* ROVERE A. (1978) - Pacification, résistance et mouvements populaires en Corse (1770-1774), p 69-108 *In* Etudes Corses - Numéro 10, Bastia, ACSH, p 98.

523 *In* REY D. (1995) - Les Fuorusciti corses en Sardaigne et en Toscane de 1769 à 1789, p.65-82, in *Études corses*, Numéro 45, Ajaccio, La Marge, p 75.

524 *In* ROVERE A. (1978) - Pacification, résistance et mouvements populaires en Corse (1770-1774), p 69-108 *In* Etudes Corses -Numéro 10, Bastia, ACSH, p 104.

The defeat of the Paolists in 1774 and consequences for the Jacobites.

From January 1774 onwards, the unrest in Corsica accelerated. On January 7th 1774, when Balagne was a frequent landing place for the Fuorusciti paolistes, a detachment of the Corsican Provincial Regiment went to Palasca village and fired on unarmed villagers. This gratuitous violence was a reaction to the losses they had suffered the previous day at Castifao, where the men of the paolist Antonio detto Capracinta killed their captain, Gio Battista Buttafuoco. The Royal Military Junta of Caccia was directly targeted by this paolist action. The circumstances of his death by gunfire and the identity of his assassin are recorded on his death certificate in Castifao village.⁵²⁵

In this climate, Clemente de Paoli commissioned his cousin Nicodemo Pasqualini to set up war councils on the island. Pasqualini organized a clandestine Consulta on Monte Stello in early February 1774.⁵²⁶

In this context, in Tuscany, the island of Elba became militarised, and on February 16th: *“We learn from Porto-Ferraio that 114 men have recently been enrolled to form the militia that this place must maintain, and which must make up a company of 120 men. The appointment of the officers of this troop is reserved for the Grand Duke, who will soon designate those he has chosen. The soldiers must be between 16 and 40 years of age and be natives of the country”*.⁵²⁷ The following February 18th, the Grand Duke of Tuscany issued a decree appointing the officers of this company, including Giuseppe Mibelli as lieutenant of the Portoferraio company.⁵²⁸ The Vatican press picked up this decree of appointment.⁵²⁹ The same newspaper reported that a papal frigate was calling at Portoferraio that very day.⁵³⁰ Many precisions must be made. Giuseppe Mibelli was the son of Captain Mibelli, a Tuscan soldier who died on 10th June 1769. Above all, he was the son-in-law of Emmanuel Stuart, who lived with him in Portoferraio. Charles Edward Stuart was also living in Rome at the time when this papal galley opportunely found refuge on the island of Elba.

Giuseppe Mibelli never took up his posting to Portoferraio,⁵³¹ and left for Corsica with his entire family shortly afterwards. As well as being an experienced soldier in the prime of life (aged 39) and a master gunsmith, Manuel Stuart must certainly have had other qualities, which were mobilized as part of the agreements reached between Paolists and Stuart supporters in Tuscany. It is difficult to seriously envisage any other hypothesis to explain his definitive move to Corsica.

525 In Archives Départementales de la Haute Corse - E 99/7, Dépôt des Communes, Castifao.

526 In ROVERE A. (1978) - Pacification, résistance et mouvements populaires en Corse (1770-1774), p 69-108 In Etudes Corses -Numéro 10, Bastia, ACSH, p 100.

527 In Gazette de Nice, 1st March 1774, p 4.

528 In Gazzetta Toscana, N°10, anno 1774, p 35.

529 In Notizie del Mondo, 5 March 1774, N° 19, p 152.

530 In Notizie del Mondo, 22 February 1774, N° 16, p 124.

531 In Archivio della biblioteca comunale Fioresana - C22, Lettere, Negozi, etc... 1772-1780.

Before returning to the sequence of military events in Corsica, it is important to consider some political considerations in 1774. Firstly, the Grand Duke of Tuscany's interest in the Paolist initiatives in Corsica was both political and strategic. He paid particular attention to the close correspondence between Pasquale de Paoli and his fellow Florentine Raimondo Cocchi, of which he kept copies of 40 letters.⁵³² A reformer, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, was working on a project for a constitutional monarchy that he would have liked to see tried out in a small country like Corsica.

Simultaneously, the Sardinian plan for Corsica was still on the cards, but it was proving difficult to negotiate with France and the Republic of Genoa. On May 10th 1774, the death of Louis XV precipitated the course of events in Corsica. The Comte de Marbeuf was recalled to Versailles and left the interim government of Corsica to the Comte de Narbonne. Narbonne, who was very well informed about the plans of the paolists, ordered the complete disarmament of the Corsicans.

While Marbeuf tried to convince Versailles that the solution in Corsica could only be a military one, the entire island interior rose up in the last week of May 1774. On May 30th 1774, after crushing a French troop at Campoloro, the paolist Pace Maria Falconetti, leading 500 men, seized the convent of *Caccia*,⁵³³ which, along with the Niolo region, became the nerve center of the uprising. At the same time, Tomé Cervoni from Soveria led the Paolist troops who attacked the French regiments in the *Pieve*⁵³⁴ of Talcini, Bozzio, Vallerustie, and Rostino. From Nebbio, Matteo Cesare de Petriconi led his men down the Golo. Despite this intense Paolist campaign, too many village communities failed to respond to the call to arms. The following June 7th, 50 grenadiers and 50 chasseurs from the Regiment *de la Fère* attempted to retake Caccia, but were repulsed by the paolists.⁵³⁵

Sixteen French battalions finally crushed the Corsican revolt, and many atrocities were committed against the Corsican population. The Niolo suffered the most from this repression. This episode shocked Sir Horace Mann in Florence, who described the "butchery" committed by the French: "*the French slaughtered 6,000 horned animals and left no trace of the houses*".

On June 23rd, eleven Corsicans were hanged as an example. Other entire regions dealing with the Paolists were devastated: Fiumorbo, Bozzio, Vallerustie, Balagna, and Talavo.

532 In TRAMPU A. (2014) - Tra Corsica e Toscana : Emer de Vattel e i percorsi del costituzionalismo settecentesco, p 61-79 in Etudes Corses - Numéro 78, Ajaccio, Albiana/ACSH, p 71.

533 In Gazette de Leyde, 12 July 1774, Supplément, p 8.

534 Corsican County based on parishes.

535 In ROUX C. (1984) - Les Makis de la résistance corse, 1772-1778, Paris, France Empire, p 96.

The new bloody and repressive episode in Corsica was compounded by some very bad news for the Paolists and Jacobites from Versailles: no sooner had the Duke of Aiguillon resigned than on June 17th 1774 the Duke of Choiseul once again paid his respects to the new King. The new Minister of War, the Comte du Muy, had this to say about Corsica: *“Those who claim that the conquest of Corsica is only onerous for France no doubt ignore how necessary Cape Corsica is to us for our important trade with the east. The foreign nations feel the advantage so well that there is reason to presume that a jealous power is fomenting the continual revolts of the bandits on this island”*.⁵³⁶

Against this backdrop of general defeat, Clemente de Paoli's letter of July 2nd 1774 to the Paolists who were still holding out in the Corsican mountains may come as a surprise; he advised Nicodemo Pasqualini to continue the guerrilla warfare to show the European Courts that France was not yet in control.⁵³⁷ Not only does this support the Comte du Muy's statement, but it also sounds more like a means of exerting pressure on the negotiations underway than a real encouragement to wage a war of attrition in Corsica. This was indeed the case because in July 1774, rumors spread throughout Europe about the transfer of Corsica to the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia.

On July 8th in Turin, it was announced that: *“His Highness the King of Sardinia is making great preparations to take possession of the island of Corsica, which has been ceded to him by France (...) A fleet of 14 ships of the line is currently being prepared at Cagliari to embark a corps of troops under the orders of the Duke of Chablais, his majesty's brother, to take possession of the island”*.⁵³⁸ This news was confirmed in Vienna, Berlin, Amsterdam and London, where the press reported *“an offensive and defensive agreement between Sardinia and France and the forthcoming marriage of the Prince of Piedmont and Princess Adélaïde of France”*.⁵³⁹ Were the negotiations about to conclude with an agreement on Corsica? For the Stuart Pretender, without the possible support of the Duke of Aiguillon through his cousin FitzJames, the chances of a successful agreement were slim.

However, it seems that Charles Edward Stuart still believed in one. From mid-July 1774, he lived in Pisa with his wife and displayed an extraordinary amount of pomp.⁵⁴⁰ The Stuart couple stayed in Pisa for two months, as close as possible to the last Fuorusciti paolistes who were still leaving to carry out the last significant raids in Corsica.

536 *In* Gazette de Berne, Saturday, 30 July, p 3.

537 *In* ROVERE A. (1978) - Pacification, résistance et mouvements populaires en Corse (1770-1774), p 69-108 *In* Etudes Corses -Numéro 10, Bastia, ACSH, 100.

538 *In* The Scots Magazine, August 1774, p 387.

539 *In* The Gentlemen's Magazine, August 1774, p 389.

540 *In* Journal politique, 1st to 15 August 1774, p 47.

Throughout August, Charles Edward Stuart and his wife led a lavish lifestyle they had not enjoyed living in the Ecclesiastical State.⁵⁴¹ At that time, an important Court that followed him resided in two very distinct places: the royal couple lived in Cevoli, 20 kilometers east of Livorno. The rest of his Court was at Nervi, 8 kilometers south of Genoa, in other words, as close as possible to the negotiations on Corsica. At the end of August 1774, we could still read the following about the negotiations between Versailles and Turin concerning Corsica: *"If the public rumor is to be believed, this monarch has agreed to the possession of Corsica."*⁵⁴² On 6th September, the negotiations seemed to be well advanced.⁵⁴³

The Sardinian project collapsed in September 1774 and the reasons for this diplomatic failure are open to question. Some have seen the influence of Choiseul, who once again had the ear of several French ministers and helped to raise the stakes, mainly in terms of exchanges of territory between France and Savoy. This failure marked the end of all personal and political hope for Clemente de Paoli and Charles Edward Stuart. For the Stuart Pretender, it was an ultimate defeat he would never overcome. He was received privately by the Grand Duke of Tuscany and settled in Florence. During 1775, he sank into depression and alcohol; even his worst enemy and neighbor, Sir Horace Mann, spoke of the *"poor man"* he had become.⁵⁴⁴ His married life was also ruined and his health declined rapidly.

On 28 May 1778, George Keith, Earl Marischal, died in his adopted Prussia, taking to his grave his secrets, his keys for encrypting coded Jacobite letters, and everything that might have helped us find out more about the plans to establish a Stuart Pretender in Corsica, a plan that was definitively over. On a strictly personal level, Earl Marischal had no sympathy for Charles Edward Stuart, whose unquestioning decisions and sometimes lack of perspective he detested. Beyond this private disagreement, Earl Marischal remained loyal all his life to the interests of the Royal House of Stuart, which he linked to the destiny of the Corsican people.

In March 1779, Charles Edward Stuart, who was ill, asked Sir Horace Mann to show him a memorandum concerning negotiations in progress between London and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The request being approved, he declared that he was very pleased with it and that *"he will fight for this cause against any Frenchman he meets"*.⁵⁴⁵

541 *In* Gazette de Cologne, N°LXVIII, supplément, 26 August 1774.

542 *In* Gazette de Leyde, Tuesday, 30 August 1774, Supplément, p 6.

543 *In* Gazette de Berne, N°75, 17 September 1774, p 1.

544 *In* PININSKI P. (2010) - Bonnie Prince Charlie, a Life, Stroud, Amberley Publishing, p 59.

545 *In* DORAN Dr (1876) – Mann and manners at the Court of Florence, Vol. II, London, Bentley & Son, p 355.

The influence of Jacobitism after Charles Edward Stuart's death

In the last years of his life, Charles Edward Stuart remained a tragic icon for all those who had supported him, and he continued to receive prestigious visitors both in Florence and in Rome, where he lived shortly before his death. In 1780 John Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute was again the target of a press campaign against his support for the Stuart Dynasty.⁵⁴⁶

Among his last loyal followers, we are particularly interested in Earl Pembroke. Boswell reminded him in 1782: "*I hope you will never forget that you are a Corsican*",⁵⁴⁷ which in Jacobite parlance can have a double meaning. Between 1784 and 1785, Earl Pembroke was in Florence and regularly dined with Charles Edward Stuart and his daughter Charlotte. Even more surprising was his direct intervention in 1787 with the British government on behalf of the dying Prince, especially his daughter's rights to financial assets confiscated since 1689 by the British Crown. He succeeded in getting the British Parliament to vote to transfer part of these assets to the Stuart Pretenders. Charles Edward Stuart opposed this out of dignity, and it was probably his last political decision.⁵⁴⁸

When Charles Edward Stuart fell seriously ill in 1784, the question of his succession by the Cardinal of York worried some Hanoverian Englishmen. On this point, Sir Horace Mann was categorical, declaring that he had maneuvered so well in Rome in 1766, "*that no future pope will allow the Cardinal of York to proclaim himself King of England*".⁵⁴⁹ The death of Charles Edward Stuart on 31st January 1788 ended political Jacobitism and installed a legendary figure, Charles III Stuart for nostalgic Jacobites and "Bonnie Prince Charlie" more affectionately. A few days before his death, the British government made the new Governor of Australia, Arthur Phillip, promise not to restore Charles Edward Stuart to the throne of England.⁵⁵⁰

However, the page of Jacobitism was far from turned in England. In 1812, a natural grandson of Charles Edward Stuart published an article in London criticizing the authoritarianism of the Hanoverians, without fully realizing the consequences. In August 1817, the Secretary of State Lord Simouth sent a British agent to Paris, John Schrader, to physically eliminate the last Stuart offspring, however illegitimate he might be. The operation failed because the French services refused to collaborate.⁵⁵¹

546 In LOVAT-FRASER J.A (1912) - John Stuart Earl of Bute, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 80.

547 In COLOMBANI M.J (2019) - Naples et la Corse, deux étapes du Grand Tour d'un libertin en quête de vertu, James Boswell (1740-1795), in VERGE-FRANCESCHI Michel Dir, La Corse et Naples, 2019 Ajaccio, Editions Alain Piazzola, p 92.

548 In The Gentlemen's Magazine, Vol. 77 - Part. II, September 1807, p 883.

549 In Horace Mann to Horace Walpole, Florence, Letter, 18 September 1784.

550 In MAC LYNN F. (1988) - Charles Edward Stuart: A tragedy in many acts, London, Taylor & Francis, p 397.

551 In Pininski P. (2011) - Lord Sidmouth attempt to 'eliminate' Charles Edward Stuart's grandson in The Stewarts - Vol. 23 / N°4, Edimbourg, Stewart Society, p 343.

The royal Jacobite title reverted to Cardinal Henry Benedict Stuart, who was crowned Henry IX by the last loyal Jacobites in Rome. Although the last diehard Irish Jacobites continued to call him "*His Majesty the King*", the Cardinal of York informed the Vatican that he would continue to appear publicly as Cardinal and that the royal title would remain incognito, with no further claim to the British crown.⁵⁵² With this last Prince Stuart, the royal Jacobite title took on more of an honorary function, symbolizing the Royal House of Stuart's historical heritage rather than a title signifying de facto the continuity of the political struggle against the Hanoverians. This stood except for the staunchest Jacobites like Officer John O'Dea (who had served at Porto Longone), or the most distrustful English agents and officials.

As early as 1786, the Scottish clergy debated whether a Cardinal without descendants could be a King, which meant the de facto extinction of the Royal House of Stuart. It was decided that the royal title inherited from the Stuarts would pass to the King of Piedmont-Sardinia on the death of the Cardinal of York.⁵⁵³ This decision demonstrates the extent to which the support of the King of Piedmont-Sardinia for the Stuart cause had been recognized, and validates the search for a multilateral political agreement concerning Corsica from 1766 to 1774, as mentioned above.

In the last decade of the eighteenth century, as the French Revolution shook all European monarchies, Jacobitism, apart from a still active minority, gradually became more romantic in nature. This romanticism was also a way for the Scots to preserve their identity in the face of cultural repression imposed by London.

However, the European networks that had developed around this cause had not disappeared, and family alliances, similarities of combat, and friendships endured. Such a network could explain some of the various political alliances on the European scene.

Pasquale de Paoli could not help but identify with the republican ideals of the French Revolution. The Convention's decree of 30 November 1789 authorized all Corsicans in exile to return home. On April 3rd 1790, Paoli arrived in Paris. On April 16th, he spent the evening with the Countess of Albania, widow of Charles Edward Stuart, of whom he said: "*If I had anything to do with her, the friendship that cannot be denied her would quickly turn into the twin sister of love*".⁵⁵⁴ This is a concrete example of how old networks can continue to exist, and how their interpersonal skills can still be used to facilitate political action, as Paoli would soon find out.

552 In SHIELD A. (1908) - Henry Stuart Cardinal of York and his times, London, Longmans & Green, p 265.

553 Ibid, p 276.

554 In VERGE-FRANCESCHI M. (2005) - Paoli : un Corse des lumières, Paris, Fayard, p 435.

Pasquale de Paoli, General Charles Stuart and the Anglo-Corsican kingdom.

First, we must examine the reasons for Pasquale de Paoli's break with the French Revolutionary Convention. Amongst other reproaches was the accusation by some members of the Convention that Paoli was responsible for the failure of the Sardinian expedition and had secretly negotiated with the English. The Conventional Salicetti called for his arrest on January 28th 1793. To counter the first accusation, one need only recognise that it was the three Corsican battalions supplied by Paoli that prevented the Marseille troops from being massacred in Sardinia.⁵⁵⁵ On the second point, Dorothy Carrington clarified matters: "*Paoli did not contact the English; on the contrary, it was the English who approached Paoli intending to obtain an agreement for the cession of St Florent to Great Britain in exchange for which Corsican independence would be respected.*"⁵⁵⁶

Furthermore, his first contact with the English came after Salicetti's accusations. Be that as it may, faced with the intransigence of the Convention, a Consulta was convened in Corté city on 23 May 1793. 1,009 delegates, plus a further 2,037 participants, voted to break with France,⁵⁵⁷ in a state of legitimate resistance to oppression. From this point onwards, an internal civil war would pit the paolist republicans against the Republicans loyal to the French Convention. Fighting occurred all over the island: "*News from Corsica mentions that General Paoli fought against the French around Monticello, Castifao, and Pietralba, during which he killed many of them and took many prisoners.*"⁵⁵⁸

Pasquale de Paoli knew that in the balance of power of Corsica against France, the two countries were too unevenly matched. France had been at war with Great Britain since July 1st 1793. In a letter to the English admiral Hood dated August 25th 1793, Paoli implored Great Britain for military protection. George III agreed to support him only because he was the most powerful man in Corsica.⁵⁵⁹

When the British squadron arrived in Corsica, Colonel John Moore was tasked with finding out about the military situation on the island and Paoli's intentions. He landed in Balagne on January 9th 1794. Hood attributed the English military successes in Corsica to this zealous intelligence mission.⁵⁶⁰

555 In FRESET J. (1827) – Histoire de la Maison de Savoie, Tome 3, Turin, Albiana, p. 338.

556 In CARRINGTON D. (1995) - La Création du Royaume anglo-Corse : Préméditations et tractations (1793), p 95-99 in PALMIERI J. Dir. - Actes du Colloque tenu à Bastia sur le Royaume Anglo-Corse, B.S.S.H.N.C N° 670-671, Biguglia, SSHNC, p 95.

557 In GRAZIANI A. M. (2002) - Pascal Paoli, Père de la patrie Corse, Paris, Tallandier, p 316.

558 In Kentish Gazette, Friday, 3 January 1794, p 3.

559 In CARRINGTON D. (1981) - Sources de l'Histoire de Corse au Public Record Office (1776-1796), p 47-61 In B.S.S.H.N.C N° 641,4e Trimestre 1981, Biguglia, SSHNC, p 54.

560 In DEBRETT J. (1795) - State Papers relative to the War against France, Vol. II, London, Burlington House, p 68.

On the 14th of the same month, Colonel John Moore led an official delegation to Paoli in Murato. This soldier was the son of Professor John Moore, who had entertained Pasquale de Paoli at dinner in Glasgow in 1771 and had fought alongside Charles Edward Stuart in 1745. During his Grand Tour of Italy, younger Colonel John Moore met Charles Edward Stuart in Florence in 1775. The man who introduced Sir Elliot, an envoy of King George III, to Paoli, was directly linked to the Scottish networks with which Pasquale de Paoli was very familiar.

Paoli was aware of the expectations of the Nationals, who had retaken the island's interior without any outside help and who now "*gathered in the squares and awaited the promises of freedom*".⁵⁶¹ One Paolist warlord, the staunch republican Carluccio de Caccia (Carlo Felice Grimaldi d'Esdra), took offense at the request for support from the British monarchy and opposed Paoli in front of the delegation.⁵⁶² This fact illustrates the difficulties faced by Pasquale de Paoli on the island, who had to deal with his internal opposition, which was pro-independence, republican, and anti-royalist, wage war on the supporters of the Paris government and be wary of Royalists who had emigrated and were tempted to return to Corsica.

As a political agreement between Paoli and Elliot seemed to emerge, the British military intervention entered its effective phase. To take the last strongholds held by troops loyal to the Convention, naval operations were entrusted to Horatio Nelson, and landing and land operations to General Charles Stuart, who was thought to have superior military skills. He landed on May 15th 1794, and Bastia capitulated on the 23rd. On the 28th, Paoli sent a letter to King George III congratulating him on the capture of Bastia.⁵⁶³ Charles Stuart was the younger brother of Lord Mount Stuart, 1st Marquis of Bute, the man who had visited Corsica in 1768 and 1769. General Charles Stuart was a British patriot who did not hold George III in high esteem. He had the words "*The King gets everything from us and we get nothing from the King*" engraved on his rifle. This jeopardized his military career. Therefore, he was another key figure from the same Scottish networks linked to the Paolists. On hearing of the fall of Bastia, Officer Theobald Dillon asked the Under-Secretary of State Evan Nepean to allow him to go and fight in Corsica.⁵⁶⁴ He was the great nephew of Arthur Dillon, the man who had informed James III Stuart of Cammock's presence in Corsica. It was no coincidence.

561 In Archivio di Stato di Torino – Mazzo 1, Corti Straniere, Corsica, Letter, Paoli to Consul de Piemont-Sardaigne in Livorno, 26 January 1794.

562 In VIEUSSEUX G.P (1846) Archivio Storico Italiano, Tomo XI, Firenze, Vieusseux, p 481.

563 In Public Record Office – HO 42/32/186 f. 261, Home Office, Domestic Correspondance, George III, Letter, Paoli à George III, 28 May 1794.

564 In Public Record Office – HO 42/31/64 f.164, Home Office, Domestic Correspondance, Letter, Theobald Dillon to Evan Nepean, 9 June 1794.

The plan for an Anglo-Corsican government for Corsica was the subject of lengthy discussions and several disagreements between Sir Gilbert Elliot and Pasquale de Paoli. Very early on, Sir Elliot complained to London about Paoli.⁵⁶⁵ At the Consulta held in Corté from June 10th to 15th 1794, the Constitution of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was adopted. Much to Paoli's dismay, George III appointed Sir Gilbert Elliot Viceroy. Disagreements between the latter and Paoli persisted, particularly over the inadequacy of the British troops landing in Corsica.⁵⁶⁶

For the time being, Calvi had not surrendered and the most urgent thing was to organize the military offensive there. On June 29th, General Charles Stuart Marched on Calvi with 600 men and a battalion of Corsican volunteers. Paoli knew that the military involvement of the Corsicans was important to create a political balance of power with Elliot, but many were reluctant to go to Calvi. Many English soldiers fell ill on the spot and the few Corsicans present distinguished themselves particularly well in battle. General Charles Stuart said of them: "*No troop in the world can behave better.*"⁵⁶⁷

When his old comrade-in-arms, Achille Murati, asked to be exempted, Paoli replied, "*The general order has been given for all the families of the Jacobite Party, and no exceptions can be made.*"⁵⁶⁸ Paoli commonly used the word "*Giacobini*" in his correspondence, but here he was referring to the "*Partito Giacobito*", which included Stuart, Stewart, Moore, Campbell, Hay, Duncan, Douglas Wemyss, MacDonald, Gordon, and so many others who were in Calvi, and whose families he knew very well had Jacobite roots. In other words, the Corsicans could not withdraw while the Scottish allies were active.

On August 2nd 1794, the general assault was made on Calvi, during which the Corsican volunteers suffered a few casualties, including Lieutenant-Colonel Sabattini.⁵⁶⁹ At 9 a.m. on August 10th, Calvi capitulated and military operations ceased in the Balagna area. On August 12th, General Stuart informed Henry Dundas, Secretary of State for War, of the victory. He emphasized the decisive role played by the two Corsican battalions (Giampietri and Sinibalbi) in a night attack on the French battery at Mollino-Ciesco alongside the grenadiers of the Royal Irish,⁵⁷⁰ and in particular, their Captain, Donald MacDonald. The Court in London made this communication available to the public.

565 In CARRINGTON D. (1981) - Sources de l'Histoire de Corse au Public Record Office (1776-1796), p 47-61 In B.S.S.H.N.C.N° 641,4e Trimestre 1981, Biguglia, SSHNC, p 56.

566 In ARRIGHI J.M., JEHASSE O. (2008) - Histoire de la Corse et des Corses, Paris, Perrin, p 371.

567 In Archivio di Stato di Torino – Mazzo 1, Corti Straniere, Corsica, Letter, Paoli to Consul de Piemont-Sardaigne in Livorno, 2 July 1794.

568 In Jean Marcel Leccia private fund, Letter, Paoli to Murati, 29 July 1794.

569 In The Scots Magazine, N° 56, 1794, p 371.

570 In Whitehall dispatch, 1st September 1794.

After the victory at Calvi, Colonel John Moore proposed to General Charles Stuart that they tour Corsica to ascertain the feelings of the island's population. They traveled around Corsica for over a month, with Captains St Clair and Duncan, issued from old Scottish Jacobite families, at their side.⁵⁷¹ Other Scots and Irish with this profile were stationed on the island, notably in the Royal Irish Guard Regiment, which took possession of Calvi, and in the Highlanders guarding the Palazzu in Corté, including Colonel George Gordon, Marquis of Huntly. This regiment of Highlanders, the 92nd Infantry Regiment, included elements of the former French Jacobite Royal Scots Regiment. Among these men was a certain Butler, whose mother was Corsican!⁵⁷² Could there be a link with the family of James Butler, the 2nd Duke of Ormond?

On October 3rd 1794, General Charles Stuart completed his journey. When he arrived in Corté, he found that Sir Elliot had completely neglected the military hospital, causing casualties among the wounded and sick who had returned from the siege of Calvi.⁵⁷³ A memorable dispute broke out with Sir Elliot, who clarified: "*He did not have to refer to his authority for all matters concerning the army, at least until Sir Elliot had a commission from the King giving him this command*".⁵⁷⁴ Thirteen letters were exchanged between October 12th and 16th 1794 concerning the dispute between Sir Elliot and General Stuart over military command and the island's defense plan.⁵⁷⁵ The rupture between the two men was total.

In accordance with Viceroy Elliot's decree of November 6th 1794, General Charles Stuart, with the help of Pasquale de Paoli, set up three royal Anglo-Corsican battalions. Viceroy Elliot modified the entire organization. General Stuart had prioritized the military effectiveness of these units by establishing five companies of 100 men per battalion, to unify the command and guarantee good pay for the soldiers. Sir Elliot reorganized the battalions into 10 companies of 50 men, to increase the number of Corsican officers for purely clientelistic reasons, which reduced the soldiers' pay.⁵⁷⁶

On November 12th, he set up a regiment of light cavalry, the Corsican Light Dragon. Moore, Hay, and Antoni commanded the first squadron. Campbell, Kennedy, and Peraldi commanded the second squadron. This unit was very useful for criss-crossing Corsica, a fact that did not escape Gilbert Elliot's notice. The Viceroy demanded that it be reduced on the grounds that it was useless, and a year later, it was completely disbanded.

571 *In* MACDONALD J (2016) - Sir John Moore: The Making of a Controversial Hero, Barnsley, Pen & Sword, p 56.

572 *In* National Library of Scotland, Blair Collection, Celtic Monthly - Vol 6, 1898, P 329.

573 *In* MACDONALD J (2016) - Sir John Moore: The Making of a Controversial Hero, Barnsley, Pen & Sword, p 57.

574 *In* MOORE J. C. (1834) - The life of Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore K.B – Vol. 1, London, John Murray, p 85.

575 *In* CARRINGTON D. (1981) - Sources de l'Histoire de Corse au Pub lic Record Office (1776-1796), p 47-61 In B.S.S.H.N.C N° 641,4e Trimestre 1981, Biguglia, SSHNC, p 58.

576 *In* MACDONALD J (2016) - Sir John Moore: The Making of a Controversial Hero, Barnsley, Pen & Sword, p59.

General Stuart tried one last mediation with Henry Dundas, explaining that *“he regretted that Sir Gilbert Elliot had never got on with Paoli”*.⁵⁷⁷ Stuart repeatedly defended the idea that the Corsicans needed a soldier (himself) who would reassure them of his ability to defend the island. He also spoke of the fact that while the people of Corsica showed him kindness, affection, and attachment, the Minister should not stop at these trivial considerations to form his opinion of him. As he reviewed his regiments on January 1st 1795 at the Porette in Corté, he once again proposed a defense plan for the island to Viceroy Elliot. According to John Moore: *“The general considered his job with maturity and presented a defense plan to the Viceroy, who, without a single consideration for the general’s opinion, modified it on essential points and assigned officers without taking his recommendations into account.”*⁵⁷⁸ On the following January 29th, Paoli wrote: *“I learn that Chevalier Stuart, who is not in good harmony with the Viceroy, has been dismissed from his command and wants to return to England”*.⁵⁷⁹

At the opening session of Parliament in February 1795, Sir Elliot opposed the appointment of Pasquale de Paoli as Speaker of the House. Elliot sent a lengthy indictment to the Duke of Portland, Secretary of State for the Interior, in which he wrote that he was *“moving the Parliament from Corti to Bastia to escape Paoli’s influence”*.⁵⁸⁰ For Elliot, the fact that Paoli had been elected President of the Chamber meant that *“he is in effect the King of Corsica, and from that moment, all British authority in that country disappears”*. Elliot assured Portland that Paoli had espoused democratic principles incompatible with the Monarchy’s legal constitution. The Paolists had no choice but to capitulate to this political diktat.

Pasquale de Paoli expressed his fear to General Charles Stuart that Great Britain would simply abandon Corsica in the event of a French offensive.⁵⁸¹ Disgusted by the attitudes of Elliot and Pozzo di Borgo, General Charles Stuart left Corsica on February 7th 1795. He returned to London, accompanied by Captains St Clair and Cesari Colonna, to try to influence his government’s position on managing Corsican affairs. On the 17th, Viceroy Elliot wrote to the Duke of Portland that he had decided to invalidate all military postings ordered by General Stuart.⁵⁸² Sir Elliot now intended to muzzle any opposition in Corsica, including by depriving Paoli of his support in key positions in the British army.

577 In STUART WORTLEY E. (1925) – A Prime Minister and his son, London, John Murray, p 247, Letter from Charles Stuart to Henry Dundas, 2 December 1794.

578 In MOORE J. C. (1834) - The life of Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore K.B – Vol. 1, London, John Murray, p 85.

579 In Archivio di Stato di Torino – Mazzo 1, Corti Straniere, Corsica, Letter, Paoli to Consul de Piemont-Sardaigne in Livorno, 22 January 1795.

580 In Public Record Office, FO 20/22 - Home Office, General Correspondence, Corsica, Secret Letter, Elliot to Portland, 22 February 1795.

581 In McERLEAN J. (1995) - Paoli et le Régime Anglo-Corse, p 125 à 132 in PALMIERI J. Dir. - Actes du Colloque tenu à Bastia sur le Royaume Anglo-Corse, B.S.S.H.N.C.N° 670-671, Biguglia, SSHNC, p 126.

582 In Bibliothèque Municipale de Bastia, Fond patrimonial, Côte P 38 2 / 19.

In London, Charles Stuart was Paoli's most loyal supporter, but he also had many friends in Corsica whose activism bore fruit both among British officers and in the Paolist party. Towards the end of February 1795, Colonel John Moore compared Elliot's government to a vast system of corruption for the sole benefit of his despotic power. He fervently hoped that the Corsicans would revolt.⁵⁸³

Viceroy Elliot humiliated the men of a royal Anglo-Corsican battalion by asking them to clean up the streets of Corté, which they refused, arguing that they were soldiers and not servants. Many Corsicans deserted the royal Anglo-Corsican battalions, prompting Viceroy Elliot to promulgate martial law on March 31st 1795 and to hunt down traitors and deserters. Against this backdrop, Carlo Felice Grimaldi d'Esdra was killed at Castifao, and Giovanni Stuart, the only son of the late Emmanuel Stuart, fled.

From April 1795, Colonel Moore was very concerned about the increasing loss of confidence of many Corsicans in their British ally. He discussed very openly with those close to Paoli how to remedy the situation. He claimed that Viceroy Elliot was not defending the interests of the Crown, but those of Pozzo di Borgo's party.⁵⁸⁴

On May 4th 1795, Sir Elliot wrote to the Duke of Portland: "*Paoli's intrigues are still supported by the cabal which General Stuart left behind him (...) He is supported by a faction in Corsica (...) he is working against the administration in Corsica (...) his majesty must support his own government*".⁵⁸⁵ Another Scottish officer was implicated in this plot: Captain Campbell, who regularly visited Paoli.

On May 16th 1795, Colonel John Moore had a long discussion with Pasquale de Paoli, who was now speaking openly against the Viceroy Elliot, even fearing that the latter would make a bad report about him to London.⁵⁸⁶ On July 7th, Moore reported on the situation to General Stuart: "The Viceroy is continuing as he began, a spoilt child led by the nose by Pozzo di Borgo (...) There is not a single place on the island where people are not asking for you and expressing the wish to see you return".⁵⁸⁷ On July 14th 1795, Elliot's aide-de-camp knocked a bust of Paoli to the ground, causing riots in the island's interior.⁵⁸⁸ On July 31st 1795, Sir Elliot spoke for the first time of the existence of an Anglo-Paolist Party whose leader was Colonel John Moore, in the service of Stuart and Paoli.

583 *In* MACDONALD J (2016) - Sir John Moore: The Making of a Controversial Hero, Barnsley, Pen & Sword, p 56.

584 *Ibid*, p 63.

585 *In* Bibliothèque Municipale de Bastia, Fond patrimonial, Côte P 38 2 /19.

586 *In* MACDONALD J (2016) - Sir John Moore: The Making of a Controversial Hero, Barnsley, Pen & Sword, p 63.

587 *In* STUART WORTLEY E. (1925) – A Prime Minister and his son, London, John Murray, p 251, Letter from Moore to Stuart, 7 July 1795.

588 *In* CARRINGTON D. (1981) - Sources de l'Histoire de Corse au Pub lic Record Office (1776-1796), p 47-61 In B.S.S.H.N.C N° 641,4e Trimestre 1981, Biguglia, SSHNC, p 57.

According to him, the aim of this Anglo-Paolist Party was to appoint General Stuart Viceroy of Corsica.⁵⁸⁹ On August 2nd, he wrote to Henry Dundas: *"In everything he does, Paoli always acts in concert with the English supporters of General Stuart"*.⁵⁹⁰ Although he was somewhat gentle with him, he also implicated Lord Huntly.

On August 3rd, Moore informed General Stuart of the deteriorating political situation on the island: *"We have just seen Paoli the other night with Oakes and Lord Huntly (...) He has been unable to prevent the burning (but perhaps that was his wish) of the effigies of Colonna and Pozzo di Borgo in most parts of the country. (...) He regretted the conduct of the Viceroy, which was a real misfortune for his country. He must wish for his removal, but he knows his interests too well, and he is, I think, too good a citizen not to prevent the slightest violence against an Englishman."*⁵⁹¹

In a letter to Galeazzi dated August 17th 1795, Pasquale de Paoli denounced the conduct of the Viceroy Elliot and Pozzo di Borgo, criticizing them for *"waging war and considering as rebels to the King those who offered him the crown of this Kingdom."*⁵⁹² Coincidentally, the day before, Sir Elliot had sent a memorandum of several pages to the Duke of Portland calling for concrete measures to be taken against the activities of Paoli, Stuart, and Moore.

Elliot was very concerned about Stuart's political activity in London, and to calm him, Henry Dundas told him: *"That he has never seen or heard of General Stuart since his return from Corsica"*.⁵⁹³ Through the intermediary of Sir Drake, who was in Italy, British intelligence confirmed Sir Elliot's remarks and informed London at the beginning of September 1795 that *"Paoli is stirring up all the scoundrels in the interior"*.⁵⁹⁴ In a letter dated September 17th 1795, the Duke of Portland asked Viceroy Elliot about Colonel Moore *"whether it would not be advisable to bring this officer before a court martial."*⁵⁹⁵ From the following October, all of Paoli's supporters in the British army were either sent home from Corsica or silenced.

On October 1st 1795, Colonel John Moore received a despatch from the Duke of Portland ordering him to leave Corsica within 48 hours.⁵⁹⁶ The next day, just before leaving the island, he wrote to his father from Bastia to explain that he was being made to pay for his political involvement in Corsica.

589 In Bibliothèque Municipale de Bastia, Fond patrimonial, Côte P 38 2/19, Confidential Note from Vice-Roi Elliot, 31 July 1795.

590 In Public Record Office, FO 20/8 - Home Office, General Correspondence, Corsica, Letter, Gilbert Elliot to Henry Dundas, 7 August 1795.

591 In STUART WORTLEY E. (1925) – A Prime Minister and his son, London, John Murray, p 251, Letter from Moore to Stuart, 3 August 1795.

592 In VIEUSSEUX G.P (1846) Archivio Storico Italiano, Tomo XI, Firenze, Vieusseux, p 537.

593 In Public Record Office, FO 20/8 - Home Office, General Correspondence, Corsica, Letter, Henry Dundas to Elliot, 22 August 1795.

594 In McERLEAN J. (1995) - Paoli et le Régime Anglo-Corse, p 125 à 132 in PALMIERI J. Dir. - Actes du Colloque tenu à Bastia sur le Royaume Anglo-Corse, B.S.S.H.N.C N° 670-671, Biguglia, SSHNC, p 125.

595 In Bibliothèque Municipale de Bastia, Fond patrimonial, Côte P 38 2/19.

596 In MACDONALD J (2016) - Sir John Moore: The Making of a Controversial Hero, Barnsley, Pen & Sword, p 67.

On October 13th 1795, Pasquale de Paoli was ordered to return to England, and Frederick North, Elliott's Secretary of State, was put in charge of the practical details. The Anglo-Paolist party was disbanded, but the situation continued to deteriorate. Just before leaving, Moore had been surprised to see the 100th Infantry Regiment in arms to warn of an attack by factious members of an Anglo-Corsican battalion.

On November 15th 1795, bypassing the ministerial cabinets close to Elliot, General Stuart decided to appeal directly to William Pitt, the Prime Minister of Great Britain: "*With his departure, (Colonel Moore) both officers and soldiers, both British and Corsican, and on all sides, have lost the person they esteemed, and in whom they placed their trust for his military talents. I also regret Paoli's departure, by which Corsica is deprived of the only man capable of controlling disaffection, strengthening the laws, and giving energy to a Government*".⁵⁹⁷

The Corsican revolt against the Viceroy culminated in the *Bistugliu* rally in April 1796. In response, on May 27th 1796, Frederick North decreed the dissolution of all Corsican militias and asked them to return to their homes. On July 7th 1796, Pasquale de Paoli wrote to his friend General Charles Stuart to remind him of his predictions about the abandonment of Corsica, a letter in which he once again expressed all his verve against Sir Elliot.⁵⁹⁸ This letter was premonitory, for on July 8th 1796, Sir Elliot wrote to the authorities in Portoferraio: "*The French troops have occupied the Port of Livorno and fired on the King's ships stationed in the roadstead, notwithstanding the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. This leads us to believe that the French have the same intention concerning Portoferraio and will have an easier means of attempting an offensive against Corsica. This motive has determined me to prevent the enemy's plan, to send a garrison to Portoferraio and to defend this place against any invasion.*"⁵⁹⁹

Rather than admit defeat in Corsica in a state of general insurrection, Elliot, true to form, suggested a strategic withdrawal to the island of Elba! In August, George III gave the order to evacuate Corsica. After Major Knesevich had led a reconnaissance mission and prepared the transfer of troops to Portoferraio, the English left the island. By 22 October 1796, the bulk of George III's troops had left and Elliot's short reign ended. The French army from Italy was soon to land on the island, initiating a 3-year campaign of military pacification. Charles Stuart expressed his regrets to Paoli, writing that he had tried to serve the country as best he could.

597 In STUART WORTLEY E. (1925) – A Prime Minister and his son, London, John Murray, p 251, Letter, Charles Stuart to William Pitt, 3 August 1795.

598 In McERLEAN J. (1995) - Paoli et le Régime Anglo-Corse, p 125 à 132 in PALMIERI J. Dir. - Actes du Colloque tenu à Bastia sur le Royaume Anglo-Corse, B.S.S.H.N.C.N° 670-671, Biguglia, SSHNC, p 126.

599 In NUNCI G. (1898) - Storia dell'Isola dell'Elba, Porto Longone, Nunci, p 210.

During the experience of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, there was, of course, no Jacobite project for the benefit of the Stuarts involving Pasquale de Paoli. It cannot be denied that military officers from former Scottish and Irish Jacobite families allied themselves with Paoli against Elliot's authoritarianism. This persistence of support networks from one generation to the next reflects, to say the least, the high degree of sympathy and trust these old Jacobite families had for Pasquale de Paoli.

As if history wished to pay a final tribute to this agreement between Paolists and Jacobites, Pasquale de Paoli died in London on 5 February 1807 and Henry Benedict Stuart on 13 July 1807, both aged 81.

No trace remains of this unique historical interlude in the official history of Corsica. Despite this forgotten story, the family branch of one Stuart survived on the island. The royal Jacobite title passed to the King of Piedmont-Sardinia, Charles-Emmanuel IV, and his descendants. A commemorative sword knife to the glory of this Royal House was produced in the first half of the nineteenth century. Giovanni Stuart, the only son of Emmanuel Stuart, owned a copy of this knife in Castifau village, which has remained in the Corsican Stuart family from generation to generation, right up to the present day.

Conclusion

Nothing predestined Corsica to play the slightest role in the century-long war of succession between Stuarts and Hanoverians for the British Isles. Of course, eighteenth century Corsican elites educated in the best Italian universities were aware of the unfortunate fate of Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, and even of the existence of a Jacobite movement in support of the exiled royal House of Stuart; but all that was far from their concerns.

Notwithstanding the fact that a central figure of the island's mythology, Sampiero Corso, had had contact with the Stuart family, it all seemed very remote.

Yet Corsica, with a strategic location in the Mediterranean that had dictated the island's role since time immemorial, would necessarily be drawn into the conflicts occurring in its natural geopolitical space, the *Mare Nostrum*. If Jacobites were involved in these conflicts, sooner or later, they would encounter the Corsicans. And the presence of Corsicans in the Spanish and Italian armies automatically led to close encounters.

Above all, it was the Sicilian War of 1718 that opened Jacobite eyes to the full potential of Corsica. This war was the founding act that gave Corsica a place in Jacobite diplomacy; for as we have seen, Jacobite political activity was an inescapable reality on the European political scene throughout at least the first half of the eighteenth century.

As fate would have it, the Corsican revolutions occurred when the Jacobite movement was at the height of its power. The future of Corsica became of interest to the last Stuarts as soon as negotiations could be made directly with the "Corsican malcontents", but this interest is above all credited to the action of one man: Earl Marischal.

Why did the 10th and last Earl Marischal, Lord Protector of Scotland, propose installing a Stuart Pretender on the Corsican throne in 1731? Practical considerations are understandable, but what are we to make of Lord Marischal's political constancy in wanting to entwine the destiny of the Royal House of Stuart with that of Corsica?

The main revelation of this book is that Charles Edward Stuart did indeed have a long-term plan to establish himself in Corsica, a plan supported at different times and in different contexts by Earl Marischal. From then on, Earl Marischal's entourage included people such as Théodore of Neuhoff, James Boswell, and Pasquale de Paoli, the leader of the Independent Republic of Corsica: all mainstay figures in Corsica's historical and cultural mythology. One wonders whether Earl Marischal himself is not one of the most important figures in Corsica's history.

The important nature of the relationship between the Jacobites and Paoli's Corsica is revealed in the unwavering support in terms of propaganda, financial and military aid, by the struggle for influence within the British Parliament to help Corsica, the Corso-Sardinian alliance project, and finally by the help given to Paoli after the battle of Ponte Novu.

It becomes difficult to deny the scope of this plan to give Corsica a Stuart Prince, a plan that was publicly mentioned seven times (1731, 1736, 1741, 1753, 1766, 1769, 1772). Like the Corsicans, Charles Edward Stuart was a victim of French duplicity. Both were manipulated to serve the interests of France, whose acquisition of Corsica remains the major act of its foreign policy in the 18th century. The great conflicts of the century and various political reversals destroyed any hope of seeing this project succeed. This book is intended as the first reference text on the reality of the historical links between the Royal House of Stuart and Corsica.

In the general context of the Age of Enlightenment, the interest shown by Jacobites, philosophers, and the most enlightened of the sovereigns in the constitutional future of Paoli's Corsica is also noteworthy. Questions of constitutional reform rejoin the conservative republicanism of Earl Marischal and Charles Edward Stuart, from whom King Gustav III of Sweden drew some inspiration for implementing his measure of equal rights for Swedes. The reforming sovereigns, the King of Piedmont-Sardinia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, helped the Stuart Pretender and Pasquale de Paoli with their projects.

These questions of constitutionality have a definite echo in twenty-first-century Europe, where the problem of the rights of stateless nations calls into question the institutional framework of sovereign states. Once again, the democratic aspirations of the Corsican and Scottish peoples are being expressed simultaneously, as was already the case in the eighteenth century. Clearly, the traditions of Scottish and Corsican demands are aligned.

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The first edition met with great success in Corsica and was the subject of a number of conferences over two years. It received positive reviews in the press, such as in *La Revue Française de Généalogie* [The French Review of Genealogy] which described the work as "A scholarly book... devoted to an almost unknown subject, at the crossroads of history, politics and genealogy"



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